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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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EAST EUROPE REPORT
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GDR ROLE IN USSR'S SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES OUTLINED

Hamburg AUSSENPOLITIK in German Vol 35 No 4, 1984 pp 373-393

[Article by Prof Dr Boris Meissner: "The GDR in the Soviet System of Alliances"]

[Text] By its incorporation in the Soviet Union's multilateral and bilateral system of alliances, the GDR has a special place by the side of the dominant power in the socialist community in particular and the socialist world system in general. In the course of several decades, it has strengthened its ties and, consequently, its dependence on Moscow. However, Prof Dr Boris Meissner, Institute for Eastern Law at Cologne University, also notes a trend that is increasing the political influence and, to some extent, the independence of the GDR, and, under Honecker, extended the scope for serving specific GDR interests. The GDR first joined the inner circle of the Soviet system of alliances by way of the Warsaw Pact. Subsequently it assumed steadily closer ties and greater obligations by way of the treaty on sovereignty, the treaty on integration, and the Bloc treaty. In the outer circle, the GDR surpasses all other Soviet satellites by virtue of the quantity and intensity of political cooperation treaties. This applies in particular to the Afro-Asian Third World countries, acknowledged by Moscow to follow a socialist orientation. Moreover, SED agreements with Third World unity parties, relating to cooperation in the field of ideology, to organizational structure and cadre training, lend weight to the GDR as the Soviet Union's partner in the North-South relationship. The GDR had always been the outstanding champion of integration and Bloc formation in Eastern Europe. Its special relationship with the Soviet Union was designed to consolidate the regime's dominance at home but also to allow it to achieve the status of a junior partner. Of course the crises in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union's economic situation and the inadequate integration within the Bloc have changed the situation. Economic relations with the West and, above all, inner-German trade have gained increasing importance for the GDR. Nor did Honecker join the Soviet refusal of a dialogue on arms limitation.

I. The GDR's Special Role in the Soviet Union's Politico-Military System of Alliances

The consequences of World War II and the East-West conflict resulted in the emergence of a bipolar power system that continues to dominate international politics, despite many changes. The Soviet Union, the dominant power in the East, sometimes describes its sphere of power and influence as the "socialist world system," sometimes as the "socialist community." Both these terms are to be found in the chapter on foreign policy of the USSR Federal Constitution now in effect.¹ Only after Stalin's death did they evolve in the Soviet Union's international doctrine (representing the external aspect of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Soviet interpretation).

When the Eastern Bloc was still a monolith, it was customary to describe it as the "socialist camp." Since the Soviet Government's policy statement of 30 October 1956, shortly before the suppression of the popular revolt in Hungary, the term "socialist community" became current usage instead. The 1961 CPSU program sometimes also uses the phrase "socialist world community." This was on the one hand to emphasize the intercontinental nature of the communist system of states, on the other provide the connection with the "socialist world system," proclaimed at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956, and including in a wider meaning the non-governing communist parties and their close allies also. Among them are the unity parties, termed "national democratic," in those developing countries which are now described as "states with a socialist orientation," but formerly usually known as "states of national democracy."

With the growth of the Soviet Union's self-confidence as a world power (perceptibly so for some years past), the differences between the two terms tended to fade. Though both were still used, Brezhnev seemed to prefer the term "socialist world system" even when talking about the narrower Soviet sphere of power and interests. Because they are cited in Article 30 of the Union Constitution, it was difficult to keep them apart in their regional references. The first definition from the Soviet standpoint did not arise until the Central Committee report to the Twentysixth CPSU Congress in 1981. According to this, in addition to the Soviet Union and the European people's democracies Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the GDR, the Asian people's democracies of Mongolia, Vietnam and Laos as well as Cuba are members of the "socialist community." Afghanistan, occupied by Soviet forces, and Kampuchea, occupied by the Vietnamese Army, are not considered parts of the "socialist community." The same applies to Yugoslavia, Albania, the People's Republic of China and, to a certain extent also to North Korea; all are considered socialist states outside the community. They are, however, included in the "socialist world system" in the wider meaning, which embraces the entire international communist movement.

Under Andropov, the existence of the "socialist community" was again officially confirmed. From the territorial aspect it is smaller than the original Eastern Bloc.² Only its European core now enjoys regional integrity--coupled with stronger treaty ties--, justifying the designation "Soviet Bloc." Among the non-European community members, only Mongolia is included due

to equally strong de facto ties. The Soviet Union's hegemony affects the other sections of the community to a greater or lesser extent.

As a consequence of expansive Soviet foreign policy, two circles of the Soviet system of alliances have emerged. One inner circle, represented an integrated hegemonial-imperial alliance (though not without tensions), and an outer circle characterized by the great variety of treaty relations.³ These two circles overlap in the non-European part of the "socialist community."

Due to the dual structure of the socialist states, relations arise not only between the respective governments but also between the ruling communist parties. These are largely regularized in law. Much the same applies to relations with the ruling unity parties in the "states with socialist orientation."

With regard to the "socialist community," we may suppose that relations at party level are based on the principle of "proletarian internationalism," at government level on that of "socialist internationalism." The Soviets, for their part, interpret both these principles (intimately related to one another) in the meaning of a claim to leadership by the CPSU and the Soviet Government, in other words in the meaning of an imperial hegemony, within the framework of both interparty and international relations. This claim to leadership is justified by the Bolshevik seizure of power in the 1917 October Revolution, from which Soviet Russia emerged as the first socialist state in history, and by the enormous experience gained by the CPSU and the Soviet state in the construction of socialism and communism.

The socialist social order is here considered as a preliminary stage of a communist social order which can be completely realized only upon including the whole world. This ideological objective gives rise to a world revolutionary aspect that is more or less perceptible in the foreign policies and the interpretation of international law of the various socialist states.

To justify its leading role among the socialist countries, the Soviet Union claims (and this claim is presented in the Union Constitution) to be the only "state of the entire people" with a fully "developed socialist society." The other socialist states continue to be described only as "dictatorships of the proletariat" and held to be still at the stage of constructing and further organizing developed socialism.

The GDR is among the socialist countries which fully subscribes to the imperial claim to dominance by the Soviet Union in conformity with this ideological interpretation. Due to its geostrategic location and its advanced economic development as a part of Germany, the GDR has central importance in the Eastern system of alliances among the Soviet satellites. After the collapse of the original Eastern Bloc, the GDR has increasingly become a factor of integration, indispensable to the dominant Soviet power in its worldwide sphere of power and influence. Firstly the GDR is the Western cornerstone of the Soviet Bloc, secondly one of the hinges for the cohesion of the intercontinental "socialist community," and thirdly one of the brackets connecting the two circles of the Soviet system of alliances.

The statement of Article 30 of the Soviet Constitution, describing the Soviet Union as an "element of the socialist world system, the socialist community," must be read in connection with the simultaneous ideological circumlocution of the Soviet claim to hegemony.

The GDR has always preferred the term "socialist community of states" to that of "socialist community," because the former means less with respect to the cohesion of the community. Both terms are to be found in Article 6 Paragraph 2 of the revised GDR Constitution, also in the SED statute and program of 1976, but nothing has changed with regard to the priority of the term "socialist community of states," also present in the party program. The party program specially emphasizes the predominance of the Soviet Union by describing it as the "main force of the socialist community."

It is startling to see that Article 6 Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 describes the GDR as an "indivisible element of the socialist community of states." This phrase, conforming to the greater emphasis on the principle of "socialist internationalism" by the "Brezhnev doctrine," was added in the course of the 1974 constitutional amendments. The 1976 SED statute is more restrained and merely uses the words "firm element."

Despite much increased Bloc formation (in which the GDR was much involved), the "socialist community" must still be as a mainly international association of states, defined by grades of dependence. The gradual inclusion of the GDR in the Soviet system of alliances (to be dealt with later in greater detail) consolidated its dependence on the dominant Soviet power in the course of 35 years. However, at the same time it increased its political influence and, to a limited extent, its independence. From satellite, the GDR advanced to the status of a self-confident retainer who cannot be simply disregarded by the dominant power. In the Germany policy, most of all, but also in attitudes to detente it has been quite evident that the continuing general agreement of Soviet and GDR interests does not amount to the complete identity of interests.⁵ Despite the special emphasis on the GDR's ties to the dominant Soviet power, developments since the end of the Brezhnev era point up the efforts of Honecker and the other SED leaders to expand their scope for looking after specific GDR interests and thereby securing some autonomy for themselves.⁶

II. The GDR's Status in the Inner Circle of the Soviet System of Alliances

1. The Special Features of the Inner Alliance

The inner circle of the Soviet system of alliances is characterized by the linkage of a multilateral with a bilateral system of pacts. The multilateral system of pacts is represented by the Warsaw Pact (WP) and the Council for Economic Mutual Aid (CEMA). The bilateral system of pacts consists of bilateral treaties of alliance which, just as the Warsaw Pact, are designated "treaties on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance." The greatest importance is assigned the "mutual assistance" element. These treaties are therefore primarily mutual assistance pacts and, from the aspect of the other types of alliances to be met with in the Soviet system of alliances, it would be wrong to describe them as mere "treaties of friendship," though that is often done.

In September 1950, the GDR joined the Council for Economic Mutual Aid and, in May 1955, the Warsaw Pact as a founder member. In contrast to the other Soviet satellites, therefore, it was admitted first to the multilateral and only later to the bilateral system of alliances.

Though the regional competences of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) and the Council for Economic Economic Aid do not coincide, CEMA's focal point is certainly also in Eastern Europe. In cooperation with the specialized organizations linked to it, CEMA thus complements the operations of the WPO from the economic and scientific-technical aspect.

My analysis of the GDR's status in the inner circle of the Soviet system of alliances will here be restricted to the politico-military aspects, however important the economic aspect and the GDR's role in CEMA.⁷ I will therefore first of all deal in greater detail with the GDR's status in the Warsaw Pact and, subsequently, in the bilateral treaties of alliance.

2. The GDR and the Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact, concluded on 14 May 1955 by a total of eight socialist states,⁸ represents a multilateral pact of assistance, combining cooperation for the purpose of preserving peace with assistance in the case of armed aggression. Similar to the North Atlantic Treaty, the obligation to assist is phrased rather loosely in Article 4. It does not provide for automatic military assistance but leaves it to the individual partner in the alliance to decide the method and extent of aid. I will later deal in greater detail with the special case of the GDR.

Assistance is explicitly limited to armed aggression in Europe. The Warsaw Pact and the later bilateral treaties of alliance justify defense against such aggression by the right to individual and collective self-defense as per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which represents an exception from the general ban on force. "Collective self-defense" is based on the legal fiction that an attack on another party is to be considered an attack on oneself and therefore justifies military aid.

The main reason for the conclusion of the treaty was the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Western system of alliances when the Paris Treaty went into effect. Consequently the preamble to the Treaty (extending to only 11 articles), the WP is described as a counterweight to the WEU [Western European Union] and NATO and, at the same time and in conjunction with Article 11, as a possible quid pro quo in the case of the establishment of a "system of collective security in Europe." Other reasons were the Soviet Union's desire for the increased political and military integration of its narrower European sphere of power with the inclusion of the GDR and the necessity, after conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, to provide a legal basis for keeping Soviet forces in Hungary and, temporarily, in Romania.

On the basis of the Warsaw Pact, complemented by a resolution on the establishment of a common supreme command of 14 May 1955, a military-political organization was set up, which exhibits the nature of an international

organization. The Soviet Union's dominance in the Warsaw Pact Organization was secured by filling all top jobs with Soviet Russians, adopting Soviet military organization and training methods and standardizing weapons.

Since joining the Warsaw Pact Organization, the GDR has made great efforts to adjust the training and weaponry of the NVA [National People's Army] to that of its neighboring allies. In fact, the NVA was from the first built up as part of the coalition forces. The first stage of development ended in May 1958 with the Political Advisory Committee's confirmation of the NVA's acceptance in the united armed forces. Cooperation with the "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG)," enabled the NVA to gain full combat readiness within a relatively short time. The revolution in the defense strategic thinking of the Soviet Union and the 1959/1960 conversion of the Soviet Army to nuclear arms, represented mainly by missiles, resulted in the general revaluation of the Warsaw Pact. From 1961, the Eastern-Central European armed forces were reequipped, and the NVA was actively involved since the erection of the Berlin Wall. The second stage was initiated by the inclusion of the NVA in the first strategic echelon which combines the forces of the northern region of the Warsaw Pact Organization. In the mid-1960's, the NVA achieved the training standards of the Polish and Czechoslovak armies.

In August 1968, the NVA (under the Soviet supreme command) participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This involvement in armed intervention, not covered by the provisions of the Warsaw Pact, also infringed the obligations accepted by the GDR in its 1967 bilateral treaty of alliance with the CSSR. The GDR also contradicted its own 1968 Constitution, which states that the GDR will never use its armed forces "against the freedom of another people."

After the intervention in the Czechoslovakia, various measures have been adopted (at Soviet initiative), in the course of which the Warsaw Pact Organization has been perfected from the military and the political aspect. This is reflected not only in the improvement of weaponry and training but also in the structure of the leadership and the organization. At the Budapest Meeting in March 1969, the Political Consultative Committee resolved on the establishment of a permanent committee of the defense ministers, a military advisory council and a technical committee responsible for the coordination of weapons technology. At the Bucharest Meeting in November 1976, a permanent committee of the foreign ministers was set up. The united secretariat was reorganized at the same time. The GDR was actively involved in the efforts to achieve greater military and political integration--opposed by Romania in particular. Within the framework of the speeded-up arms modernization of the Soviet Armed Forces, the NVA's value has increased even more from the standpoint of the Soviet Army which dominates the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The GDR used the many changes to which the Warsaw Pact was subject in recent years to not only gain greater influence in the coordination of foreign and security policy in the WPO but also achieve military equality with the other Soviet satellites. Despite the successes it scored in this respect, nothing has changed with respect to the GDR's special status in the WPO.

Disregarding the all-German problem, this special status is due to three

reasons. First by the German version of the text of the Warsaw Treaty, second by the incorporation of the entire National People's Army in the united armed forces, third by the special provisions of the troop stationing treaty with the USSR of 12 March 1957.

In Article 4, the Warsaw Pact provides only for an automatic alliance obligation, not for automatic assistance by the treaty members in the case of armed attack on one or more treaty partners in Europe. Just like NATO, it does not acknowledge an automatic state of war and, consequently, the immediate transfer of the operative decisionmaking authority to the military leadership of the alliance. According to the WP, it is up to the party lending assistance to decide how to aid the attacked state. The GDR is evidently an exception. According to the (divergent) original German text of the Warsaw Pact, the extent and direction of its aid are decided by the other allies. In the Russian, Polish and Czechoslovak version, each partner state lends the victim of attack "aid by every means that seems to it required." The German phraseology, on the other hand, obligates the GDR to "prompt assistance, individually and in combination with other partner countries of the Treaty by any means that appear to them required." It seems unlikely that a mistake in translation may have occurred in the German text. Not that the argument about the divergent German version of the assistance clause appears to be of any practical significance, because the decision on the deployment of the National People's Army will probably be up to the Soviet power which dominates the combined supreme command.

Particularly important in this connection is the fact that, due to the resolution adopted by the political advisory committee on 28 January 1956, the armed units of the NVA were incorporated in the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. They were thereby completely subordinated to the combined supreme command. Evidently the GDR Minister for National Defense continues to be one of the deputies to the supreme commander, while this function has been exercised in the other WP countries by the deputy defense minister of the respective country since 1969. This has increased the independence of the WP countries.

Consequent on the troop stationing treaty with the USSR of 12 March 1957, the GDR is at a decided disadvantage by comparison with the other popular democracies with which the Soviet Union has concluded troop stationing treaties. In contrast to the other countries, it has no right to codetermination, merely to consultation with respect to the fixing of the size and deployment or movement of Soviet forces. The Soviet Supreme Command may act on its own discretion if it considers the security of Soviet troops in the GDR threatened. This provision gives rise to an additional intervention potential for the Soviet Union, not applicable to other WP countries.

3. The GDR and the Bilateral Treaties of Alliance

9

The system of bilateral pacts, in which the GDR was not included until some time later, is represented by bilateral treaties which are treaties of alliance in the narrower meaning. They serve above all the rendering of assistance in case of armed attack, not only cooperation for the purpose of

preserving peace. They focus on the obligation to mutual aid, in order to counter all violent military actions directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of one of the allies. By their basic structure they are mainly aid pacts. Three generations of development are discernible. While the first and the second generation are clearly separate in time, the second and third overlap in time.

As long ago as World War II, the Soviet Union had begun the construction of a bilateral system of pacts in Eastern Europe, without any equivalent existing in the West. The treaties of the first generation (1943-1949), concluded at Soviet initiative, were primarily "security treaties," providing mainly aid against Germany "if it were to renew its aggression," or one of Germany's allies. The second generation (1964-1972), based on the principle of "socialist internationalism," served not only to repel an attack from the outside or its prevention but was designed to promote increased integration. These "integration treaties" renewed the entire bilateral system of pacts, from which Tito's Yugoslavia had withdrawn in 1948.

Though the treaty of alliance concluded between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on 6 May 1970 after the occupation of the CSSR comes into this time frame, it really forms the starting point for the treaties of the third generation from 1975 on, that reflected the "Brezhnev doctrine." Additionally included in them was the phrase "further adjustment of the nations" and the concept of "socialist economic integration." The revelation of the imperial features of Soviet hegemony and the increased inclusion of the countries involved in the Soviet Bloc entitles us to describe these treaties as "Bloc treaties."

The first bilateral government treaty the Soviet Union concluded with the GDR, was the "Treaty on Relations between the USSR and the GDR" of 20 September 1955. This specially stressed the GDR's sovereignty. Some Soviet specialists in international law "substantially" equated the "sovereignty treaty" with an alliance. In fact the treaty provided for cooperation in politics, economics and culture, not in defense.

The all-German objective, still clearly discernible in the "sovereignty treaty," was most likely the reason why the Soviet Union did not decide until much later to include the GDR in the system of bilateral alliances. The GDR's incorporation in the bilateral system of pacts began in 1946 (sic!), at a time when Khrushchev was carrying out a correction of his aggressive Germany policy, which had resulted in the Berlin crisis. Linked with it was the decision to renew all earlier bilateral mutual aid pacts. The USSR's treaty of alliance with the GDR of 12 June 1964 initiated the second generation of bilateral treaties, including a total of 20 mutual aid pacts. The conclusion of these new treaties needed to wait until after the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. They include the GDR's alliances with Poland (15 March 1967), Czechoslovakia (17 March 1967), Hungary (18 May 1967), Bulgaria (7 September 1967) and Romania (12 May 1972). Ulbricht was able in these treaties to largely prevail with the German political conception he advocated, though with some cuts relating to Berlin.

The treaty of alliance between the USSR and GDR of 7 October 1975 initiated a new chapter in treaty policy. It followed the model of the USSR-CSSR treaty of 6 May 1970 and, even more obviously, bore the features of a "Bloc treaty." The greater emphasis on the ties with the Soviet Union corresponded to the change in the Germany policy initially pursued by Honecker and expressed in the constitutional amendment of 7 October 1974. From the common standpoint of the USSR and the GDR it was also a response to the situation that had emerged on the basis of the Eastern treaties, the Berlin Agreement, the basic treaty and the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) final act. Following the second bilateral mutual aid pact with the Soviet Union, the GDR concluded third generation alliances with Hungary on 24 March 1977, Poland on 28 May 1977, Bulgarian on 14 September 1977 and Czechoslovakia on 3 October 1977. Characteristically, no such treaty was concluded with Romania.

Evidently for reasons of foreign affairs considerations, the Soviet Union hesitated to unilaterally produce the total unity and integrity of its immediate sphere of power by the conclusion of more "Bloc treaties," and thus advance toward a confederation. After the outbreak of the Polish crisis, it seemed even less advisable to pursue this approach. This Soviet behavior was bound to annoy the GDR which had made special efforts for building up a system of Bloc treaties and had galloped ahead rather too far, at the expense of its own interests.

As a result of this situation, the system of bilateral alliances in Eastern Europe currently consists of some overlapping treaties of the third and second generation. The latter were concluded for 20 years, like the earlier treaties of the first generation. They will be extended for another 5 years respectively unless abrogated 12 months before the due date. The treaties of the third generation, on the other hand, provide for a life of 25 years. Reciprocal relations are somewhat unclear especially with respect to the GDR which has concluded third generation alliances before the corresponding second generation treaties had lapsed. Again there was no change or cancellation of the USSR-GDR "sovereignty treaty" of 20 September 1955, which--just like the treaty of alliance of 12 June 1964, assumes that the German issue remains open.

The bilateral alliances differ from the Warsaw Pact by providing for automatic assistance with all means in case of armed attack. Moreover, in most of the bilateral alliances, aid is not limited to an attack in Europe. The 1975 treaty no longer mentions the regional limitation which ruled the 1964 Soviet-GDR alliance by its direct reference to the aid obligation arising from the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's alliance with Poland of 8 April 1965, linking Articles 6 (aid) and 7 (preventive measures) does include a regional limitation for assistance. Poland would be obligated to render assistance only in case of armed aggression by "West German forces of militarism and revanchism" or its allies. It is bound to be of the utmost interest to the GDR to see in which form this treaty (to be extended in 1985) will in fact be renewed.

III. The GDR's Status in the Outer Circle of the Soviet System of Alliances

1. The Special Features of the Outer System of Alliances

In addition to a transitional zone, formed by the remaining Asian parts of the original Eastern Bloc (Mongolia, North Korea), the outer circle of the Soviet system of alliances includes the extra-European parts of the "socialist community" (Vietnam, Laos, Cuba) and nonaligned Afro-Asian states with a socialist orientation. Among the latter, Afghanistan and Kampuchea are particularly closely linked with the "socialist community," due to their being occupied countries.

The Soviet Union built up its system of alliances in East Asia in the form of bilateral aid pacts, separate from the development in Eastern Europe. Following the conflict between Beijing and Moscow, this system has lost its integrity. Since the abrogation of the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual aid between the USSR and the People's Republic of China of 14 February 1950, we are dealing with two independent and overlapping systems of bilateral aid pacts. Mongolia and North Korea are both involved as treaty partners of the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China respectively. However, the dominant type of treaty by far, in the zone of transition and the entire outer circle of the Soviet system of alliances, is represented by treaties on friendship and cooperation. In the outer system of alliances also, interparty agreements supplement intergovernmental treaties.

For most non-European members of the "socialist community" the bilateral and multilateral systems of pacts are linked only within the framework of CEMA. In 1962 Mongolia was admitted as a CEMA member country, followed by Cuba in 1972 and Vietnam in 1978. Laos has not yet gained admission.

The Soviet Union seems not to be interested in admitting one of these states to the Warsaw Pact--possible in the case of Mongolia. First of all any regional extension of the aid obligation would have needed the amendment of the treaty text. Secondly such an initiative would have meant an additional strain on the tense relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

2. The GDR and Political Cooperation Treaties

In contrast to the bilateral alliances,¹⁰ two generations are to be distinguished in the bilateral treaties on friendship and cooperation.¹⁰ The first generation, when the People's Republic of China was still involved, was concerned mainly with cooperation with respect to economics, science and technology and culture. In the second generation, emerging since the early 1970's, the emphasis was more on political and sometimes military cooperation. The treaties of the second generation are primarily "political cooperation treaties," designed as entente treaties, and which may therefore be considered alliances in a wider meaning. It would consequently be misleading in this case also to describe them as mere "friendship treaties."

The GDR took part in the first generation cooperation treaties at a very early stage. On 25 September 1955 it concluded such a treaty with the People's Republic of China, on 22 August 1957 one with Mongolia. With respect to its subject matter, the second GDR cooperation treaty with Mongolia (12 September 1968) and still mentioning the earlier German political attitude of the SED, represents something of a transition to the second generation of cooperation treaties.

The starting point of the new GDR treaties on political cooperation was its third treaty with Mongolia (6 May 1977), which came very close to an alliance. It was followed by the treaties with Vietnam (4 December 1977), Angola (19 February 1979), Mozambique (24 February 1979), Ethiopia (15 November 1979), Kampuchea (18 March 1980), Cuba (31 May 1980), Afghanistan (21 May 1982) and Laos (22 September 1982). As regards Kampuchea, Laos and Cuba, the GDR more or less acted on behalf of the Soviet Union which has preferred so far not to conclude cooperation treaties with these countries.

Added in the meantime was the treaty on friendship and cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) of 1 June 1984,. Like Bulgaria, the GDR used Kim Il-song's information trip to the Soviet Union and its European satellites to conclude this treaty on political cooperation, that displays some special features.

In contrast to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, the GDR has not yet managed to conclude such a treaty with Libya. Nor did the Soviet Union. North Yemen is another state without a "friendship treaty" with the GDR. It is interesting to note that the People's Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) has so far concluded a treaty on political cooperation with the Soviet Union alone.

The GDR's treaties on political cooperation with Mongolia, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Cuba and Laos differ substantially from the treaties with Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan. A special case is the GDR's treaty on political cooperation with North Korea; it is much closer to the first group. Still, there are decided differences even with regard to the treaties within the respective group, one of which is in the sphere of direct Soviet hegemony, the other largely in its extended sphere of influence. In the case of the first group of states, the treaties (running to 9-12 articles) were concluded for 25 years, just like the treaty with North Korea. In the case of the second group of states, the articles (running to 13-15 articles) and including the treaty with Afghanistan, provide for a 20 year term.

Cited as the basis of bilateral relations with Mongolia and Cuba is "socialist internationalism," in the treaties with Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and North Korea "proletarian internationalism." The treaties with Mongolia, Vietnam and Laos state that the "defense of socialist achievements" is an "internationalist obligation" of the contracting parties in the meaning of the "Brezhnev doctrine." The treaty with North Korea mentions only mutual efforts "to defend the achievements of socialism."

The treaties with Mongolia, Cuba and Laos include a reference to the

"socialist community of states." All three treaties provide for its "reinforcement." The phrase "unity and integration" occurs only in the treaty with Mongolia. It was already included in the 1968 treaty, but that document also mentioned "strengthening the power." The treaties with Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea relate this strengthening to the "socialist world system." They only mention the "unity of the socialist states" to be consolidated. The treaty with North Korea also includes the requirement "to produce...the unity and integration of the socialist states." In view of the earlier mentioned special status of North Korea, the treaty lacks a reference to the "socialist community" or the "socialist world system." Nor is that to be found in the treaty with Afghanistan, generally phrased with great caution. A modified consultation clause involving an obligation ranging from an exchange of opinions on the international situation to common action, is found only in the treaties with Mongolia and Cuba.

As regards the second group of states, only the treaties with Angola and Mozambique are based on "proletarian internationalism." The GDR incurred the greatest obligation vis-a-vis Mozambique. The treaty provides not only for modified consultation but also for military cooperation. All treaties, including that with Afghanistan, specially stress nonalignment. All of them mention support with regard to the consolidation and development of the "socioeconomic achievements," not their defense. Typical for the treaties with this group is the obligation of the respective treaty partner "that they will not enter any alliances or join in actions directed against the other high contracting party" and the statement "that the obligations of this treaty do not contradict treaties concluded earlier," and that the contracting parties obligate themselves "not to enter any other international agreement incompatible with this treaty."

The treaties with both groups deal in detail with cooperation in the field of economics and many other fields. Most of the treaties provide for cooperation between state organs and social organizations.

The treaties go into much detail about the common struggle against imperialism and colonialism, linked with the "struggle for peace." Insofar as the treaties are based on socialist or proletarian internationalism, the principles involved in this take precedence over the also mentioned principles of "peaceful coexistence," even in their relationship to detente. The principle of the peoples' right to self-determination is mentioned in several instances. Particularly emphasized is the principle of the "inviolability of borders." In concrete terms this relations to the "state border" between the GDR and the FRG. The statement that "West Berlin is not part of the FRG and will continue not to be ruled by it," responds to another GDR concern, but Mozambique has not observed this in practice.

The treaty with North Korea lays particular stress on the general ban on force. Several other treaties emphasize the right to individual and collective defense. Notable in the case of North Korea is the provision that the contracting parties will make "every effort in the interest of speeding up the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea" with the objective of a peace treaty. In connection with some remarks by Honecker it suggests, albeit

indirectly, that the corresponding German political objective expressed in the "sovereignty treaty" (which is not limited in time) continues despite the contrasting version of the 7 October 1975 treaty of alliance with the USSR.

The demand for the creation of a secure system of peace, sometimes in connection with disarmament, is related either to the world as a whole, or to Europe, Asia, the Middle East or Africa. The treaty with Laos advocates a "peace zone" in Southeast Asia.

Toward the end of the Brezhnev era, a shift of Soviet key policy toward the Third World was noticeable--from Africa to Asia--and also greater interest in the Caribbean. As for Africa, in addition to Cuba the GDR was assigned the task of preserving the positions acquired for the Soviet Union and, if possible, further expand them. Within the scope of the Soviet Union's global foreign policy, the GDR's commitment to the Third World, especially Africa, was largely governed by its special interests which are predominately of an economic nature. Since Brezhnev's heirs seem to be rather more cautious in their approach to the Third World, the GDR's importance as the Soviet Union's ally is likely to increase in the North-South relation. At the same time, it may well concentrate more on some countries in order better to look after its own interests.

IV. The GDR and Interparty Agreements

1. SED Agreements with Communist Parties in Socialist States

The ruling communist parties are the main holders of the external power of their states, regardless whether they are or are not part of the Soviet imperial association. The only difference is within the narrower Soviet power sphere, between the exercise of external power by the respective party and the collective observance of the "leading role" which, in several instances, leads beyond the internal sphere of alliances and includes the entire "socialist community."

The formal organization of relations at party level¹¹ did not occur until after Stalin's death. Since 1956, interparty relations were developed at various levels, both bilaterally and multilaterally. On the one hand, party delegations alone or together with government delegations met for bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, international party conferences were conducted, and these either included the entire communist world movement or the entire Eastern Bloc, or related only to the immediate Soviet power sphere. Initially the joint party statements were published separate from the state agreements. Following the example of the Soviet-Polish Declaration of 18 November 1956, it became customary to record government and party agreements in a single document, described as "declaration," "statement" or "communique." The multilateral party conferences, beginning in 1957, were initially organized as joint conferences of first or general secretaries, who usually met before WPO and CEMA conferences. They adopted decisions in principle upon which the resolutions of the two community organizations were later based.

Sometimes such collective decisions occurred independent of these conferences. The decision on the construction of the Berlin Wall, for example, was taken on Soviet initiative at a meeting of first secretaries on 5 August 1961. Subsequently this formed the basis of a statement by the governments of the WP states without these latter having met. Later the joint conferences of party and government heads assumed the function of the alliance's most important decisionmaking body. Since 1971, joint meetings by the first or general secretaries have resumed in the Crimea, attended also by the Mongolian Revolutionary People's Party. Similar meetings occurred on the occasion of various party congresses. Since 1977 the Crimean meetings are taking place on a bilateral basis. At the Twenty-sixth CPSU Congress in 1981, Brezhnev spoke of the prospect of a summit conference to be held in Moscow in June 1984.

In 1973, after a first conference in 1970, Central Committee secretaries for international and ideological issues began to take turns to arrange meetings. They negotiated agreements in the intellectual-cultural and ideological field involving all governmental and nongovernmental activities in this sphere. Working meetings of the respective competent Central Committee sections served to prepare the conferences, the resolutions of which have binding effect on the implementation of bilateral treaties on scientific and cultural cooperation and on the regular conferences of the ministers for culture. A beginning was made in 1974 with discussions by the Central Committee secretariat for party organizing work, competent for cadre and organizational questions. These meetings take place at longer intervals. The communist parties of Mongolia and Cuba attended the Central Committee secretaries' meetings alongside the communist parties of the immediate Soviet power sphere; they were later joined by the communist parties of Vietnam and Laos.

The SED has been actively involved in the development of relations at party level in all its manifestations. In USSR-GDR cooperation, it always assigned "the crucial and priority role" to interparty relations.

After the official organization of interparty relations by the CPSU, the first official negotiations between the CPSU and the SED took place in January 1957. Since that time Ulbricht took great pains to influence decisions arrived at at party level. His resistance to Brezhnev's detente policy and his obstinate ideological interpretation of the GDR's status and its relationship to the FRG resulted in his early replacement in May 1971, at the behest of the Kremlin. Since then frequent meetings and negotiations between Brezhnev and Honecker helped the better coordination of policies. The two party chiefs are officially reported to have met 29 times since 1979. In the same period, Honecker met 14 times with other top CPSU officials.

In 1976 the first interparty agreement was concluded to provide for settled cooperation between the CPSU and the SED in the field of theory and ideology for 2 years. Since the introduction of the rotating discussions by the competent Central Committee secretaries, bilateral party agreements were concluded in conjunction with the multilateral agreements settled at these meetings. CPSU-SED cooperation is evidently less developed at regional level.

Several of the bilateral alliances of the second generation and all treaties of the third generation provide for close cooperation between the "social organizations" as well as between state organs. The former is not restricted to relations between communist parties. It also includes cooperation by the mass organizations, in particular the labor unions, youth federations and other transmission belts of the ruling parties.

2. SED Agreements with Unity Parties in Developing Countries

The GDR has always assigned great importance to relations with unity parties either in power or aiming for it in the Third World.¹² Above all this applies to relations with the ruling parties in the "states with a socialist orientation." They are described as "the focus of cooperation between the states and the peoples of the socialist community and the countries with a socialist orientation." They are supplemented by corresponding relations between the mass organization, in particular the labor unions and youth federations.

Among the "states with socialist orientation" in the Soviet sphere of influence, the GDR has concluded such agreements with the Democratic People's Party of Afghanistan, the MPLA - Party of Labor (Angola), the Commission for the Organization of the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE), The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (Iraq), the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Congolese Party of Labor, the FRELIMO Party (Mozambique), the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist (Ba'th) Party (Syria). There are other agreements with the National Liberation Front (Algeria), the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin, the Democratic Party of Guinea, The National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar, The Democratic Union of Malian People, the South-West Africa People's Organization (Namibia), the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLO), the United National Independence Party (Zambia), the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe, the Zimbabwe African National Union, the African National Congress (South Africa).

The parties involved usually conclude agreements and working protocols for a 2-year term. Settled in these agreements are the procedures for political consultations and other important issues of interparty cooperation, with special emphasis on cooperation in the ideological field, organizational structure and cadre training. The SED concluded 5-year agreements with the MPLA, FRELIMO, COPWE, the YSP, the PDPA and the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

V. The GDR and the Dominant Soviet Power

Ever since Khrushchev, the Soviets have described relations between the "socialist states" as "a new type of relations," especially with respect of relations within the "socialist community." The principle of "proletarian-socialist internationalism" has been specially emphasized in the meaning of Soviet dominance as the politico-ideological and also international-legal basis of these relations.¹³ The "Brezhnev doctrine" reinforced this trend to a solid block formation. In Brezhnev's time it became customary, with respect

to the inner circle of the Soviet system of alliances, to talk of a "new kind of alliance." As the Russian word "sojuz" might also be translated as union, the possibility arises of a perspective ranging beyond the present status of bloc formation. The objectives related to this prospect have become quite evident by way of the doctrine of the accelerated adjustment of the socialist nations--not only the socialist states which are part of the narrower Soviet imperial association--, and by the call for quicker "socialist economic integration."

Among the Soviet satellites, it is the GDR which most obviously made this objective its own. By the de-Germanization of its constitution and the conclusion of the "bloc treaties," the SED leaders under Honecker more than in Ulbricht's time assumed the function of outrider for the Soviet imperial power.¹⁴ They evidently hoped by their special relationship with the Soviet Union to consolidate their own rule and to gain for the GDR the status of a junior partner. The desired special relationship is reflected in the GDR Constitution by the special emphasis on the alliance with the Soviet Union by comparison with relations with the other countries of the "socialist community," an emphasis absent from the constitution before the 1974 Law on the Amendment of the Constitution. Article 6 Paragraph 2 Sentences 1 and 2 reads: "The German Democratic is for ever and irrevocably fraternally united with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The close and fraternal alliance with it guarantees the people of the German Democratic Republic the further advance on the path of socialism and peace."

Though some constitutions of the other Soviet satellites stress the Soviet Union's status as *primus inter pares*, none of them concede it such a far reaching special position. The Bulgarian Constitution, for example, mentions an "unshakeable alliance." However, this statement refers not only to the Soviet Union but also to the other fraternal socialist countries.

Disregarding the stress on a special relationship that in fact obtains in the economic sphere,¹⁵ this unique phrase indicates the GDR's willingness to a treaty based confederation. In the earlier development of the Soviet state, such a confederation represented the precursor of the subsequent federal unity in the shape of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Realization of such a treaty based confederation presumes the establishment of common organs on a bilateral basis. However, nothing like that has been provided for, despite the increased Bloc nature of the 7 October 1975 treaty of alliance. Moreover, the designation of the alliance in the preamble to the treaty as being "close and fraternal" is somewhat weaker than in several second generation treaties. Possibly the exaggerated phraseology of the constitution was designed only to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty which responded better to the special interests of Honecker's SED leadership. This is certainly suggested by the downgrading on the basis of the treaty of the problems related to Germany and Berlin.

For several reasons, the situation has changed in the meantime. As a consequence of the Polish crisis and the growing economic difficulties of the Soviet Union, "socialist economic integration" has not advanced. Economic relations with the West and, above all, inner-German trade, have assumed far greater importance for the GDR. The doctrine of the disintegration of the integral German nation into a separate bourgeois-capitalist and a socialist nation has turned out to be a dead end. Honecker has made an effort to get out of it by recourse to the concept of the people as a whole and the revival of national German traditions.¹⁶ This correction was possible, because Honecker succeeded in distinctly strengthening his personal power in the SED Politburo, while--due to the rapid succession of leadership changes--the Kremlin displayed increasing insecurity. This power shift was promoted by the recall of the long "reigning" Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov, that Honecker managed to obtain from Andropov in May 1983. Though the autonomy gained thereby is very limited in view of the massive Soviet armed forces on GDR territory, it does permit Honecker to champion a more independent line in his Germany policy so long as the Kremlin leadership is not united with respect to foreign affairs strategy and tactics.

Soviet disunity was already discernible in the course of the U.S.-USSR negotiations on missile limitation in Geneva. The conflict with Honecker was triggered by the Soviet Union's unilaterally imposed emplacement of short-range missiles in the GDR and the CSSR in October 1983.¹⁷ It was aggravated by the "rejection strategy" rigidly represented by Gromyko. By contrast, Honecker used the November 1983 SED CC Plenum to plead for continued negotiations on arms limitation and, consequently, the resumption of the East-West dialogue.¹⁸ Emphasizing the common responsibility for peace of the two German states, he also recalled the common basis and suggesting an improvement of existing German-German relations on top of "limiting the damage." He thus became the spokesman for a more flexible policy advocated also by some Kremlin leaders who reject the total sealing off of the Soviet Union.

The differences between the Soviet Union and the GDR were bound to increase when Honecker began to give more concrete form to his preferred strategy in negotiations with the Federal Government at a time when the trend to isolation was strengthened in the Kremlin due to the earlier described internal reasons. This trend may be much influenced also by the preparations of next year's 40th anniversary celebrations, relating to the victory in World War II, Yalta and Potsdam, and also by the need to renew the Warsaw Pact which is nearing the end of its term. These considerations to some extent explain the violence of the attacks by PRAVDA and other Soviet and some Polish and Czechoslovak press organs not only on the all-German objective of the Federal Government but also on the flexible Western and Germany policy of Honecker.

Regarding their satellites, the Kremlin leaders have never quite abandoned the "right of investiture" in effect under Stalin vis-a-vis the other communist leadership organizations. Honecker was very adroit in his cadre policy and, consequently managed at the Eighth CC Plenum in June 1984 by personnel shifts in fact to decisively strengthen his power base in the Politburo, not merely obtain greater backing for his policy.²⁰ This was bound to infuriate all

those in the Kremlin, who still cling to this right of investiture. On the other hand, remarks not only by the Hungarians but by IZVESTIYA indicated that Honecker and the majority of the SED Politburo backing him may continue to expect some degree of support by Moscow. This involves mainly the forces who are interested in the preservation and expansion of economic East-West relations and, therefore, a revival of detente.

The further course of the dispute between the two differing opinions in the narrower Soviet power sphere is hard to predict at this time. Whatever happens, the outcome is like to significantly affect the cohesion of the entire alliance, not merely the Soviet-GDR relationship.

FOOTNOTES

1. On the text of the USSR Federal Constitution of 1977 and the constitutions of the other "socialist states," see G. Brunner, B. Meissner: "Verfassungen der Kommunistischen Staaten" [Constitutions of the Communist States], Paderborn 1979.
2. On the various stages of development of the Eastern Bloc, see J. Haber, "Der Ostblock. Entstehung, Entwicklung und Struktur 1939-1980" [The Eastern Bloc. Generation, Development and Structure 1939-1980], Baden-Baden 1983. The "Geschichte der Sozialistischen Gemeinschaft" [The History of the Socialist Community], East Berlin 1981, was written from the GDR standpoint by a collective of authors, led by E. Kalbe and beginning with the 1917 October Revolution.
3. See B. Meissner: "The Two Circles of the Soviet System of Alliances," in R. Loewenthal, B. Meissner (editors): "Der Sowjetblock Zwischen Vormachtkontrolle und Autonomie" [The Soviet Bloc Between Hegemony Control and Autonomy], Cologne 1984, pp 54ff.
4. In his book "Die Rechtsnatur des Sowjetblocks. Eine Juristische Entschleierung" [The Legal Nature of the Soviet Bloc. A Legal Revelation], West Berlin 1981, D. Frenzke begins by presuming a mixed situation with respect to international and constitutional law.
5. See J.L. Koppe, "GDR Foreign Policy. An Attempt at Political Appraisal," in G. Gutmann, M. Haendcke-Hoppe (editors): "Die Aussenbeziehungen der DDR" (Jahrbuch 1980 der Gesellschaft fuer Deutschlandforschung) [GDR Foreign Relations (1980 Annual of the Society for Germany Research)], Heidelberg 1981, pp 31ff; F. Oldenburg, "The Autonomy of the Model Student. On the USSR-GDR Political Relationship," in Loewenthal/Meissner (as note 3), pp 159ff; on GDR foreign policy also see the collection "Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR. Bestimmungsfaktore, Instrumente, Aktionsfelder" [Thirty Years GDR Foreign Policy. Determining Factors, Instruments, Fields of Action], edited by H.A. Jacobsen, G. Lepin, U. Scheuner, E. Schulz, Munich/Vienna 1979; P.J. Winters, "GDR Foreign Policy" in H.P. Schwarz (editor): "Handbuch der Deutschen Aussenpolitik"

[Manual of German Foreign Policy], Munich/Zurich 1975, pp 760ff; for the GDR standpoint, see the volume edited by G. Hahn, W. Haenisch, H. Busse and K. Lingner: "Aussenpolitik der DDR fuer Sozialismus und Frieden" [GDR Foreign Policy for Socialism and Peace], East Berlin 1974.

6. See S. Kupper, "Clinging to Detente, The Relationship of the Two States After Afghanistan," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 1983, pp 1045ff; F. Oldenburg, "Is the GDR Going its Own Way in the Soviet Empire?" DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 1984, pp 491ff.
7. On GDR foreign trade relations within the framework of the Soviet system of alliances and its role in CEMA, see the contributions by M. Haendcke-Hoppe, Karl C. Thalheim and A. Uschakow in Gutmann/Haendcke-Hoppe (note 5), pp 61ff, 121ff, 145ff; see also the articles by J. Bethkenhagen and H. Machowski in the manual "DDR und Osteuropa Wirtschaftssystem, Wirtschaftspolitik, Lebensstandard" [GDR and Eastern European Economic System, Economic Policy, Standard of Living], Opladen 1981.
8. See B. Meissner: "Der Warschauer Pakt" [The Warsaw Pact], Cologne 1951; the same author, "Warsaw Treaty Organization" in R. Bernhardt (editor): "Encyclopedia of Public International Law," instalment 6 1983, pp 359ff; J. Hacker, "The GDR in the Warsaw Pact," in Gutmann/Haendcke-Hoppe (note 5) as before, pp 187ff; S. Tiedtke, "The GDR's Status in the Warsaw Treaty Organization," in "Die Nationale Volksarmee" [The National People's Army], Reineke near Hamburg 1976, pp 42ff.
9. B. Meissner, "International Relations between the GDR and the Soviet Union against the Background of the Treaties of Alliance," in S. Mampel, K.S. Thalheim (editors): "Die DDR - Partner oder Satellit der Sowjetunion?" [The GDR - Partner or Satellite of the Soviet Union] (1979 Annual of the Society for Germany Research), Munich 1980, pp 143ff; the same author, "Specific Changes in the Eastern Pact Systemn," AUSSENPOLITIK, 1979, pp 282ff; Loewenthal-Meissner (note 3), as before, pp 57ff; H.-H. Mahnke, "Beistands- und Kooperationsvertraege der DDR" [GDR Treaties of Cooperation and Assistance], Cologne 1982, pp 16ff; treaty texts, ibid, pp 95ff.
10. See Mahnke (note 9), pp 46ff; on the Soviet Union's bilateral treaties on political cooperation see B. Meissner, "Specific Changes in the Eastern Pact System," AUSSENPOLITIK 1979, pp 291ff; Loewenthal-Meissner (note 3) as before, pp 84ff. The text of the GDR's political cooperation treaties with Laos and North Korea, not included by Mahnke, was published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 23 September 1982 and 2/3 June 1984 respectively.
11. See B. Meissner, "Interparty Relations in the Eastern Bloc and the Principle of 'Proletarian-Socialist Internationalism'," in "Internationales Recht und Diplomatie" [International Law and Diplomacy], 1961, pp 147ff; the same author, "Regional Cooperation and Organization: Socialist States," in R. Bernhardt (editor), "Encyclopedia of Public International Law" as before, pp 329f.

12. See H.V. Loewis of Menar, "The GDR and Africa," in H. Gutmann/Haendcke-Hoppe (note 5) as before, pp 221ff. From the GDR standpoint, E. Langer, "Together against Imperialism, for Peace and Social Progress. On the Development of the GDR's Relations with Revolutionary Parties and Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America," DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, 1982, No 9, pp 44ff.
13. See T. Schweinfurth: "Sozialistisches Voelkerrecht? Darstellung - Analyse - Wertung der Sowjetmarxistischen Theorie vom Voelkerrecht 'Neuen Typs'" [Socialist International Law? Presentation - Analysis - Appraisal of the Soviet-Marxist Theory of International Law], West Berlin, 1979.
14. See Oldenburg (note 6) as before, pp 173ff.
15. See A. Uschakow, "Institutional Forms of Economic Relations between the GDR and the USSR," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 1980, pp 518ff.
16. See B. Meissner, "The German Nation and the German People from the Standpoint of the USSR and GDR,": in D. Blumenwitz, B. Meissner (editors): "Staatliche und Nationale Einheit Deutschlands - Ihre Effektivitaet" [State and National Unity of Germany - Its Efficacy], Cologne 1984.
17. See C. Schmidt-Hasuer, "The Long Paper War of the Red Brothers. The Chronicle of the Crisis between the Kremlin and the East German Communists," DIE ZEIT, 10 August 1984.
18. See K.W. Fricke, "Treaty Loyal and Ready for Dialogue," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 1984, pp 1ff.
19. See B. Meissner, "Soviet Politics: From Andropov to Chernenko," AUSSENPOLITIK, 35th year, pp 259ff.
20. See P.-J. Winters, "Personnel Decisions and their Political Background. The Eighth SED CC Plenum," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHI, 1984, pp 673ff.

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CSO: 2300/111

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

YUGOSLAV LEADER'S MESSAGE TO CEAUSESCU

AU040950 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 1 Dec 84 p 5

[Text] To Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP secretary general and president of the SR of Romania:

Esteemed Comrade Ceausescu: I want to express cordial thanks for the congratulations and warm words you conveyed to me on my birthday.

I want to take this opportunity to express our satisfaction with the successful development of relations of cooperation between the LCY and the RCP and between the two neighboring socialist countries, and I also want to express the conviction that our relations will continue to develop in the interests of the nations and nationalities of the SFRY and of the SR of Romania and in the interest of peace, social progress, and socialism.

Ali Sukrija, president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium.

CSO: 2700/57

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ROMANIANS WARSAW PACT MEETING--A regular meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member-countries took place between 3 and 5 December in Budapest, under the chairmanship of Army General Lajos Czirinegi, minister of defense of the Hungarian People's Republic. The meeting was attended by the defense ministers, the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and the chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member-countries. The Committee of Defense Ministers examined issues related to the practical activity of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member-countries and adopted appropriate decisions. The meeting proceeded in a working atmosphere and in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding. [Text] [Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1800 GMT 5 Dec 84]

CSO: 2700/57

PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY TO CONVENE 24 DECEMBER

AU042008 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 4 Dec 84

[Decree of the People's Assembly Presidium]

[Text] In accordance with Article 77 of the Constitution, the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania decided to convene the People's Assembly in the sixth session of the 10th legislature at 1700 on Monday, 24 December 1984.

This decree comes into force immediately.

Tirana, 4 December 1984.

Decree No 6133

Ramiz Alia, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

Sihat Tozaj, secretary of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

CSO: 2100/13

ALBANIA

BRIEFS

GREEK OFFICIAL LAYS WREATHS--Karolos Papoulias, alternate foreign minister of Greece, and the persons accompanying him laid wreaths and paid tribute at the Martyrs of the Nation Cemetery. They were accompanied at the ceremony by Pirro Bitu, director of a Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Met Rreli, deputy chairman of the Tirana District People's Council Executive Committee, and others. [Text] [Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 4 Dec 84]

CSO: 2100/13

REALISM, NOT ROMANTICISM NEEDED TO ACHIEVE PEACE

East Berlin STANDPUNKT in German No 10, Oct 84 pp 265-266

[Article by C. Ordnung: "Joint Security and Foe Images"]

[Text] I. In the church's peace effort, the removal of foe images is frequently demanded; they are seen as a cause of the danger of war. In official church statements, the concept of foe image is often used with an attribute. For example, one turns against irrational perceptions of the enemy and an undifferentiated friend-foe way of thinking. But such statements so far lack any evidence whether rational perceptions of the enemy and differentiated friend-foe thinking also would prove to have positive aspects for peace efforts.

Foe images are quickly detached from their roots in society, become emotionally charged and lead a life of their own. For this reason, they have a rather disorienting effect on peace efforts, so that one can agree with the demand for their removal. However, the baby must not be thrown out with the bath water. As long as man has existed, there has been the fact of enmity in our world. This fact does not spring from subjective imagination, but is rooted in objective societal conditions. When a group of people suppresses and exploits others, this must necessarily produce enmity. He is not the disturber of peace who designates this as enmity; rather, it is he who maintains such conditions and profits from them. Thus, the most effective removal of foe images would be changing those conditions which produce enmity. Incidentally, Marxists also distinguish between a "justified perception of the enemy and a foe image formed by blind hatred," which is to be rejected (Sozialismus und Entspannung [Socialism and Detente], Berlin 1980, p 235).

The Bible is more realistic than some Christians. When it speaks of love for one's enemy, it does not demand feelings of liking for enemies, but an attitude which does not seek the destruction of the adversary, but rather a modus vivendi with the enemy. Peace without enmity will only exist when God's reign of peace is fulfilled at the end of time. Peace on earth is a peace among foes. Enmity, therefore, does not have to hinder peace. The question we are confronting--which, however, is hardly being asked yet in work for peace--is this: How do we deal in a differentiated manner in our work for peace with the societal and political fact of enmity? The answer could be as follows:

1. We must make clear that the peace we are concerned with today is a peace among enemies--not a heavenly peace in which all problems are solved. Years ago, C.F. von Weizsaecker said: World peace is not the Golden Age. Because many (young) Christians in their work for peace start from utopian-romantic ideas of peace, they often fail in the burdensome task of political peace action. For the sake of peace, disillusionment is particularly necessary here.

2. It is important for the church peace effort to support all those political concepts which want to put into concrete form the insight that peace is a peace between enemies, such as peaceful coexistence or joint security, of which it is said that they are today the political expression of love for one's enemy.

II. The idea of joint security developed by the Palme Commission is based on two facts:

1. In view of the technical development, particularly in the military sector, security can no longer be won and sustained against the enemy, but only jointly with him;

2. Despite this common interest, the enmity of both sides continues to exist. It concerns security among foes.

This concept coincides strongly with that of peaceful coexistence, although they are not completely identical. I see the following difference: peaceful coexistence puts a stronger emphasis on antagonism, since it sees the confrontation as a class struggle between capitalism and socialism. Joint security does not define the nature of the opposites; it largely ignores historical aspects and therefore can be linked with the theory of super-powers. While a final reconciliation does not seem possible under peaceful coexistence, the idea of a security partnership developed from the concept of joint security does not expressly exclude it in the long term. However, for the present and the near future one assumes the continued existence of opposites.

Both concepts are thus determined by the dialectics of enmity and partnership. In this context, it is important to be aware that the concept of peaceful coexistence has gained further meaning in this regard in recent years. The book "Socialism and Detente" names three basic elements of detente:

1. The existence of common interests, such as prevention of a nuclear war, or the solving of global problems of an ecological nature;

2. Mutual willingness to compromise. Since no basic identical interests exist, and since neither side can force its will upon the other, concessions are imperative;

3. A certain amount of trust. As a central question of trust, "respecting mutual security interests" is cited.

From this premise it is easy to understand that socialist countries have accepted the idea of joint security in a positive manner. Leading

representatives of the Soviet Union, the GDR, and other countries have expressly said so. A number of uncommitted states also have a positive attitude toward this concept. It is mainly the United States and most of the other NATO countries who openly reject this concept. They are quite obviously foes of a peace among enemies.

III. Perhaps one can make progress in the discussion of "foe images" if one distinguishes between absolute and relative foe images.

Anti-imperialism, for instance, appears to be a relative foe image. It wants to mobilize a fight against imperialism, not primarily emotional but on the basis of a sober political analysis of the historical development and present global political situation. Its aim is not the liquidation of the human representatives of the imperialist system, which is seen as a necessary stage of development of human history. It aims at a change of this system, which can only occur through peaceful means. For this reason it advocates peaceful coexistence with it, and that also means with its representatives.

Anti-communism, on the other hand, sees communism as a morbid aberration of history, the center of evil, the archenemy of mankind. It is not concerned with a sober analysis and confrontation. It is not based on history but on tales through which hatred and disgust are to be engendered. It is an absolute foe image, because it does not consider possible a lasting, peaceful coexistence with communism. A study by U.S. Quakers on the "Anatomy of Anti-communism" says, "thus anti-communism is programming World War III."

While relative foe images are practically an element of the concept of joint security, the absolute foe image presents a striking contrast to it. Joint security cannot be realized without rejecting the absolute foe image of anti-communism. A central question of the church's work for peace should therefore be: How can we help to change the attitude of those rejecting joint security, of the foes of a peace between enemies?

1. It is often said in church peace work that all sides want peace, they only take different roads towards it. This theory obviously is not correct. Whoever rejects joint security, calls the opponent the archenemy, develops strategies for a limited, winnable nuclear war, must have his will for peace questioned. Such an attitude, adopted by the present government of the United States, is not motivated by pure malice. The United States represent 6 percent of the world's population, and they use up 40 percent of the world's resources. They want to maintain and strengthen this position, which means exploitation and disharmony for millions of people. Whoever questions this position is considered the archenemy, because he threatens the vital interests of the United States. Martin Niemoeller has pointed out time and again that mammonism is behind anti-communism and has called upon the church for a prophetic word on this subject.

2. Thinking in this direction is blocked by the theory that, in working for peace, each one is to begin with criticism of his own government and conditions in his own country. This is an attitude of provincialism which waives an analysis of the world situation and proceeds from the assumption that all governments are equally responsible for the present danger of war. After the

U.S. invasion of Grenada, theologian McAfee Brown addressed a letter to Christians all over the world asking them to support the churches in the United States in their fight against the war policy of their government which threatens the entire world.

3. Lastly, we must be concerned with doing away with anti-communism still affecting our churches because of its disorienting and distorting effect on peace work. It steers activities of peace groups in a direction which can be used by anti-communists for their purposes. It hinders churches from understanding and interpreting--for instance, in ecumenicalism--the concerns of a socialist peace policy. And precisely that could be a contribution of our churches to the realization of the concept of joint security.

9917

CSO: 2300/122

REVANCHISM, SUBVERSION SAID TO BE GOALS OF RADIO GERMANY

East Berlin JUNGE GENERATION in German No 10, Oct 84 pp 21-23

[Article by Dr M. Klaus: "On an Interference Course: (Pan) German Radio"]

[Text] May 1984: A row about "Radio Germany" ("DLF")--the station which, around the clock, is intent on interfering with the internal affairs of the GDR. The nasty word about "dirtying one's own nest" could be heard on the bosses' floor, accompanied by booing from the blackest [most conservative] circles in the FRG who denounce even the DLF as a "red radio station."

What had happened? A DLF commentary had hinted at the inhuman conditions under which 10 million FRG citizens must live. The conservative majority of the broadcasting supervisory board (which superintends the station) did not like it one little bit. Although the reported facts were true, they would give GDR citizens "an undesirable picture of the FRG." For this reason, "such statements are to be omitted" in future. And, as a matter of discipline, the director of the DLF was officially reprimanded for this broadcast.

The row is not entirely new. For some time now at the DLF, the "specialists" in matters of ideological diversion also have been arguing over the method of how best to transport the ideological contraband. Many variations exist. For instance, there are some who believe that, in order to denounce the GDR more credibly, some self-criticism could safely be practiced. It is then almost neutralized again through twisted logic. This is how: "FRG bad, GDR even worse, therefore FRG not so bad at all!" In turn, others who are still trying to sell the FRG as the "golden, free West" to the "poor, unfree brothers and sisters" in the GDR, of course get into difficulties with their demagoguery if too many bare facts become known about everyday life in the FRG.

So the argument is about tactics. There is unanimous accord, however, on the goal to wipe out socialism on German soil. There has never been the least doubt about that at the DLF: history and minutes of broadcasts prove it.

"Reunification" Radio

From the very beginning the DLF was installed as an instrument of the imperialist "reunification" policy. In his provocative "greetings to the East Germans" on the occasion of the first broadcast on 1 January 1962, the then president of the FRG established the revanchist broadcast mission of bringing GDR

citizens into opposition to their government and to orient them toward imperialist patterns of thought and attitudes: "This German radio is to contribute its part...to include you in the life and activity of the free segment of the German people."

This mission remains unchanged today--despite the fact that the FRG government meanwhile has signed documents binding under international law, such as the basic treaty between the FRG and the GDR, and the CSCE final act, which expressly stipulate the obligation of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. On the occasion of the 20th DLF anniversary in 1982, the president of the FRG Bundestag cabled provocatively that it was the DLF's most important task to "reinforce" the people in the GDR "in the hope of also being able to live in freedom some day." The upper-class FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE explained at the same time that at the DLF, "the GDR is seen as a part of Germany..."

These "modifications," cosmetic corrections which were due to the process of detente during the seventies, were wiped out through new programming guidelines by the DLP broadcasting supervisory board in September 1983. They expressly emphasize "a special mission" vis-a-vis radio listeners "in the GDR." They state further: "The broadcasts are to contribute to the promotion of mutual understanding among Germans, and to strengthen awareness of their solidarity." Thus it was announced through DLF microphones: "We should like that also toward the East, borders are no longer lines of separation for human beings and peoples... This can only be accomplished if questions are kept open, at least on a legal basis. We have legal positions...which are consistent with a Germany having the borders of 1937."--Truly: legal positions! [Pun in German: rightist positions!]

Radio of Subversion

Constant peddling of the theses of "the continued existence of the German nation" and of "keeping the German question open" is a firm component of the subversive attitude toward the GDR, and the DLF is committed to cooperate in their realization. It is the avowed intent of the radio station to attain "ideological penetration" in socialist countries. Particularly this way:

--The DLF, like the U.S. diversionary stations "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty" and "RIAS," makes itself out to be a substitute domestic broadcasting station. In DLF parlance: "in-house station" of the GDR. One wants to offer listeners "an up-to-date 'newspaper' several times a day" and "something like aid for living." For this purpose, for example, GDR press quotes, falsified or taken out of context, are twisted into the cliché of an appropriate anti-communist picture of the GDR in the broadcast "from East Berlin newspapers." A program scheme, already adapted to GDR life styles as early as 1974, is to make the broadcasts "more topical, flexible and extensive" and is also to ensure that the station "can be located on the radio set."

--Even more than previously, the station focuses on target groups it intends to provide with antisocialist argumentation patterns. While the morning and daytime programs with alternately informative and musical pieces are primarily directed at large segments of the population, the "background information" programs in the evening are mostly intended for "debaters."

--Attempts are made to sow distrust among certain segments of the GDR population against the policy of the SED, and to encourage subversive activities. Members of our coalition parties are called upon, with a clearly antisocialist emphasis, "to put a little pressure on the SED and to show the flag." GDR scientists are incited to speak out against the socialist defense policy. It is suggested that church circles direct their peace actions against the socialist state.

--With great propaganda display, citizens of the FRG and West Berlin are called upon to take "a journey to the other Germany," in order to stress the "solidarity of Germans." For talks with GDR citizens, the DLF recommends the subject of so-called liberality. Thereby, "public awareness and political opinion is to be sharpened and stimulated" in the GDR.

Two areas in particular are responsible for the implementation of the diversionary goals vis-a-vis the GDR.

The "East-West editorial department" has the task of (carrying out) "intensive observations of political and societal conditions in the GDR, to produce background information, comment on certain factual situations, and to incorporate them into larger contexts."

The West Berline DLF studio--with an exceptionally large number of employees--serves primarily for the "collation" of information from the GDR mass media for diversionary and secret service use.

Divisive Radio

Through the DLF language service for (actually, against) the CSSR, the People's Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of Hungary, every opportunity is taken to slander socialist society, through anticommunist attacks, as being "armed to the teeth," "in a state of crisis," and "a police state." With constant attacks against the supposedly obligatory "socialist model of the Soviet Union" and with nationalistic slogans, the fraternal relations among the socialist nations are to be unsettled, anti-Sovietism is to be fomented, and the socialist community is to be divided amongst itself.

Wherever counterrevolution raised its head, DLF microphones were there; the ringleaders could proclaim their counterrevolutionary concepts on the radio station; DLF commentators tried to bring about parallel developments in the GDR. Whether in the spring of 1968 in the CSSR, or in the fall of 1980 in Poland, what was demanded was the elimination of the socialist community, orientation towards the West ("Let's go to West" [as published]), and unhampered distribution of counterrevolutionary pamphlets. And: "The GDR must get involved, too..."

But there, the DLF has miscalculated!

9917

CSO: 2300/120

STATE HINDERS REPORTING ON CHURCH SYNOD

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 3 Nov 84 p 9

[Text] GDR authorities have again interfered with the work of a church-owned weekly newspaper and have had the MECKLENBURGISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG, published in Schwerin, correct its reporting on this year's meeting of the synod of the GDR Church Conference in Greifswald at the end of September. This became known yesterday at the synod of the Mecklenburg regional church, at present meeting in Schwerin.

Upon inquiry the synod was informed that the church newspaper, among other things, had intended to report on the Church Conference synod's resolutions concerning environmental issues, deployment of new nuclear missiles in West and East Europe, and service of young draftees in the unarmed construction units of the GDR army. Through state intervention, production and delivery of the respective newspaper issue was delayed for several days.

There have been several instances in the past of obstructing the church's newspaper work. A few months ago, the Saxon church journal DER SONNTAG had to withdraw an issue because of a children's poem published therein. The East Berlin paper DIE KIRCHE had to be reprinted because it had answered a letter to the editor concerning the permissibility of the church sew-on patch "Swords into plowshares."

The fall meeting of the Mecklenburg regional synod was opened on Thursday night by chairman Wahrmann of Wismar. During the 4 days of consultations which will end on Sunday, among other things the synod will deal with the work of the diaconate in the regional church, and with reports on the latest meeting of the Church Conference synod in Greifswald, the Eisenach meeting of the Lutheran General Synod in June, and the plenary session of the Lutheran World Conference in Budapest this past summer. However, the annual report and statement of account of the Schwerin church paper will be represented only at the meeting next spring.

9917

CSO: 2300/120

PAST, FUTURE OF OLYMPIC MOVEMENT DISCUSSED

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Peter Nemeth: "The Olympiad"]

[Text] In December the members of the NOB [International Olympic Committee] will hold an extraordinary Congress in Lausanne. No one can doubt the reason for the exceptional conference. It has already been made known a number of times through the press that a delicate subject will be discussed, namely, whether--and if so, to what extent--sanctions should be applied to countries which do not participate in the Olympics. The use of the present tense, or rather the future, is important, because it is not the situation that developed at the Los Angeles Olympics or the countries that did not go there, that will be on the agenda, but rather the coming games. At the same time, there is no doubt that Los Angeles will be frequently brought up in the discussions. And in such a way that the countries which did not participate will be denounced. It is not accidental that recently a responsible NOB official used the word "boycott" even though formerly he used the terminology of "non-participation." It is possible that the sports leaders of socialist countries will be attacked and proposals will be drafted demanding radical steps. For example, full (or perhaps final) exclusion in the case of nonstarters.

The sports officials of the socialist countries still judge that their position regarding Los Angeles was proper and justified. No one should be deceived by the record participation; of the 142 countries, exactly 30 were represented by only six participants, or the number for which the NOB assumed the burden... Despite this, it can be said that the spectators were witnesses to good and interesting competitions at the 1984 Olympics, and outstanding results were also achieved. But it was also shown that without the participation of the athletes from the socialist countries a program of real value is not conceivable. There is no sense in a comparison of results achieved in A-category competitions, for every contest is different, and results must be measured in the given situation and circumstance. But perhaps we can risk saying this much: The competitions showed that the athletes were well prepared. Of course, this is an extremely summary statement which conceals the details, but let it be permitted us to ignore these--in order that we do not stumble into the path of superfluous comparisons. The Congress to be held in December--independently of the expected substance of discussion--will in essence bring an era to a close. It will conclude the 4 years which have elapsed between the two Olympics. And with this we will strike into a new Olympiad. Because

the basic task continues to be the nurturing of the Olympic spirit, the development of the movement, and good preparation. In this connection, the question arises for every lover of sports and even for those who are not sport fans: What will be the situation 4 years from now? It is still impossible to give a real reply to this question. But no particular political maturity is needed for us to judge that it was a mistaken decision to award Seoul the right to hold the games. This decision, more precisely the designation of the site of the games, is already in itself a source of opinion differences and of conflicts. And it is hardly a mere assumption to state that with its decision the NOB has from the beginning diverted the games into a dangerous political direction.

The basic concept of the sports leaders in socialist countries--and this was emphasized at the October conference--has always been to support and keep the movement alive. Obviously, this must also be the goal of the International Olympic Committee. If it is not, it will naturally bring itself and the cause of universal sports to the brink. I do not believe, I cannot believe, that the leaders of the NOB will not see this for themselves, and moreover will not act to protect the unity of sports.

Of course, our athletes--and obviously those of other countries--would like a reassuring answer. A reassuring answer to the question whether they can prepare confidently and enthusiastically for the next Olympic games--and beyond that [to] the succeeding games. I believe their task has to be to prepare themselves. Sober reason dictates this.

I believe that in this way Hungarian sports can also close the books (as the sports leadership has already done) on the evaluation of the past 4 years. It is extremely difficult to judge where we actually stand. Unfortunately, in certain sport branches we have lost our leading role, and have fallen back into the medium range, while in other sports branches we have succeeded in advancing somewhat. But also in regard to the latter, it is in order to weigh carefully our chances, for it can easily be that behind those who have moved to the vanguard adequate reserves do not exist and will not be able to take on the positions that have been won.

Looking ahead, 4 years is an extremely long time. But it may be too short for us to carry out all the tasks that await Hungarian athletes. The leagues still abide by the exact goals, but caution is necessary, this too may be a difficult lesson. It is not a simple matter truly to judge what kind of placements we have, whether we have the athletes and teams which are favorable to meeting the requirements.

In any event, the task is clear: prepare with full strength for the Olympic games.

6691

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CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS UNDER TWO PRIMATES COMPARED

Paris ESPRIT in French Jul-Aug 84 pp 51-61

[Article by Adrien Le Bihan: "Two Ways To Deal with the Devil, from Cardinal Wyszynski to Cardinal Glemp"]

[Text] On 25 September 1953, Cardinal Wyszynski, then 52 years of age and primate of Poland for five years, was arrested in the middle of the night at his official residence on Miodowa Street in Warsaw, by policemen in civilian clothing. He was held prisoner for three years, at first in secret, in deconsecrated church buildings, in Stoczek Warminski in the extreme northeast of Poland and later at Prudnik, in Silesia; the last year it was at Komancza in the extreme southeast, in an actual convent. During all this time the Polish government stated, and Polish and international opinion believed, that he was being held under house-arrest in a monastery. In reality, in the words of the Cardinal himself, it was a "civil death in camouflaged concentration camps."

There was a little of Robinson Crusoe in this cardinal who himself observed, and imposed on his two fellow prisoners (a priest and a nun), a strict schedule that consisted of working in the garden, raking the paths, shoveling snow and keeping up his logbook.¹ But he was also a man of action, typified more by what he did than what he felt. In short, dense paragraphs, Wyszynski sometimes blames himself, often pleads, but never theorizes. You see him working out not his doctrine, but the behavior which was henceforth always to be his. These "Notes from Prison" show in particular how the religious and political spheres together supported what, until 1981, was to be a dualistic attitude, yet one without duplicity.

Since he became primate of Poland, Wyszynski had been keeping up a conflictive dialog with the communist authorities. Agreements were signed in 1950. In the main, they guaranteed ecclesiastical freedoms and the freedom of worship, at least on paper. On its side, the episcopate accepted the new power and the notion of collectivization. After a century and a half of slavery, said Wyszynski, the church had had only 20 years to reorganize itself. After the war, "we had to find time, to regain our strength." But at the time the agreement was signed, the pressure on Poland was increasing. Boleslaw Bierut's team reigned without any power sharing. In 1951 Gomulka was jailed. From 1950 to 1953, the campaign against the Catholic Church intensified. Through the intermediary of Pax, an association of Catholics who claim to be progressive al-

though they hurl abuse at foreigners and especially at Catholic visitors,² an attempt was being made to "anesthetize the population." Priests were being arrested, tortured and condemned. Social aid organizations ceased to exist; Catholic education diminished; the independent Catholic press was suppressed (in Crakow, Pax illegally took over, for a period of three years, the weekly, TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, which refused to publish a funeral eulogy for Stalin). Cardinal Wyszynski was working "in an atmosphere which earmarked him for prison." As a pretext, the authorities used the question of the territories recovered along the Oder-Neisse frontier to further poison its relations with the church. In the absence of a true peace agreement between Germany and Poland, Wyszynski named four apostolic administrators to the former German dioceses, in particular that of Wroclaw, but the Vatican refused at the time to name Polish titular bishops to these dioceses (The question was to be definitively settled only in 1973). The Polish press then spread the rumor that the episcopacy was hostile to the Oder-Neisse border region; that it was thus encouraging "revenge-minded Germans." In 1951 the apostolic administrators named by Wyszynski were deposed by the government. In February 1953, the government decided to exercise control over ecclesiastical nominations. On 8 May Wyszynski uttered a vigorous protest. He was arrested four months later.

In the "Notes from Prison," the liturgical and the national calendars coincide more than once. Later on, contrary to Gomulka, Wyszynski said to the Germans, "We forgive you." It is no more logical to accuse him of nationalism than it is to reproach him with an attitude contrary to the interests of Poland. In conformity with the Polish Catholic tradition, Wyszynski saw in the resistance to the assaults of the Swedish Army (in 1655), inspired by the Virgin of Czeszochowa, a symbol of national resistance. (Here obviously the agnostic has trouble hiding his reticences). He wanted to be known as the "Primate of Mary Queen of Poland." But he also wanted the church to find in contemporary Poland the place it deserved, a place which, between the two [world] wars--too close to the authorities and too much inclined toward anti-Semitism³--it did not know how to win. Wyszynski, in his "Notes from Prison," does not take up the Jewish question. But the idea that Jews and priests were finding martyrdom in one another's company was not foreign to him. Now this sacrifice, prolonged by the communist repression, changed everything. The church was no longer on the side of the authorities. It was being persecuted by the authorities. One reads between the lines in Wyszynski's book a great "Whew!" of relief, and a regret as well: the government imposed by a foreign power did not seize the opportunity offered to it by the Polish Church after the war: "The church did not support the revolution but allowed its faithful the freedom to fight in good conscience for a fairer social system." Lacking capability, the government put too much faith in repression. The ill-used nation opposed even justifiable reforms. "If Marxism had come to Poland--as happened between 1905 and 1907--directly from the West and without the Soviet intermediary, the people would have welcomed it more warmly."

A Strategy of Encirclement

As far as his imprisonment was concerned, Wyszynski's attitude was twofold: On the one hand he fought it; on the other he accepted it. He wrote to the highest government authorities, responding to the accusations made against him. He protested with good reason. His references to the constitution of the People's

Republic of Poland (He took care to order a copy of it) and his references to the law are constant. He refused to approve anything without having preliminary knowledge of the decree which had put him in prison. Thus he points out the road that was to be followed later by Adam Michnik and the KOR [

] and, in his emigrant status, by Krzysztof Pomian in particular, taking care to explore all the possibilities offered by the law to opposition forces in Poland. But Wyszyński respected his adversary. While resisting and doing battle, he nevertheless wanted to convince and not destroy. A strategist rather than a tactician, he is by instinct a player of go, rather than a player of chess: "An act accomplished is already in place; nothing about it can be changed. Yet the manner of judging it does change.... And that is what is terrifying! What perfection an action demands if it is to emerge victorious in the judgment of history!" The player of go wins (for it is a question of winning, when all is said and done) only by keeping his opponent in the game. Seen from this angle, the pages Wyszyński wrote about Bierut, whom he sees in a dream at the moment of his death in Moscow, are a delight to read. Among the whimsical jestings of a Don Camillo and a number of crafty displays of magnanimity à la Gide or Jouhandeau, we find: "Never again will I have an argument with Bolesław Bierut. Already Bierut knows that God exists.... He is on our side from now on. [He was] the first Polish head of state to declare political and administrative warfare on the church. What awesome courage...! Finally the finger of God. Bierut died on foreign soil. He died in Moscow where he had consented to hand over one third of Poland to the Soviets, and where he had gone to seek inspiration to do battle with the church."

There was a Gandhi-like quality about Cardinal Wyszyński. Gandhi respected his British adversaries. He repudiated the slogan "an eye for an eye," which was threatening India with blindness. He was not afraid of prison. He was never in a hurry to get out of one. ("Freedom must be sought within prison walls," declaim both Gandhi and Nehru in the "Antimemoires" [Anti-Memoirs] of Malraux.) But he was always ready to argue. In prison Wyszyński announced the 30 years of nonviolent resistance which were to follow and the end of which came in 1980 and 1981, the first nonviolent revolution in an industrialized country. Prison also meant for him that his unworthiness had been recognized: "Prison is a scrapping of the old machine by God, an expression of His justice and His truth.... Even if my guards commit infractions, the Lord has the power to transform them into acts of His justice." Thus at any moment the persecutors may be dispossessed of their acts. And from that point, all kinds of reversals are possible. Wyszyński quotes the epistle of St Paul to the Romans: "Do not avenge yourselves, my dear children, but let God's anger do it, as it is written: I will take revenge, I will pay back, says the Lord." Does he purposely refrain from quoting what follows: "He who opposes the state authorities opposes God's ordering of things"? He goes beyond the formula, in fact. By accepting repentance as an expression of divine justice, he deprives government repressiveness of one of its basic attributes. He reduces it to an empty shell. Later Wyszyński would find an attractive way to turn Paul's troublesome formula around, the formula that others accepted too literally: "We do not do battle with authority as such, but with the abuse of it." His mark is recognized in the appeal to civil disobedience addressed by the Polish bishops to their priests in 1963: "Decrees that go contrary to human nature,

the Gospels, the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the constitution must not be carried out."

Wyszynski's determination paid off, as is well known. On 26 October 1956, two envoys from Gomulka (who had meanwhile succeeded Bierut and Ochab) came to inform Wyszynski that he was to be freed, that the isolation of the primate was making the people restless. Wyszynski then returned to Warsaw, and his conflictive dialog with the authorities was resumed once again on a firmer base than before. The position of the church was strengthened. The influence of his adversaries and of Pax decreased. In the years that followed, the non-Catholic opposition, which had been forming little by little, was becoming reconciled to the church. Slowly, it is true. Adam Michnik reproached Leszek Kolakowski for having waited until 1966 before answering the under-the-table appeals coming from Wyszynski, and deplored "the anti-religious obscurantism" flaunted during the sixties by the "atheistic intellectuals on the left" and the students then grouped around Kuron and Modzelewski.⁴ Anyway, what the Polish Left ended up by discovering in the throes of its disintegration--thanks in large measure to Wyszynski--was the moral dimension of political conflicts. And as a consequence, nonviolent resistance. Meditating on Thomas Becket, Wyszynski wrote while at Prudnik: "To govern a nation, one must renounce violence; only then will the troubles disappear. Empires crumble the more easily in proportion as the violence they exercise is greater. A police state is a desecrated state. It is then that a priest realizes his obligation to defend the citizens. His action does not infringe upon the authority of the state."

The Sin of Moses

The conflict between Wyszynski and certain of his bishops, which he is at first reluctant to mention, doubtless constitutes the most dramatic moment in "Notes from Prison." In its pages the ghost of Thomas Becket merges with that of St. Stanislaus, his illustrious Crakovian predecessor. Wyszynski was indeed aware that he had been betrayed. He who had written: "An ecclesiastical career demands that one be ready to go to prison," was apprised, two years later in Komancza, of the communiques that had appeared in the press at the time of his arrest. He thus discovered that the government had wrenched from the episcopate a statement directed against him, and requesting that Cardinal Wyszynski be given authorization to reside in a convent." A president of the episcopate had then been elected and had sworn an oath of loyalty to the republic. Churchmen had filled the periodical PAX with tendentious articles. Members of theology faculties had demonstrated their allegiance to the nation in congresses organized by Pax. Catholics had agreed to sit on committees along with members of the Zbowid, an alleged association of combattants in the service of the government. Commented Wyszynski: "The struggle against Christianity attracts those who want to change into bread the stones hurled at the church; swept off their feet by the forces of evil, they kneel before demons." When in 1956 the episcopacy sent a petition to the president of the Diet, requesting the release of the primate, Wyszynski reproached it for not sufficiently taking into account in its letter, the fact that the illegal decree which had determined his arrest was not reexamined: "I would have preferred that my case be treated differently." Four months later, he went further: "I thank you, Master, for having made my fate like Yours.... Your apostles left You, my bishops left me."

Your disciples left You, my priests did the same.... Only a handful of lay Catholics--who have never been considered very influential--still have the courage to recognize me."

The divorce between Wyszynski and his bishops (at least those who were not his fellow prisoners) is not of a moral order. One might suppose that the fissures within the episcopate in part reflect the four basic attitudes that Andrzej Wielowieyski singled out recently among Polish Catholics:⁵ 1) One must be satisfied to be a practicing Catholic and to survive; 2) One must support the regime and strive for broad cooperation between church and state; 3) One must struggle only to extend and reaffirm the freedoms of the church, refraining from cooperating with the regime except when it works "to increase the economic potential of the state, and thereby the national independence;" 4) (a position which is only just beginning to be limned out): "The destiny of Christianity and of the church in Poland depends on an extension of civil liberties and of the evolution of the political system in place and not on an agreement between the church and the state or on a privileged position for Catholics." Between 1953 and 1956, the bishops who still enjoyed their freedom, as well as certain other Catholic dignitaries intimidated by the authorities, oscillated between the first three of these attitudes. As for the primate, without severing himself from the third attitude, he gravitated toward the fourth.

According to Czeslaw Milosz,⁶ joined later and in very similar language by the sociologist Stefan Nowak,⁷ Polish Catholicism has "above all remained an attachment to the liturgy. In biblical tradition it is very weak.... [It] manifests a strong tendency to conceive of sin as a kind of Roman legal infraction.... [It] stresses our responsibility toward collective entities such as the church and the fatherland, in part identified one with the other, but relegates to second place one's responsibility toward real and living beings." Wyszynski remained always more or less imprinted with this brand of Catholicism. But the crisis he went through pushed him in directions until then less fully explored. He felt that from then on he would come into more direct contact with the vast throng of the faithful and at the same time maintain, even in church-state relations, the metaphysical dimension so often lacking in Polish Catholicism. He reproached himself with having always limited himself so excessively to his functions. He accused himself of the "sin of Moses," who was asked by his followers for the living water and who refused to take possession of the extraordinary faculties attached to his office. "I am overly realistic, overly aware.... My sin consists...in not imagining [any] impossible words." In prison, Wyszynski discovered that it would no longer be enough for him to carry out his episcopal functions well. "The position of the Polish episcopacy depends neither on intrigues...nor on dishonest dealings.... It depends on my present behavior.... All, including the party and the government, look to Komancza.... Those who have capitulated want me to resist."

These reversals, this juxtaposition of humility and heroism, as well as the unanticipated fact of his liberation, all confirm that the behavior of the primate went beyond mere functioning. At the beginning he was engaged in an inescapably conflictive dialog with the communist government. Now it is clear that the use of two different instruments that are not contradictory (a dualist attitude without duplicity) not only represented the single both morally accept-

able and politically effective behavior possible in the struggle against the communist adversary, but that, for the primate, this behavior had a metaphysical foundation. At that time, when the non-Catholic Left was readying itself to rejoin him in the moral dimension, he went a bit farther in the metaphysical dimension. He feared freedom more than prison. But what he refused above all was to consider any attribute or situation whatever as material for barter. The archetypical model for this form of refusal is Christ himself, who did not agree to change the stones into bread. And even an inflexibility before terror which is not due to a religious conviction may be linked to this fundamental refusal. In Wyszynski's reflections, the stone of the New Testament, not changed into bread, and the rock of the Old Testament, from which water ultimately gushed under the rod of Moses, to the profit of the nation, are one and the same.

An Insoluble Problem of Legitimacy

One would like (even an agnostic would like) to find as much firmness impregnated with metaphysics in Cardinal Glemp. But Wyszynski was the depositary of a brand of legitimacy visibly lacking in his successor, and which he possessed because of his style of spiritual resistance. For Poles, this question of legitimacy is crucial. That of Wyszynski was, of course, hampered by the defense of the church's sphere of influence, which had prior claim to his attention. Within that church, however, the trait designated by Simone Weil as the notion of orthodoxy seemed to have grown a bit thin since the fifties. Anti-Semitism was now nothing more than a line of action taken by the government. The methods used to promote anti-Semitism then struck at the church, just as they have been striking out at Solidarity since 1980. The church was the victim of measures that opposed the catechism, just as the Polish Jews of the prewar period (all other things being equal) were victims of the obligatory Sunday rest. The church's representatives helped Solidarity to formulate its demands, as Simone Weil expected of the unions, "not for more money, but for other incentives." Certain of Wyszynski's statements may have appeared overly conciliatory with respect to the government; for example, that in which, on 26 August 1980, at the height of the Baltic strikes, he called for "national and civic maturity in order to avoid foreign intervention." But coming from him, they could not seem shocking for very long. One will recall that in 1979, when he agreed to meet the new president of Pax, who seemed to be inaugurating a promising evolution (nipped in the bud since that time), he insisted on receiving representatives from KOR shortly thereafter. On the day following his death, 28 May 1981, Lech Walesa declared: "He almost never erred.... He prepared us, taught us to live, to go forward."

Since December 1981, Cardinal Glemp has preached a nearly univocal form of moderation: "The only possible route is dialog.... Solidarity among men exists in work and in feelings of nationality. It need not necessarily be an organization. What justification would there be for a brand of solidarity which would use up its strength in incessant struggle and opposition?" Obviously no one can take exception to the fact that Glemp disapproves of "a clandestine movement whose plan of action is to combat the state head-on." Adam Michnik long feared that "the ghost of 'The Possessed' of Dostoevski is hovering over every clandestine movement, and that conspiracy goes hand in hand with demoralization."⁸ But subsequently he changed his mind, and for him Soli-

clarity still exists.⁹ It would be interesting to know what Cardinal Glemp would have to say about a clandestine movement that does not combat the authorities head-on. Until the present time, he has almost routinely condemned all strike movements. He has rarely avoided the opportunity to disapprove of demonstrations. And the least that one can say is that his moderation has hardly been repaid in kind. On 29 November 1982, he called upon stage and screen actors to stop boycotting television; three days later, Jaruzelski dissolved the Actors' Association. A number of intellectuals then expressed their disenchantment vis-a-vis the church. The episcopate certainly reacted strongly to the laws of exception accompanying the suspension of martial law: It condemned in particular the "feudal-style" attachment of the worker to his place of work and the "psychic terror" to which notions as vague as that of a "sower of disorder" might lead. These laws nonetheless constituted a slap in the face for the moderate policies of Glemp. At the same moment, the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of Moscow gave the signal for a most violent press campaign against the Polish Church, accusing it of encouraging "counter-revolution." Police interventions both outside and inside churches and convents increased dramatically.

Until the month of June 1983, it was possible to believe that Glemp's moderation had facilitated the second trip made to Poland by John-Paul II. But already before this visit, the Pope had, without mincing words, expressed his support for Solidarity, proclaiming in 1982 the people's "right to a union already created and legalized" and asking all concerned to "do everything possible so that nothing would be lost...of what had come to see the light of day over the course of the previous two years, and thanks to which we feel today that we are the owners and masters of this Polish land." Keenly aware of these differences between the remarks of the Pope and those of the primate, Solidarity militants have clearly kept their distance with respect to Glemp and proclaimed their attachment to the memory of Wyszynski: "Cardinal Glemp does not foster the will to combat violence within the nation."¹⁰ "The church feels no doubt that the unions are a sacrifice to be made on the altar of Caesar.... The church... thinks more about eternity than about Solidarity."¹¹ A number of priests have rebelled against Glemp's attitude, and certain ones have been arrested. Bishop Tokarczuk, the ordinary of Przemyśl, said in a homily given in 1982: "The agents of blind force who persecute the young people, who persecute the workers...will pay the full price for this error. Can the church look upon all these sufferings without reacting, all these persecutions, all this demagoguery, all this terrible hypocrisy!" And he called for "the resumption of union activity, with Solidarity as leader." He also said that there was a trafficking in Glemp's statements calculated to separate the church from the nation; but other priests blamed Glemp's lack of prudence in affording so many occasions to the authorities to manipulate his statements: "Why do you give interviews, since in any case they will be exploited?" Glemp is now obliged, when traveling abroad, to protest that he does indeed support Lech Walesa. But it seems that in his mouth every remark, even when identical to one made by Wyszynski or John-Paul II, takes on a different meaning.

The homilies and talks of John-Paul II during his second trip to Poland, from 16 to 23 June 1983, left no room for ambiguity: "I was ill and you visited me; I was in prison and you came to me." He stressed the need to walk the road of dialog and agreement" without dissociating the two terms. His words recalled

the spirit of Cardinal Wyszynski, whom he quoted several times--and particularly the statement he made in February 1981 dealing with the free unions: "It is a question of the right that human beings enjoy to form associations; this right is proper to them and inborn.... This right is not bestowed by the state, which has only the right to protect it and to see to it that it is not violated." The firmness of these words contrasts with certain later statements, very vague ones from the episcopacy: "In order for work to be effective...the state must fulfill a number of essential conditions, and the worker must perform his tasks in a conscientious way."

Unfortunately there is worse. Last 6 January, after a lengthy meeting with Jazuzelski, Glomp condemned the installation of Western euromissiles: "Here we have news that certain European nations of ancient Christian culture are now bristling with death-dealing rockets." As Jan Krauze pointed out, "These terms designated the American rockets much more than the Soviet ones...." The position taken by the primate...runs the risk of colliding with the sentiments of a large segment of the Polish people, whose "pro-Pershing" sentiments are no mystery for anyone: it is not by chance, moreover, that Poland is the only Eastern country where the authorities have not dared to organize a popular "pacifist" campaign against the euromissiles.... In exchange for these generous gestures, did the primate obtain something in the course of his lengthy meeting with the head of state...? Nothing allows us to verify this at the present time, at any rate."¹²

Still more recently, Cardinal Glomp transferred a priest from the parish of Ursus (a working-class suburb of Warsaw), whose remarks and attitude seemed too pugnacious to him. Since the strikes and the repression of 1976, the working community of Ursus has always been in the forefront of the resistance to the abuses of power. THE FREE VOICE OF URSUS noted that a worker from Ursus had been invited to the first luncheon of the Pope in Poland, on 17 June 1983. Some residents of Ursus responded to Glomp's decision [to remove the priest] by organizing a hunger strike in their church. Such a gesture had never before been encountered in the history of the relationships between the Polish Church and its faithful.¹³

The Mastery of the Chessboard

If, in comparison to his predecessor, the present primate gives the impression of something contracted or shrunken, it is perhaps because at the summit of the hierarchy of Polish resistance, a dichotomy like that of India has come to exist: on the one side the Brahmin (Glomp) and on the other the fighter (Walesa). And, within the church, a second dichotomy: Wyszynski had closer ties to John-Paul II than Glomp has. The tactics have also changed. And tactical considerations have become more important. The twofold, though non-contradictory instruments are disappearing. Instead of a togetherness in contrary attitudes which nonetheless are not in opposition to one another, one hears successive statements that do contradict one another. The willingness to dialog, leaning less readily on firmness, seems to miss the point that agreement is what allows for more productive battle. The power and peace of the words of David, which Milosz had helped spread in Poland in 1981 ("Jahweh will give strength forever. Jahweh will bless His people in peace.") become dissociated. Non-violence is detaching itself from resistance. Solidarity was never simply an

organization. Its emergence (in the sense applied to this term by modern physics) means much more than that. As for Glemp, he sees in the Solidarity of today nothing more than a defunct organization. The latest position he has taken may even allow us to believe that we are now witnessing a major turning point in the relationship between the Polish Church and the communist state. It all boils down to the proportion of legitimacy the state is recognized as enjoying. Whether the latter wants it or not, its legitimacy, given its origins and its machinery, will never be whole and entire. This legitimacy comes to it from the outside essentially: Soviet origins and support, recognition by the international community. Since the Helsinki Agreements, one may even say that this external legitimacy is henceforth total, that it can receive no greater confirmation. But the Polish nation (which believes in Santa Claus) still hopes to broaden the weak base of its internal legitimacy.

During the postwar period, Wyszynski depended heavily on this desire, which the people had not yet begun to contradict in great numbers, as a basis for his politics of dialog with the authorities. In the attitude of the Polish Church under his direction, a kind of sharing came to exist. External legitimacy was recognized as it was already by the nations. That is why the question of the bishoprics in the former German regions was finally settled as the authorities wished. The visit of John-Paul II to Wroclaw, 21 June 1983, settled this question once and for all, and the Polish minister of religions went so far as to declare on this occasion: "The fact that the Pope is going (to Wroclaw) is tantamount to a declaration that he favors the Potsdam Agreement." But it was also at Wroclaw that the Pope pronounced the word solidarity most eloquently. As for internal legitimacy, it is quite a different matter. Wyszynski and John-Paul II frequently repeated that the nation is above its governing machinery, and that moral order is superior to political order. In other words: internal legitimacy has earned its own right to exist; it is contingent. The latter, moreover, contrary to the desires of the authorities, has also continued to shrink. The two visits of John-Paul II and the emergence of Solidarity have made this evidence crystal-clear: The Polish nation is less than ever the anointed of the people. It can take pride only in that fragment of internal legitimacy which results from the handling of administrative organizations when it conforms to the law. And Polish society does not cease in the main to refuse to allow external legitimacy to strengthen internal legitimacy unduly. No mixture of genres. Anent to this, the attitude of Marek Edelman, second in command at the time of the Warsaw Ghetto insurrection of 1943, is exemplary. At the beginning of 1983 he refused to serve on the committee of honor responsible for preparing the ceremonies desired by the authorities, declaring: the insurgents "struggled not only to remain alive, but also to live in dignity and freedom.... To mark our anniversary in Warsaw, where the entire life of society is dominated by humiliation, would be a betrayal of our struggle." On 17 June 1983, John-Paul II even called it to the attention of the Polish authorities that social renewal in Poland had begun in 1980, and he added: "Such a renewal is indispensable in preserving the good name of Poland." John-Paul II thus reversed the perspective: external legitimacy in no case confers internal legitimacy, but if the latter is too strongly questioned, then the former is fatally compromised.

Later events or statements of which we had no knowledge will perhaps come to light to contradict us. But to judge by our current information, it appears

that the attitude of Cardinal Glemp differs a great deal from that of Cardinal Wyszynski as far as the legitimacy of the communist government is concerned. Less firm in the criticism of abuses, Glemp is more inclined to recognize that this government has internal legitimacy. By his stance on the euromissiles, he extends the question of external legitimacy to legitimating policy that does not concern Poland alone. Cardinal Glemp, who is obviously not a good player of go, is letting the Polish government place its pawns in such a way that both internal and external legitimacies will soon be represented by a single piece on their common checkerboard. But who else will sit at this table?

FOOTNOTES

1. Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, "Notes de Prison" [Notes from Prison], translated from the Polish by Joanna Ritt, Editions du Cerf, 1983.
2. In the May 1955 issue of ESPRIT, Francois Sellier, recently returned from a trip organized by the Association of Polish Economists, writes: "No non-conformist Western authors are being translated.... Nonetheless, Pax Catholic Editions has translated several Western authors (Etienne Gilson, Bernanos, Daniel-Rops, Father Pezeril). The government's respect for freedom of worship has prevented an alienation of the working classes...." Not a word about Wyszynski, still in prison at that time.
3. See especially Pawel Korzec, "Juifs en Pologne" [Jews in Poland], Presses of the National Foundation of Political Science, 1980.
4. Adam Michnik, "L'Eglise et la gauche. Le dialogue polonais" [The Church and the Left. The Polish Dialog], Le Seuil, 1979.
5. "Nous chretiens de Pologne" [We Christians of Poland] Ed. Cana, 1979.
6. Czeslaw Milosz, "Une autre Europe" [Another Europe], Gallimard, 1964.
7. "Polakow Portret Wlasny" [Self-Portrait of the Polish], Crakow, 1979.
8. Adam Michnik, "Penser la Pologne" [Thinking Polish], La Decouverte-Maspero 1983.
9. LE MONDE, 1 September 1983.
10. SOLIDARNOSC, information bulletin, 27 October 1982
11. Ibid., 13 December 1982.
12. LE MONDE, 8-9 January 1984.
13. At the end of March 1984, the war of the crucifixes waged by students, parents of students and teachers in a number of Polish schools is one more proof of the spontaneous capacity for resistance of these faithful.

REVANCHISM ASSOCIATED WITH FATHER JANKOWSKI

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 272, 13 Nov 84 p 2

[Article by Obserwator: "Lord, Give Us Back a Free Motherland"]

[Text] A show was recently staged in Gdansk which could be described as a farce were it not for certain matters in it which are too serious for a farce. First, a look at the farcical elements in the story.

In a Gdansk church, Father Henryk Jankowski, who is well-known not only to the congregation of his church, was decorated with the "Commander's Cross of the Order of Poland's Rebirth." The decoration was performed by Father Bernard Witucki. The order had been granted to Fr. Jankowski by (yes!) the President of the Republic [little of the head of state in prewar Poland] on 30 August 1984.

This brief note looks like a farce. Fr. Jankowski was distinguished with the Commander's Cross for, quote, "his outstanding achievements in social and charity work" by the "President" of the Republic, that is, by a person living in London whose title is recognized by no one in the world and who represents nothing and nobody.

It is not even certain that this pitiful "President" is aware of this decoration.

By itself, this is a ludicrous story. However, it was accompanied by facts and events which cast an entirely different light on it. During this event in the Polish city, Gdansk, Fr. Jankowski claims that everybody is praying, "Lord, give us back a free motherland."

On the same day, the head of the Catholic Church in Poland, Jozef Cardinal Glemp delivered a homily at John the Baptist's cathedral in Wroclaw inaugurating celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the Catholic Church's return to Poland's ancient Piast lands.

How can these two events be reconciled? Fr. Jankowski is praying in Gdansk for a free motherland while the Cardinal celebrates a ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of the Church's return to those territories, a return which became possible only because after the victory over Nazism a free Polish state was born, bringing freedom to the Baltic coast and to the banks of the Oder. Is Gdansk not part of those ancient Polish territories?

But Fr. Jankowski's sermon is in tune with other voices and other views.

On the same day on which Fr. Jankowski spoke in the Polish city of Gdansk about freedom for the motherland, calls for a free motherland were also made in West Germany. In Bonn, Chancellor Helmut Kohl attended a congress of "East German Regional Associations [Landsmannschaften] at which its chairman Herbert Hupka said, 'We are speaking on behalf of our native lands, our patrimony in eastern Germany--Eastern Prussia, Western Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, Upper Silesia.' Another official representative, Josef Kuerten, told a meeting of the "Association of Gdansk People" who convened to demonstrate for the restoration of the "Free City of Gdansk" in Kiel on 26 May this year, "Let this meeting of representatives of the Gdansk people from all over the Federal Republic reinforce the awareness that the Gdansk people firmly continue to insist on their goal--the recognition of their right to the homeland from which they come."

What particular free motherland is meant? Is it only Gdansk, Szczecin, Wroclaw? West German revanchists have much bigger appetites.

In its official mouthpiece DAS OSTPREUSSENBLATT (23 June 1984), the Eastern Prussian Regional Association demands, "When publishing maps of Germany in its borders which are valid from the standpoint of international law, it is necessary to mark the Klajpeda region [Memel-Land]" because "from the standpoint of international law this region belongs to Eastern Prussia and is among the territories the state sovereignty of which has been reserved for future regulation. Thus, the 1937 border is unacceptable as a point of departure for future peace negotiations relating to territorial settlements. The idea of the 'borders of 1937' has its source in the occupation law imposed on Germany by the victorious powers after 1945," writes the journal.

The West German Minister for German-German Relations Heinrich Windelen dotted the i's when he told a 27 May 1984 gathering at the Munsterlandhalle that the purpose was to preserve a sense of duty toward the Eastern Prussian lands, because the point of this is all of Europe, but Europe does not end at the Elbe or Wiser rivers. "Also Dresden, Breslau (Wroclaw), Danzig (Gdansk), Thorn (Torun), Prag (Prague) and Warschau (Warsaw) belong to Europe."

This revanchist chorus, which identifies Europe with a great German Reich, is singing in unison. On 7 May this year, during a West Berlin instruction course in German politics, a Christian Democratic deputy to the West European Parliament and spokesman for the Association of Pomeranians, Philipp von Bismarck, said, "As for our children and grandchildren, the supreme question is not a 'return to the homeland' but 'European progress' toward a free Eastern Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania, for a free Poland in a free Europe."

A surprising coincidence--prayers for a free Poland are said by Fr. Jankowski and von Bismarck. Free of what? Of Gdansk, Wroclaw, Torun, Silesia, Warsaw?

During the Munsterlandhalle meeting, the leaders of the Eastern Prussian LANDSMANNSCHAFT distinguished Minister Windelen with and "Eastern Prussian Medal." "Again and again, you have spoken out for an undivided Germany. Never have you faltered in your views. You have reassured and encouraged us, the Prussians. You have been and you are a prudent honest advisor to us, as well as a friend who shows, I should say, full understanding."

Fr. Jankowski, who freely draws on money sent from the Federal Republic while also calling for a free motherland, has not yet received such a distinction. But instead he received one from London.

This story, which is pervaded with the spirit of Targowica [symbol of treason to Poles], makes one reflect on the moral standards and dignity no Pole should ever compromise no matter what kind of clothes he wears.

Fr. Jankowski today prays, "Lord, give us back a free motherland."

In 1978 I witnessed Primate Stefan Wyszynski's trip to West Germany. One of the sites he visited was the Dachau concentration camp where the Nazis had murdered 861 Polish clergymen. That occasion gathered members of West German organizations of Poles, including a choir which sang several songs. One of them was the religious hymn "Lord, Thou Which Hast Protected Poland for so Many Centuries" [of which the title quotation is part]. Cardinal Wyszynski was standing at the microphone. When the choir arrived at the final words, the Primate joined in the singing with his sonorous voice intoning, "Lord, bless the free motherland."

That was a lesson of patriotism. It should also be a lesson to Fr. Jankowski and his flock. But, is Fr. Jankowski capable of seeing the difference between Philipp von Bismarck and Cardinal Wyszynski?

CSO: 2600/306

DETAILS ON MEETING OF SEJM INTERNAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

PAP Version

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 2 Oct 84 pp 1, 2

/Text/ On the occasion of the approaching 40th anniversary of the formation of the Citizens' Militia /MO/ and the Security Service /SB/, a ceremonial meeting of the Sejm Committee for Internal Affairs and the Administration of Justice was held on the list of this month in Warsaw.

In addition to the deputies, the meeting was attended by representatives of services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs /MSW/ from the entire country. The following also participated in the meeting, which was presided over by the chairman of the committee, Deputy Zygmunt Surowiec (ZSL, Kalisz); Sejm vice marshals Zbigniew Gertych and Jerzy Ozdowski, as well as PZPR Central Committee candidate Politburo member and Minister of Internal Affairs General of Arms Czeslaw Kiszczak.

In recalling the events which accompanied the revolutionary socialist changes in our country 40 years ago, Deputy Z. Surowiec emphasized that next to continuing the fight against the Nazi invaders, the most important task was the rebuilding of the country and strengthening the people's authority and the undertaken reforms. In turn, a necessary condition for achieving these goals was the assurance of internal peace, law and public order. For the purpose of implementing these rather difficult tasks, the People's Council in Poland /KRN/ and the Polish Committee of National Liberation /PKWN/ created a Ministry of Public Security and a Citizen's Militia. It is impossible to enumerate all the tasks which were and which continue to be implemented today by the functionaries of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their basic function was and continues to be the protection of the nation's internal security and the creation of conditions that enable every citizen to live and work in peace. Methods and forms of combating crime are being perfected. Statistics tell us how many crimes have been uncovered and how many criminals exposed. "However," the speaker pointed out, "no one can say precisely how many crimes have been prevented by the efficient action of the organs of security and by the militia and how many have been thwarted. It is impossible to forget the significance of this preventive activity." The threat to our country from Western special services is a separate matter. It is not just recently that Poland has become the object of their interest. And it is also not just today that they have

started to sow unrest and weaken our defense potential by using increasingly more ruthless and complicated methods. "Not to notice this fact," indicated Z. Surowiec, "would be to lessen the unquestionable accomplishments of counterintelligence."

The committee chairman made reference to the events of 1980-1981 and recalled that specific spheres of political adversaries of socialist Poland were bent on creating an atmosphere of isolation for functionaries of the MSW within society. In the fight against the socialist state, the MSW became the main target of attacks against MO and SB functionaries: not infrequently, various acts of terror were committed.

In an atmosphere of socipolitical crisis, the functionaries of the militia and of the Security Service protected peace and social order as well as the fundamental interests of citizens: their life, health and property. They counteracted the increasing penetration of Poland by Western special services.

The fundamental task of the MSW under conditions of progressive normalization of life in the country is the firm and definite combating of the remnants of the antisocialist underground and all signs of social pathology including, in particular, the threat which criminal and economic violation of the law entails.

Deputy Z. Surowiec presented the cooperation between the committee and the MSW in a general outline form and emphasized that during the present term of the Sejm, the committee has examined the problems associated with the activity of this ministry. The minister of internal affairs has submitted information six times on the activities undertaken by the ministry for the assurance of public law and order in the country. The state of firefighting services in the country occupies an important place in the work of the committee. For the first time, the committee has conducted an evaluation of the service conditions and cadre situation of the Frontier Guard /WOP/. Frequently, the problems of protecting public property, of combating speculation and also the work of misdemeanor councils were discussed at meetings of the committee with the active participation of the MSW. Within the framework of its jurisdiction, the committee reviews annually reports on the implementation of that part of the state budget which concerns the MSW. The evaluations conducted by the Sejm deputies constitute a basis for determining whether financial-materials management is being carried out in an exemplary manner in this ministry. A general assessment of the work of the MSW was carried out by the Sejm at its session of 21 July of this year. In passing the act on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of People's Poland, the Sejm expressed recognition and gratitude to the MO and SB functionaries for their efforts in securing safe living and working conditions for the nation.

Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak reminded those gathered that the agencies of the Citizen's Militia and public security were formed under conditions of war operations and armed combat with the internal political adversary, with the reactionary underground, with detachments of the Ukrainian Insurrection Army and with Wehrwolf bands formed by the withdrawing Nazi invader. They /militia and public security agencies/ were faced with the task of assuring safety and order in the home front, assisting in the organization of a state administration

and giving assistance to settlers and repatriates. At the same time. MO and SB functionaries assured the carrying out of agricultural reform, of the referendum of 1946 and of the elections to the Constituent Sejm in 1947. In addition, they protected the turning over of industrial plants to state control.

"One of the main goals of the reactionaries at that time," the speaker indicated, "was to prevent the leftist forces from rebuilding the country's economy rapidly after the ravages of war. As a result of this, the security agencies were faced with serious tasks of protecting the national economy from economic sabotage. The efficient functioning of the nation's economy and administration at that time depended to a large extent on the quality of the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

More than 12,000 functionaries of the Security Service and the Citizen's Militia, soldiers of the Polish Army, soldiers of the Internal Security Corps and of the Frontier Guard as well as members of the Voluntary Reserve of the Citizen's Militia lost their lives fighting to protect the people's authority.

"After nearly 40 years of existence," stressed Czeslaw Kiszczak, "the Polish People's Republic confronted the threat from its own counterrevolution supported by foreign centers. Common lawlessness intensified considerably at that time. The law was being broken due to political instigation. The constantly complicated internal situation in the country during the 1980-1981 period presented the ministry with numerous new tasks. They were implemented. The fundamental goal was to thwart the plans of the adversary and not to allow a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat to take place, to put a stop to anarchy and the dissolution of the state, and as a result to avert the threat of a civil war."

"In December of 1981 as in 1944-1947, the functionaries of the Ministry of Internal Affairs," stressed the minister, "together with soldiers of the Polish People's Army /LWP/ stood in defense of the people's authority. This time the threat of fratricidal conflict toward which our adversaries pushed was prevented in time. Their dream of tearing Poland away from the camp of socialist states was not realized, either."

"The apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has constantly improved the system and methods of its operations," stated the minister. "Today, the newest achievements of criminal technology, criminology, and of many other exact and social sciences are being used in the work of the ministry. The qualifications of the functionaries are rising systematically. Currently, 22 percent of them have a higher education and more than 60 percent have a secondary education. They are being educated in a dozen or so schools under the auspices of the ministry, including three schools of higher education and many military and civilian colleges."

However, despite the enormous progress of science, technology and work organization, the main factor which determines the quality of the work of the entire ministry is man. The commitment of each functionary to the fulfillment of his obligations, his conscientiousness, his sense of responsibility, creative initiative professional qualifications, and specialized and general knowledge all play a part in shaping the effects of the work of the ministry on a national scale.

Czeslaw Kiszczak presented some of the actions taken to achieve a definite improvement in the state of the nation and public law and order. He reminded those gathered that in December of last year a Council of Ministers Committee for the Enforcement of the Law, Public Order and Social Discipline was formed for a more complete coordination of the activity of various state agencies which guard law and order. The committee initiated broad and long-term supervisory activity in the railroad industry, in the automobile transport industry and in the area of fuel management. From April of this year, systematic inspections were begun in selected areas of the nonsocialized economy and, above all, in commerce and in small production. Work was also started on amending rules and regulations, including the penal code, for the purpose of accelerating proceedings in cases of proven guilt of the perpetrator of a crime, for improving the economy with housing resources and for raising the state of law and safety within Polish State Railroads /PKP/.

At this point, the minister stressed that in the battle against crime, prosecuting agencies cannot be left to fend for themselves. It is indispensable that in this regard there be broad-scale social support as well as close and effective cooperation between the state and the economic administration at all levels which would lead to, among other things, a significant increase of responsibility for entrusted property and for the work of subordinates.

Czeslaw Kiszczak presented activity which is aimed at informing the public more closely about the problems involved in the work of the MSW. In this respect, there is a policy in effect of acting "on an open stage." The problems and effects of the work of the ministry's services, their accomplishments as well as their shortcomings are accompanied by current information about this and are conveyed at the Sejm forum, that of its committees, the Council of State and the government. The members of the ministry's leadership and heads of provincial offices of internal affairs meet with the work forces of plants, with young people and with journalists. Many publications appear every month in the central and local press on the subject of the work of the ministry, and radio and television programs are frequently aired on this subject.

This activity brings concrete results. Public trust in the MSW is growing. And yet, it was being undermined for many years by a severe, unscrupulous propaganda campaign which did not mince words and which was waged by our internal as well as external adversaries. A particular role here was played by subversive Polish language radio broadcasting stations, which heatedly attacked and continue to attack every form of activity of the ministry undertaken for the protection of order and security in the nation. These radio stations fabricate and propagate myths about the working conditions, salaries, housing conditions and health and recreational benefits of the functionaries of the MSW. All of this activity on the part of the adversary has a markedly subversive character and is intended to undermine public trust in MSW agencies and to pit the apparatus of internal affairs against the public.

Meanwhile, the facts are totally different from that which is being publicized in various forms and with varying intensity by the adversaries of socialist Poland. "A significant part of the ministry's cadre," stated Czeslaw Kiszczak, "particularly the young functionaries do not have their own apartments."

many live in very difficult housing conditions. The living conditions in the barracks of some units are also difficult, as is the situation of the ministry's health service."

Cooperation between the MSW and the Sejm Committee for Internal Affairs and the Administration of Justice is working out very well. Minister Czesław Kiszczak emphasized that the significance of this cooperation is expressed in the full implementation of the committee's recommendations and opinions, in the comprehensive explanation of all questions which pertain to specific problems of the ministry's work and its particular services, and at the same time in its cooperation in undertaken legislative work. Recently, the significance of this cooperation concerned such regulations of importance to the functioning of the ministry as the law on the office of the minister of internal affairs and the scope of activity of subordinate organs; the law pertaining to retirement provisions for MO functionaries and their families; amendments to law regarding passports, the census and identification cards and laws pertaining to the protection of state and official secrets as well as amendments to regulations concerning the breaking of the law. A draft law which would change the rules about the service of MO functionaries is being prepared.

The problems of the daily duties of MO and SB functionaries and the tasks which face the MSW today were discussed in subsequent speeches by the following deputies: Marianna Staniewska (PZPR, Lodz); Edward Dziegiel (ZSL, Suwalki); Paweł Dabek (PZPR, Lublin); Col Henryk Celak, assistant chief of the Warsaw Office of Internal Affairs; Col Zbigniew Bardan, representative of the MSW materials provision service; Master Sergeant Robert Kwiatek, district constable of the Wrocław-Krzyki District Office of Internal Affairs; and Lt Col Edward Rutkiewicz, assistant director of the WUSW /Provincial Office of Internal Affairs/ in Bydgoszcz.

In these speeches, reference was also made to the events which accompanied the formation of the MO and SB during the first postwar years, in which a part of the participants of the meeting participated directly. In raising social-living issues of the MSW functionaries, the difficulties of the work of the ministerial health services were pointed out as well as the difficult housing situation of the employees of the ministry. The problems of combating crime and social pathology were discussed and the importance of the cooperation of the services of the MSW with society was stressed. This united front of people against social wrongdoing will significantly increase the effects of activity for the strengthening of order, peace and public safety.

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On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Citizen's Militia and the Security Service, a ceremonial turning over of the banner which was funded by the people of Lodz for the Provincial Office of Internal Affairs took place on the 1st of this month in Lodz in front of the MO and WP /Polish Army/ honor guard, the Lodz garrison and MO subunits. Tadeusz Czechowicz, Politburo member and first secretary of the PZPR Lodz Committee, took part in the ceremonies.

Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 41, 7 Oct 84 p 14

/Article by B.W.: "Forty Years of Ministry of Internal Affairs"/

/Text/ On 1 October of this year, a formal meeting of the Sejm Committee for Internal Affairs and the Administration of Justice was held on the occasion of the 40 years which have passed from the moment that the People's Council in Poland, together with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, called into being, by the power of the decree of 21 July 1944, the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The meeting was opened by the committee chairman, Deputy Zygmunt Surowiec. In his presentation, he reminded those gathered of the role which was played by the first MO and SB squads during the years of the formation and the strengthening of the people's government. These were very difficult times. The young and inexperienced MO and SB cadre, which arose from partisan detachments of the People's Army, from Peasants' Battalions and from soldiers of the Polish People's Army encountered countless difficulties in its work. In the forefront was the struggle with the reactionary underground, with the Ukrainian Insurrection Army bands, with the survivors of the fascist army and also with looting, theft and speculation. "The implementation of the agricultural reform and the nationalization of industry, both of which were passed in the PKWN Manifesto, would not have been possible without the generous help of the functionaries of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for whom so often the only reward during those years was a birch cross," continued Deputy Zygmunt Surowiec.

Besides fighting the armed underground, a friendly hand was given at the same time to those who had taken a wrong turn by giving in to hostile propaganda. From August of 1945 to April of 1947, 125,000 members of illegal organizations came out of hiding.

"In 1984, the functionaries of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are carrying out their duties with the same dedication as in 1944 under the command of Gen Franciszek Jozwiak, the first commander of the ministry, an acclaimed activist of the peasant movement and chief of staff of the People's Army during the occupation," emphasized Gen Czeslaw Kiszczak, minister of internal affairs, who was invited to the ceremonial meeting of the committee. "During the first years of the people's authority," recalled Gen Czeslaw Kiszczak, "12,000 SB and MO functionaries, soldiers of the Polish Army and of the Frontier Guard lost their lives defending this authority."

As time went on, the working conditions, work, organization, methods, knowledge and tasks of the ministry underwent changes. Today, nearly 60 percent of the functionaries have a secondary education and 22 percent possess a college diploma. This is very important because the development of the technological base does not eliminate the most important factor in detecting crime--man, his knowledge and inventiveness. In training the workers of the ministry, attention is paid not only to improving professional qualifications but also to teaching respect for the law and professional pride and ethics.

And yet, despite a significant improvement in the work of MSW services, there is still a lot to be done. The detection of crimes has risen, but at the same time their number has also increased. In 1983, 466,000 cases of crime were established in completed preliminary proceedings, while in 1981 there were 380,000 recorded cases of crime. Attention is called to the fact that the percentage of economic crimes has risen. In 1983, militia statistics recorded 46,200 cases of theft of public property, while in 1981 there were 40,600 such cases. The creation of a Council of Ministers Committee for the Enforcement of the Law, public Order and Social Discipline is to serve the improvement of this unfavorable situation. Work on amending the penal code has also been completed. Particular attention has been paid to simplifying the process of criminal proceedings, and amendments to the housing law and to the rules and regulations which define PKP activity were introduced. These changes were subjected to broad social consultation and, after being approved, they were sent to the appropriate ministries for implementation. It is expected that during the 4th quarter of this year thorough inspections will be conducted in selected areas of the economy, with particular emphasis on commerce and private production. "The effectiveness of the undertaken activity depends equally on broad public support and on a sense of greater responsibility by people in managerial positions for the public property with which they are entrusted," stated General Kiszczak.

During the course of the discussion, a detailed analysis of the work of the services of the MSW was presented by Col Henryk Celak, assistant chief of the Warsaw Office of Internal Affairs. He stated that MSW organs are overworked and that at least some of the various matters should be taken over by social organizations. The results of the work of the last few years indicate an increase in the number of cases of social pathology, such as alcoholism and work absenteeism. Since last year these matters have been regulated by proper laws, but it is still too soon for any conclusions to be made as to the effect which they have had. Their weak point is implementation. Col H. Celak also informed those gathered that the number of crimes subject to the penal code has risen. This problem is particularly evident in large cities. In the last year in Warsaw alone, 400,000 persons have been prosecuted. However, prosecutory measures are only part of this complex problem. Broader preventive activity is also necessary. More attention should be devoted to the upbringing of young people and to the supervision of social communities affected by cases of social pathology by at the same time curbing their influence on youth.

However, this is not a simple matter. In Warsaw province there are several hundred drug addicts listed on file, who should be treated. Unfortunately, there are only a few beds available in the hospitals. The rising number of crimes committed by minors is also alarming. In 1980, 13,100 cases of various offenses committed by juveniles were recorded, while in 1982 there were already 13,700 of them. Deputy Marianna Staniewsak also called attention to this fact in her remarks. Col H. Celak added that "an increase in the number of house breakins and theft of private property is also being noted." Last year, 94,300 cases of theft were recorded, while in 1981 there were 81,000. This indicates that every day there are 350 breakins, and their rate in Warsaw, for example, comes to 1 breakin every 8 to 10 hours.

The rising crime rate entails rising costs which in principle constitute both a personal loss as well as a loss for society as a whole. The money paid out by the PZU /State Insurance Office/ does not, as a rule, compensate the losses suffered by the owner of a burglarized apartment or home, and the process of finding the perpetrators is becoming increasingly more expensive. As was pointed out by Colonel Celak, the thesis that the cost of pursuing a criminal is lower than the losses arising from a crime is not verified in reality. Thus, only one conclusion can be drawn from this--that first it is necessary to teach, then to watch well and effectively and only afterwards, if the need arises, to pursue and punish.

"The tasks placed before the agencies of the MSW, for the implementation of which they are accountable to society, cannot overshadow the internal problems with which MSW has to struggle," stressed Col Zbigniew Bardan, director of the MSW Supply Department. These problems concern primarily inadequate medical care, poor housing and recreational conditions. The hospital buildings often go back to the beginning of this century, while those built during the 1950's (exactly two) are used barely to 50 percent of their potential. In 1971 there were 56 hospital beds for every 10,000 people, and it may be said that this was not too bad. However, in 1981 there were only 36 places for every 10,000 people. By way of comparison, at the same time the national average rose from 52 to 56 beds. There is a shortage of specialized hospitals, sanatoriums and rest-recreational centers. A considerable shortage of housing is keenly felt. The number of acquired living quarters during the last period is barely 30 percent of that which the ministry used to receive between 1976-1980. "It is estimated," stated Col Z. Bardan, "that between 1983 and 1985 the needs of the functionaries of the ministry will be barely 35 percent satisfied." During the year, after using up all possibilities, approximately 3,500 apartments will be assigned, while there are 21,000 workers waiting for them. According to Z. Bardan, the solution of all of the presented problems is a matter for the next 10 years. It should be remembered, however, that the average pay, which is somewhat higher than in the entire economy, is a weak incentive for work in this profession.

The ceremonial session of the committee came to a close with the speech given by Deputy Pawel Dabek, a man who 40 years ago participated in the formation by the KRN /People's Council in Poland/ of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and who today fights for law and order and social justice.

9853

CSO: 2600/134

STRUCTURE, ROLE OF NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES DESCRIBED

Poznan-Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU in Polish No 11, Nov 84 pp 5-8

[Article by Brig Gen Andrzej Rybacki, deputy commander, National Air Defense Forces]

[Text] The air-attack weapons of our potential adversary--the aviation forces of the NATO countries--improved in quality during the 1980's. Combat capabilities and views on planning and conduct of ground and air operations in the military theater of operations have changed. The NATO countries continue to expect to make wide use of aviation, in global wars as well as in local wars, with and without the use of nuclear weapons.

In nuclear war aviation is to be used for carrying nuclear loads and destroying previously unidentified or newly detected objectives of operational and tactical importance. It is to be widely used also for air reconnaissance and the execution of assignments for the other combat arms, e.g., the naval forces and transport aviation. It is expected that cruise missiles will be used throughout. In conventional warfare aviation will be the main force of action from the air on objectives in the tactical and operational zone, still maintaining constant readiness to move into action using nuclear means of destruction. The goal of these actions will be to achieve and maintain control of the air in the military theater of operations, achieve superiority in nuclear weapons, knock out the communications system, and isolate the area of operations in an assigned territory or tactical-operational direction.

Aviation, according to the experience gained from the Vietnam and Near East conflicts, will operate in small groups composed of 8, 12, 16 and more aircraft, at low altitudes (300 to 500 meters), always under cover of strong radio interference. The individual strike groups will be commanded and guided by the AWACS system of air command posts.

NATO's tactical-aviation aircraft fleet is divided into three basic groups: The first group is made up of planes with extensive electronics equipment, containing instruments for automatic flight and firing, able to conduct combat operations in difficult weather conditions, at all altitudes and tactical-operational depths (F-15, Tornado). The second group are planes with less

complicated electronic equipment, designed to strike at ground and air targets at operational and tactical depths (F-16, Jaguar). The third group is composed of planes for direct support of ground troops (attack planes), with relatively little electronic equipment, designed to attack ground targets at tactical depths (A-10, Alpha Jet). In addition, a program is underway to build radio-warfare planes of the EF-111A type, and new tactical reconnaissance planes, TR-1A (a modified version of the U-2R plane), designed for use in a precision-reconnaissance and target-destruction system--the PLSS (Precision Location Strike System) electromagnetic radiation sources. This system is intended to strike mainly at radar and missile-entry systems.

Along with implementation of a plan to rearm tactical aviation, the engineering equipment of the air forces of the NATO countries is being modernized. The modernization involves increasing the combat load of the F-15 aircraft, its fuel reserves and the range of its computer-safeguards of the radar system and other onboard systems; equipping the F-111 fighter-bomber with a system of automatic flight at very low altitudes, an underslung Pave Tack weapons guidance system, a modern radio-interference system, and Maverick air-ground class guided missiles; installing, in the RF-4C airplanes, a new radio-electronic reconnaissance system, and on the F-4F fighter planes, apparatuses which increase the navigation accuracy and combat capability of modern weapons. Various types of onboard laser equipment are also being widely used. To make it possible to detect air targets at the propitious time, radar stations, whose range is 80 to 160 kilometers, are installed in fighter planes. Means of destruction in tactical planes which may be used to conduct conventional operations are also being modernized. These weapons may be fired at large distances from the strike objectives (missiles to 60 kilometers, guided bombs to 16 kilometers). A system of televisions and lasers is used. Cluster bombs are being used more and more. They can mine large areas with precision or be used against the enemy's armored weapons, destroy troops, airstrips and airplanes concealed in light concrete shelters.

In the countries which are signatories to the NATO pact, a system of ground-, sea- and air-based missiles (cruise) is being developed. These missiles carry nuclear warheads (up to 200 kilotons) to a distance of 2,400 kilometers. The entire flight is executed at a speed of approximately 800 kilometers per hour, at very low altitudes (on the order of 16, 30 and 300 meters). The accuracy of circular evasion is 30 meters.

That, in general terms, is the aviation of the NATO countries which the forces and weapons of the National Air Defense Forces may encounter in defense of the borders of our socialist fatherland.

The National Air Defense Forces, as an independent arm of the armed forces of the Polish People's Republic, operating as part of the coalition system of the Warsaw Pact countries' air defenses, ensure the inviolability of the air borders of our country. They execute their assignments within the complex of military endeavors aimed at protecting the administrative, political, and industrial regions, the regrouping operational troops, against the reconnaissance and air attacks of the enemy. The National Air Defense Forces accomplish their tasks by energetically fighting the enemy's reconnaissance, air attacks and radio interference.

The nature of the tasks accomplished has affected the structure of the National Air Defense Forces. They are composed of fighter aircraft units, missile and artillery troops and radio-engineering troops.

Fighter aviation of the National Air Defenses, as the most maneuverable means of defense, is designed to destroy the enemy's means of air attack in the air at distant approaches to the country's borders, defended areas and objectives. It may be used for strikes on objectives in the field of battle and on the enemy's on-sea objectives. Operating in the coalition system, the Air Defense concentrates its efforts on specified directions and zones of operation of reconnaissance means and air attacks. It fights enemy-troop landing operations, reconnoiters air, sea and ground objectives, covers ocean convoys and Navy operations, and strikes, independently and in cooperation with the missile (gun) artillery, at Cruise missiles.

A characteristic feature of combat operations of today's fighter aviation is its great activity in fighting means of air attack, the execution of assignments in ordinary and difficult weather conditions, day and night, at all altitudes (from low to aircraft ceiling). Fighter aviation does battle with the enemy in the air by individual planes and groups of planes. Planes are entered into battle using radar homing systems, mainly automated homing points.

Independence in an air battle is provided to a fighter plane by a long-range detection onboard radar station, which makes it possible to fight air targets in the lead courses and under large silhouettes. Combat operations are conducted from regular and reserve airfields, air operations fields, and cooperation fields.

The principles of the combat use of the National Air Defense Forces' fighter aviation is a particular achievement of aviation in the 40-year existence of people's Polish Aviation. The basic principles include:

--High combat readiness and political disposition to protect and defend the borders of the socialist fatherland. This includes programmed training and education of the aviation unit personnel; political-party work, the shaping of dedication to ideals, patriotism and internationalism; complete identification with the party's political line and service to the nation; mental strength, the will to fight and dedication to the lofty ideals of socialism and progress; pilot training in all weather conditions and obtainment of a class 1 pilot rating; mastery of battle skills at all altitudes and under all conditions; preparation of combat and security equipment by the unit personnel; and competent work by the command and staff in directing the training process and the group's combat operations.

--Concentration of effort to execute the main tasks in a given area and during the most important period of combat operations. It is important to concentrate aviation's efforts by dispersal before operations, camouflaging aviation groups and entering them into battle at the proper time in combat operations.

--Organization of cooperation between the radio-engineering and missile troops, the ground forces of the Antiaircraft Defense, the Navy, and neighbors.

In the National Air Defense Forces' system this is one of the most important decisionmaking elements for every aircraft commander. It is based on constant reporting on the current position of air-attack weapons and one's own aircraft. The accomplishment of combat assignments and the security of one's own aircraft depends on well-coordinated cooperation.

--Surprise, which is achieved by employing the aircrafts' high maneuvering capabilities and high speeds, concealed entry into battle, use of automated homing systems, reduction of onboard radar radiation, and maintenance of radio silence.

--Economical use of forces and weapons. This is based on assigning to aviation only those tasks which it is able to execute taking into account its equipment, weapons and combat capability. In addition, consideration must be given to the tactics of operations and the flight personnel's training.

--Direct command. In the National Air Defense Forces it is the rule that the group flight commander personally commands the forces and weapons under him from the SD [expansion unknown], making use of reports from radio-engineering subunits.

During combat operations, fighter aircraft in the National Air Defense Forces employ the following methods in executing their tasks:

--Intercept air targets by being on duty at the airfield. This is the basic, most economical method of operating, used during periods when complete information is available on the location and flight direction of the air target assigned for destruction. This method is typical during periods preceding the enemy's air attack. It is also used to enhance aviation's combat operations and when the zone of target destruction is at a distance equal to or greater than the ordered zone, in relation to the objective being defended.

--Intercept air targets by being on duty in air in the duty zones. This method applies when there is no information about the current position of the air target and there is a real risk that it will penetrate into the defended objective with impunity. An earlier, shortlasting entry of aircraft into the patrol zone considerably shortens the period of entry of fighter planes into battle and provides an opportunity for destroying the air target in the ordered zone. This method of operation is typical for the first-strike groups located in the main air-operations areas.

--Independently seek and attack air targets. This is a forced and not very economical way of operating, used when there is lack of information on the location of air targets and the enemy's current activity at the approaches and deep in the area of defense (responsibility). The crew, or group of fighter planes which is in the assigned patrol zone independently destroys the air targets it sees. This method will be typical in operations against Cruise missiles.

Combat assignments can be accomplished by the National Air Defense Forces aviation only if the personnel are well trained.

In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Polish People's Republic and the 40th anniversary of the Polish People's Army, aviation units are implementing the instructions contained in the speech made by the Minister of National Defense, General of Arms, Florian Siwicki: "...we must assiduously undertake a comprehensive battle to activate, through training, the entire professional cadre, to increase its conscientiousness and discipline, to stimulate the meticulous and rigorous enforcement of regulations in military daily life, and to fulfill in full measure and at every level the demands ensuing from the governing range of training responsibility, include the area of organization and methods."

Intensive training, both on the ground and in the air, is taking place in the aviation units of the National Air Defense Forces. The unit commanders would like to see all of their personnel learn to work excellently, to organize their life in a group in which there is understanding and mutual respect. It was this year's assignment to achieve a high level of training. Forms of integrated training were applied generally in the units. Great emphasis was placed on "militarization" and improvement of "soldierliness." The air force garrisons are strictly observing military regulations. The following principle has been introduced in the air groups: Whatever the state of order and discipline on the ground, that is what it will be in the air, and that, also, will be flight safety.

9295

CSO: 2600/224

TWO YEARS OF PRON: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROSPECTS CITED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Nov 84 p 3

/Interview with Jerzy Jaskiernia, PRON National Council general secretary by Krystyna Kostrzewa: "The Differences Must Not and Should Not Divide Us"

/Text/ /Question/ PRON /The Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth/ has been in existence now for 2 years. Quantitatively speaking, how far would you say the movement has come? Under the complicated conditions existing 2 years ago, it was widely believed that the movement would end up going nowhere.

/Answer/ The movement has come a considerable way. The movement is difficult to define in terms of its overall membership, inasmuch as we really do not know how many members PRON has. The movement is not a formal organization, people do not sign up and membership cards are not issued. On the other hand, we have more than 16,000 chapters spread throughout the entire country, including both cities and villages. There are about 800,000 activists in these chapters. During the recent people's council elections campaign alone, the movement added by 2,500 new chapters. At least 135 different organizations throughout the country have acceded to the movement. Recently, PRON has been setting up movement cells at our institutions of higher learning and secondary schools. Young people are showing an increasing interest in the movement's activities. This is a very noteworthy development.

/Question/ Certainly. However, the movement's further progress depends on how we evaluate its accomplishments, its positive accomplishments. What, to say, has PRON done what it was supposed to do during these 2 years?

/Answer/ PRON's accomplishments are widely known. I will mention here some political initiatives as first the introduction and then the suspension of martial law, the release of those interned, and finally the double amnesty for those individuals who found themselves in trouble with the law for political and parapolitical reasons. I will also mention that PRON was significantly influential in the undertaking and final form of laws and statutes concerning the system of people's councils, territorial self-government, and the election law dealing with the people's councils. Beyond this, we actively participated in formulating laws dealing with public consultations and voting. These are only a few examples of our activity associated with the democratization of life. Behind us, we have the elections to the people's councils, which are now considering a series of new decisions dealing with the council's functions and democratization.

/Question/ Yes, but do you believe that the movement has achieved precisely the goals which society expected it to achieve, i.e., national accord and rebirth?

/Answer/ The answer to this question depends on how well we keep in mind the problems Poland was having when PRON emerged and under what circumstances the movement had to work during its initial period. Martial law had been declared in order to save the state from chaos and anarchy. Although it had been rejected by a certain segment of society, people felt the rigors of this situation; there was a severe economic and political crisis and ideological confusion. All of this created obstacles in the way of necessary and proper actions on the part of society and the authorities to rejuvenate the country socially. This rejuvenation was understood to be a comprehensive restructuring of the makeup and functioning of every area of life. The differences within society and those between society itself and the government should not divide us if we are talking about a higher need and the welfare of the fatherland. This was the idea behind setting up a movement of national accord 2 years ago. It is no accident that it was written into the ideological and program declaration that: "We are striving primarily to eliminate the sources of conflict in society and between society and governmental institutions." With regard to the scope of PRON's initiatives and activities, the movement has dealt chiefly with problems of conflict. PRON, however, has done everything it was supposed to do then. Of course, if someone expected that the movement would be a panacea for all of life's headaches during the crisis, he was certainly dissatisfied. This applies especially to those who generally did not believe then in the possibility of the idea of consensus materializing. As far as they are concerned, PRON achieved more than they had anticipated.

/Question/ It seems as if we are talking about the existence of two independent parties: a monolithic society with its own wishes and desires and some all-powerful force which is supposed to fulfill these desires....

/Answer/ Exactly. I would like to say that the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth is made up of people, i.e., society. The movement's strength does not depend of a group of activists on the National Council or in those councils at lower levels. It is dependent, however, on the public's support, the citizens' attitude towards the movement's ideas and activities. Unfortunately, far too many people have an indifferent attitude which, it seems, expects only the worst to happen. There are circles which consciously choose to remain ignorant with regard to the necessity for national accord; this, of course, hurts both society and the state. These circles often manipulate public opinion considerably. Several scientific, cultural and Roman Catholic intellectual circles constantly maintain an indifferent attitude....

/Question/ Perhaps we can conduct a very frank polemic or extremely frank dialogue with these circles, unless they demonstrate complete political imperviousness in relation to our important arguments, or obvious hostility with regard to everything socialist. And not only from a position of infallible argumentation. Here I will express my own view: I personally miss such a dialogue.... I miss a publically conducted dialogue with people who only recently were designated our political opponents, and now, despite their having been pardoned, are simply mistaken.

/Answer/ During discussions in a recent seminar with some of PRON's activists, we devoted much time to this issue. Reflecting jointly on the movement's accomplished and upcoming tasks, its role and place in society in a sociopolitical context different from that of 2 years ago, we spoke of the need to be far more open in our dialogue with its inherent dissimilarity of views regarding certain cardinal problems facing Poland and the Poles. I agree that the movement should be far more open than heretofore with regard to even controversial views, as long as they are expressed clearly for the good of the fatherland, strengthen the state, and do not negate the foundation of our political system. PRON intends to become an open forum for polemics and an arbitrator of objective arguments. Everyone does not have to agree with our ideological and program declaration, but he should know that even the declaration itself is a subject to be discussed and advanced.

With regard to the timeliness of our reasoning, we see how the 17th Central Committee Plenum of the party recently strengthened our hand when it confirmed in clear terms the social need for dialogue. It is sufficient to quote here the words of Premier Jaruzelski: "Our aim, which expresses a most profound political and social necessity, is to expand constantly the context of dialogue, mutual understanding, and social cooperation. We will not hastily consider anyone who opposes us an opponent and we will close no door before anyone."

Premier Jaruzelski stated pointblank that he is addressing those people who are genuinely concerned with Poland as she exists today and that they should take advantage of the opportunity presented by PRON if they differ with these or any other issues at hand. The premier indicated that we in PRON should be the addressees in such discussions.

/Question/ One more question dealing with the idea of what happens next in the movement's future. How far do PRON's achievements go with regard to the actual essence of its ideological and program declaration? I recall only those goals which undoubtedly facilitate reconciliation with those circles which manipulate, i.e., the democratization of governmental and public performance, the expansion of civil participation in government, moral rebirth, a guarantee of social justice, and the more effective setting up of an extensively intelligent, material and spiritual environment for the individual.

/Answer/ We are not talking about issues which change from day to day, or problems which are solved with the passage of a single law or ruling. Changes are achieved gradually as part of a whole process. PRON has already initiated many actions leading to the democratization of the country, extensive civil participation in governing and administering, the total implementation of the principles of social justice, and an effective prohibition of any negative factors resulting from a crisis. We have already spoken of several actions. I believe, however, that our accomplishments are insufficient in many of the above-mentioned areas and that we are always facing our most important achievements. After all, the movement's program, adopted at PRON's First Congress, will provide us with tasks until the Second Congress in 1987. We need only to set an agenda, a schedule for their implementation.

/Question/ Let us talk about tomorrow, about the distant future. There are no more "impressive" or spectacular problems to solve like the suspension of martial law or political amnesty....

/Answer/ Maybe not, but we still have a need to continue and accelerate the processes associated mainly with the democratization of the country, moral rejuvenation, reform of social institutions and the economy, and an extensively intelligent prevention of a return to past mistakes. We have a need to bring as best as we can a further and comprehensive understanding between the most divergent social groups and the government in order to implement fully the promises and values of socialism, and this implementation process should be approved by the broadest possible segments of the public. We have discovered and continue to discover that society is a part of life; all of our actions should and will be targeted at the implementation of this principle.

/Question/ That is a rather general assertion....

/Answer/ We are undertaking and will continue to undertake in the near future many specific measures. The creation of such institutions as the Constitutional Tribunal, in accordance with a constitutional amendment which envisions the tribunal to become the Office for the Protection of Civilian Rights, ranks among the most important and politically fundamental issues with which we are dealing. Additionally, we have the proposed bill dealing with social consultations and public voting; we are also undertaking intensive actions concerning the nature and development of education, including the National School Assistance Movement, and the struggle against social ills. The key area of current public dissatisfaction is moving from the political to the economic. For this reason, PRON's activities must work to discover such measures in this area that are closely linked to the material level of the public's life and to social justice on this level. And as far as our less important problems are concerned, even though their impact on society can be great, I will only mention the protection of the environment as one of them. PRON should also thoroughly discuss and take a position on rationing, which is still dragging on and causing undoubtedly harmful social repercussions. We also still have a lot to do in the area of administration and civilian contacts. PRON plays a key role in the elections campaign for positions in the self-government of city and rural inhabitants; the election problems here were caused by the people's council elections and are clear and specific. An especially important challenge facing PRON will be the Sejm election in 1985; this election will be preceded by discussions on a new elections law.

/Question/ Can you characterize PRON's relations with the government? There once were fears in the movement itself, not just among its opponents, that the relations would not be equal, that PRON would be just a screen, a facade....

/Answer/ I have been the movement's general secretary for too short a time to evaluate this problem accurately and objectively. But if we are talking about good cooperation and correctness in building the relations of a social movement with the government or with the state's administration, then our mutual meetings and discussions should prove that things have worked out well for us. Our next meeting will be in December; we are now preparing issues which we intend to

bring up. Generally speaking, these will be issues from the social areas of economic reform, social policies, and cooperation with the rural administration. These are very substantial issues. I simply reject the notion that we are talking about a conspiracy to throw up a curtain to cover the government's efforts or some sort of facade calculated to confuse the people. This notion will also be rejected by anyone who objectively considers PRON's accomplishments up to now and wants to follow PRON's efforts in the future....

/Question/ The abduction and murder of Father Popieluszko strikes at the heart of any national accord; it can have a retarding effect on any dialogue or plans to enhance it in the future....

/Answer/ Without knowing in advance of the horrible conclusion to this kidnapping that the priest had been murdered, I proclaimed this act shameful on behalf of our movement's attempts to reach a consensus at the 17th Plenum and simultaneously appealed to the public not to permit itself to be pushed off the road of national accord. The movement condemned this provocative and criminal deed during the deliberations of our National Council's Executive Committee Presidium, proclaiming it to be a dagger driven into the still unhealed wound of the Polish people, who were still suffering from the events of recent years. I can now repeat and ensure that we will remove any and all obstacles on the road to national accord.

/Question/ Yes, this was emphasized strongly at the 17th Plenum. What has emerged for PRON from the deliberations of the plenum?

/Answer/ A great deal. Briefly summarizing the deliberations' results for PRON, we find that the party, as the guiding force of our state, has become a steadfast and decisive supporter of national accord; the party stands close to us with regard to our movement's basic concept of expanding the social base to state government. It was also simultaneously and distinctly stressed at the same plenum that without extensive public participation the state stands alone; this then breeds doubt, uncertainty and error. Even this sole assertion, though there were many like it, testifies to how much the authorities, as well as we activists in PRON, have to gain in the development of democracy and the attraction of the widest strata of society for the purpose of governing the state; this especially includes the attraction of the largest number of people who belong to no party and are thus not organized. These opportunities, and I stress this once again, can be realized by PRON. I would also like to take this opportunity to repeat one of the thoughts expressed at the plenum, namely, that many negative developments in our social life are the result of a lack of know-how in utilizing the democratic institutions we already have. It is also PRON's task to utilize these institutions and to teach other people how they too can take advantage of them.

INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE INITIATIVE PRAISED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 264, 3-4 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Zygmunt Szeliga: "Dispossessing the "Haves"]

[Text] This column should probably begin by referring to the works of philosophers and other learned men who study human nature. It was these men who discovered and described two different attitude and behavior patterns of man in relation to his fellow man. The first, which can be described as active and creative, is marked by a commitment to equal the achievements of others. In contrast to this pattern, there is a destructive, passive pattern, which in its most extreme version consists of a desire to deprive others of what they own, and in a milder version, involves a disinterested envy, frustration and anger.

Now, 40 years after the construction of socialism began in Poland, after 40 years of developing socialist social relations, nobody can reasonably claim that an individual's material position or social status here are the result of the same factors as are at work in the capitalist system. Only this might justify the destructive attitude, an attitude of continually claiming things for oneself. Nor can one argue that those who have achieved nothing in life owe this solely to external factors beyond their own control.

Yet destructive, passive attitudes are very common in Poland. This problem acquires special significance at present given the economic reform, designed to create a totally new model of the way in which our economy functions. This new model is based on the energy and enterprise of the individual, of social and occupational groups, and of economic organizations. But this spirit of enterprise must be rewarded with tangible benefits, while these same benefits have to be denied those who fail to display this attitude. I am positive that, unless this rule is unconditionally respected, we will achieve no progress either in our bid to reform the economy or in our attempts to achieve the kind of growth which any impartial assessment of our actual potential tells us is entirely feasible.

In other words, every individual and every economic organization has to be absolutely certain that they will have the right to possess anything they achieve thanks to their own ingenuity, enterprise or imagination, or even by skillfully exploiting favorable circumstances. And nobody will be able to take it away from them. This must apply both to individuals and to enterprises. Thus, if Mr Kowalski takes proper care of his 50 hectares of land and raises 600 pigs within a year (let me assure readers that this is quite feasible), then he has every right to make a net profit of Zl.2 million. Nobody has any grounds for resenting this, even if Kowalski's net profit appears staggeringly high

when compared to the average monthly earnings of under 20,000 zlotys, or even to the salary of a government minister. What is ultimately important to the economy, to society as a whole, is the fact that Kowalski's pigs constitute 60 tons of meat, enough to cover the meat rations of a town of 20,000 people for an entire month.

Accordingly, if a Mr Nowak and several of his friends open a brickyard near Warsaw and churn out a million bricks a month, and if every one of them makes a million zlotys a month doing so, then they cannot be allowed to live in fear that somebody is going to take this away from them.

I repeat--this is the way it should be, the way it has to be, if our yearnings for an efficient economy (and consequently, for the well-being of our citizens) are not to remain empty promises and hopes. Needless to say, none of this means that we should condone profiteers, thieves, individuals or firms who make exorbitant profits with no real effort on their part, etc.

But unfortunately, cheap egalitarianism is still rampant in Poland. To its champions--people with destructive, passive attitudes--all private ownership is like a red rag to a bull: Does this person have that? Do those people have that? Then take it away from them! Give it to the "have-nots."

This is a simple and easy formula for social justice, equality, and other noble things besides. But in reality this philosophy will produce neither justice nor true equality, but the demise of energy and enterprise, and the equality that stems from common poverty.

The call to dispossess the "haves" applies, of course, primarily to individuals, especially those in the private sector, private farmers, etc. The aforementioned Mr Kowalski has meanwhile cut back his herd of pigs, producing not 600 but a few dozen every year. He was tired of fending off the hordes of zealous advocates of equality who visited his farm nightly in search of boxes containing dollars and jewelry which they might share out amongst themselves. Rumor had it in the village that Mr Kowalski had amassed these riches in return for his pigs. Now that there are no pigs, says Mr Kowalski, there is no envy. And I can get by with what I make from my crops and my few pigs.

CSO: 2600/309

BAKA SPEECH FOR SEJM DEBATE ON ECONOMIC REFORM

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Nov 84 supplement REFORMA GOSPODARCZA pp 1, 2, 4

[Speech by Wladyslaw Baka, government commissioner for economic reform delivered before a plenary session of the Sejm on 10 October 1984: "Instrumentation Is More and More Effective."]

[Text] It is not my task to read a paper on the themes of the government report on the implementation and results of the reform; these are well known to you as citizens and deputies. The report itself was published and is easily available. I believe it is my duty to discuss certain problems mentioned in the course of discussion in both the commissions and at today's plenary session.

First of all, I would like to stress the concurrence of the evaluations of the deputies and the government in the complex questions connected with the implementation of the reform. This refers to processes that took place in the past, hierarchization of problems that remain to be solved, and most of all, the course of their solution. Statements, made today, at this podium, that the principles of reform are being borne out by experience, that there is no other way to improve our economy and bring it into a line of lasting progress except through effective implementation of the principles of reform, are very important.

This general evaluation given by the Sejm strengthens the conviction and determination of the government in implementing the program of reconstructing the system of economic functioning outlined three years ago by the Ninth Congress.

In his speech, Prof Alojzy Melich, deputy and reporter, and other deputies, called attention in their statements to the weaknesses of the implementation, the ineffectiveness of certain methods and the insufficient exploitation of possibilities created by the reform.

The government is aware of many inadequacies that occur in practice, including those in its own activities. Appropriate actions are being taken to overcome these weaknesses, to master the workings of managing the economy and increasing the precision and effectiveness of economic instruments. Even if progress in this area continues to be inadequate, specifically, as a result

of a lack of adequate ready methods and examples of how to proceed, then at least it is becoming progressively more clear. Parenthetically speaking, we must fully accept the comment of Deputy Melich that the new system of economic functioning places new tasks before science, especially with respect to developing methods and ways of action of the central organs in managing the national economy through economic instruments. Guided by the method of gradual progress -- there is no other method -- we are streamlining the mechanisms of functioning and the central direction of the economy. Everything indicates that this is producing continuously improving results. This conclusion is supported by comparing the results achieved in 1984 with results in 1983. It can be illustrated using the example of three exceptionally important problems.

First, the matter of prices. The instruments we are using today seem to be better and more effective, however still inadequate, than in the past year. The fact that during 8 months of the past year, increase in retail prices was 13.6 percent while the plan envisioned 15-16 percent indicates that the instruments used were effective enough to maintain the price increases within the planned limits.

In this way conditions are created, as was often brought up in the course of today's discussion, for enterprises to aim primarily, and in the future, exclusively at a real increase in production and a real improvement in management efficiency. In view of the facts, we cannot today say that we have not mastered the processes of setting prices. At the same time, however, we cannot say that all of this is already in order, that everything has been done. We believe that the regulations are proper, but implementation still leaves much to be desired. This refers, for example, to the principle of using fixed costs as a basis for setting prices. The regulation is warranted, but its implementation in practice presents serious difficulties. But we must not yield. Taking into account all the limitations and difficulties, in practice we must unconditionally maintain this essential principle. This is in the interest of the reform. More than anything, however, it is in the interest of the people.

Enterprises do not take advantage of the rights granted to them to protect themselves against excessive purchase prices. The report shows that of 800 cases of price investigations, in only approximately 350 were there any traces of any price negotiation. This was the case in 1983. This year, the situation has improved somewhat. Specifically, limiting the possibilities of price increases of the end products resulted in the enterprises becoming more interested in the prices of production factors, the prices of raw materials and equipment. Now we are taking a further step. The principle has been introduced that in case of an increase in prices of supplies of raw materials and equipment, an enterprise will not be able to transfer all of the effects of the change in prices of supplies to the price of the final products. It will be able to transfer only a limited part, for example 95 percent, of such effects. The remainder, if the enterprise wants to maintain a profit, will have to be "covered" by an improvement in efficiency. We have evidence that this regulation will elicit a protest on the part of many enterprises. Its

introduction is in the interest of the people, and, in the long run, also in the interest of the enterprises themselves.

Our goal is, and this is consistent with the guidelines of the economic reform, to give prices an internal character with respect to enterprises, to eliminate incidents of exploitation by enterprises of a monopolistic situation, the possibility of forcing prices on their partners. An in-depth study of the market has been done so that we might better match prices to conditions prevailing in a given sector of the market.

Some circles of the community are heard to claim that official prices should be made universal and uniformly imposed, that allowances should be limited. But we must consider that a person who demands official prices for all goods and services and at the same time demands that allowances be limited, falls into a contradiction. This is the verdict of economic patterns. I speak of this because propositions pertaining to extending the range of official prices and propositions pertaining limiting allowances are equally popular among people.

Finally, the aspect of social consciousness. A complete, permanent regulation of prices, making prices exclusively official, would result in a regression in economic consciousness. Specifically, it would confirm in the community a false conviction that the government and its will decides the level of prices. We know that such a conviction has, in the past, in an exceptionally forceful way made it more difficult to rationalize the national economy. And consequently, this was the case with prices external to the enterprises. However, formulated in the same way as regulations of economic efficiency, the regulations on social expenditures were unconditionally respected. This is the line that the government uses as a guideline in its activity.

Second, the problem of wages. A year ago theses were formulated concerning anarchization in the area of wages. Today we sometimes hear that we did not make much progress in this area. The problem continues unresolved, but perhaps even in this area we can speak of changes for the better. During the last three years we passed from a complete deregulation of the wage system in 1981, and partially in 1982, to initiating the construction of a new order in this area. Putting wage scales in order is very difficult, both because of strong social pressures and from consideration for the sociological order already established; thus, wages can be equalized only almost exclusively by raising wages. This requires very substantial funds, significantly exceeding the potentials that our economy commands. In the process of ordering wage scales, two directions are most important: correcting the wage systems in the enterprises themselves and creating bases and mechanisms of an effective central wage policy. On 26 January, the Supreme Sejm passed an important law creating plant systems of compensation. At this time approximately 350 enterprises are operating according to the principles of this law. We expect that by the end of the year the number of such enterprises will be 700. It was resolved that after 2 years, the Sejm will evaluate the functioning of this law on the creation of plant compensation systems. Work on this evaluation

has already started. In general, it may be said that the solutions covered by the law are proving themselves in practice and serve well to reinforce the dependence of wages on results of work.

However, if we are concerned about forming a central wage policy, then the matter is considerably more complicated, specifically because there are no suitable scientific methods that would, in an unequivocal manner, determine what kind of system and what wage scale are just. In this area, international comparisons are also deceptive. A return to wage scales of the past would also be unwarranted. What was recognized as acceptable just 10 years ago is unacceptable today. What is considered just in another country is admitted to be improper in Poland. We also had to undertake the task of creating wage scales and proportions from the guideline base. We will be able to take these scales as a basis for wage policy if they stand the social test, if they are accepted in the crucible of popular discussion and in practice.

Finally, third, the matter of improving efficiency. Frequently it is said that in this area, the reform mechanisms have had no effect thus far. In the light of facts, such an opinion appears to be unfounded. I will limit my comments to two elements. In 1983, we had a decrease of 2.6 percent in materials required for production, and in the first half of this year, this decrease was 5.2 percent. We must also take into account the fact that industry is operating under conditions of serious import limitations. The matter of productivity is similar. Not many people in Poland are conscious of the fact that during 9 months of the current year, productivity in industry was 4 percent greater than it was in 1979, the best year for productivity. This is in terms of real time. Meanwhile, under comparable conditions, or taking into consideration shortened work time, productivity, computed in fixed prices obviously, was approximately 7.5 percent higher. This means that in the area of productivity in industry, we have taken a definite step forward. Despite this, industrial production continues to be lower by approximately 3.5 percent as compared with 1979. This is the result of a drop of approximately 7.5 percent in employment. Industrial production per person is less by approximately 9 percent, which is connected with the increase in population that occurred during the last 5 years. We must also keep in mind the fact that this index is a statistical average. Production of certain items and their supply in the marketplace continue to be lower by several percent than they were 4 years ago. These painful shortages in certain sectors of the market are what the people feel. This is the real reason for the discrepancy between statistical data that illustrate the objective picture of the economic situation in the country and the people's impressions of this situation.

On the basis of these facts, we may say that in 1984 there was an improvement in many of the mechanisms and devices for managing the economy. They are giving continuously better results. As was evident from the data presented today by General Tadeusz Hupalowski, president of the Supreme Chamber of Control, progress that has occurred on a national scale has not occurred with the participation of all enterprises, nor of every part of the workforce.

The information presented by the president of the Supreme Chamber of Control indicates effectively how much remains still to be done, how culpable waste continues to be widespread in our country. We must take this circumstance into account also in our further activity.

The government fully shares the opinion which the deputies have expressed that progress thus far is primarily the result of mobilizing surface reserves. We are aware that in the coming years it would be difficult to maintain the dynamics attained by depending on exploitation of simple reserves. They are simply being exhausted. Symptoms of a certain improvement that we have noted in 1983 and 1984 in the area of technical progress and structural changes will not make a spring, they will not ensure that we will be capable of solving the long-term problems of the country. The government is paying much attention to these matters. Appropriate legislative and implementation measures are being undertaken. Here I have in mind specifically the further transformations in the economic system aimed at eliminating barriers and creating a stronger motivation for technical progress. I am also thinking of the plan presented to the Supreme Chamber for a law pertaining to regulation of matters of central management of technical progress. I have in mind the finalizing of work on a law covering institutes and scientific-research organizations. The best legal-economic regulations pertaining to this area will be of no avail if adequate economic conditions are not created. This is why we ascribe such great significance to realizing the program of restoring equilibrium to the economy and to a more effective implementation of stringent efficiency than we have seen thus far. These are the most important conditions for mobilizing long-term economic progress. Unless we carry them out, economic mechanisms will necessarily degenerate with all the negative consequences, economic and, what is most threatening, social.

We must not entertain illusions that in the long run the state of economic unbalance can be reconciled with the reform. This would be contradictory to economic laws. A lack of balance will cause a washing out of the solutions introduced by the reform and replacing them with solutions having an mandate-distributive character. This is a measure of the significance we attach to these two directions of action. This is why the strengthening of economic balance was the primary goal set out in the precepts of the Central Annual Plan for 1985. This direction was approved by the deputies and is being widely supported by the people. We must, however, be conscious of the fact that attaining this goal will be very difficult. Not a few economic activists who presently support this policy will find themselves in a unique kind of conflict of conscience. In practice this policy will be manifested in wage and financial restrictions, in limiting investment programs in many sectors, in disciplining a variety of processes, in reconciling expenditures for sociocultural benefits with real economic possibilities. These are the requirements and the practical actions that will serve to realize the policy of bringing the economy into balance. We cannot let ourselves be diverted from the adopted course toward balance. We must not yield to social pressure or become involved in undertakings that exceed the limits of actual possibility. If we did this, we would weaken the process of improving the economy, which we have just begun.

important social fact despite the fact that we are just at the beginning of the road. It is a great factor in popular support for the process of transforming the system of economic functioning. Deputy Zenon Szulc called attention to a certain warping that occurs in the line, self-government--administrative organs, boards, etc. The government is as critical as the Sejm Commission for Workers' Self-Government of any cases of an administration's disregarding the right to self-government or inhibiting its functioning. The government administration continuously looks for problems connected with the development of self-government. In the work of the ministers, affairs of self-government have become one of the most important topics. Systems of control of the actions of administrations in this very area have been created, which are covered by the report of the Sejm commission. So it is not those blameworthy incidents that decide the relations that are being formed between workers' self-government and organs of the administration. We are not, however, minimizing such signals. The government will investigate the incidents mentioned in the report with great attention and in depth. It would be well to flag these affairs clearly, perhaps even in an exaggerated manner.

Analyzing the processes of implementing the reform, we confirm that at present we are approaching a most important threshold, the crossing of which will demand no small effort. Specifically we are concerned with something that might be called a threshold of initiative and properly undertaken enterprise, enterprise in the interest of the people. In a great number of sectors, the potentials created by the reform are far from being exploited. The force of inertia, inaction, being accustomed to the old ways are so strong that movement forward is difficult. We also see that sometimes more invention is used to circumvent reform regulations than to applying those aspects of the regulations that might be exploited for the good of the workforce, for the good of the enterprise, and for the good of those who are undertaking the action. Schooling, the criteria of knowledge, all of this has a deep meaning and is singularly necessary. But effective implementation of the principles of the reform, highly active self-government of the workers and applying to these new demands the criteria of evaluation of management personnel by administrative organs and workers' self-government are the factors that have the greatest significance for liberating initiative. One of the principal points in evaluation should be the degree of exploitation by the personnel of the opportunities and possibilities created by the new principles of management.

In conclusion, I would like to express sincere gratitude for the attention and deep understanding which the Commission and the Supreme Sejm has given to the documents presented by the government. As a result of the discussion and exchange of views and opinions, we have today a deeper, multifaceted evaluation of the actual processes that are going on in the economy, a better understanding of the effectiveness of solutions applied, and more than anything, we have a more solidly founded view of the directions for further action than we had even 2 months ago.

I would like to assure you, in the name of the government, that the conclusions and recommendations formulated by the Supreme Chamber will be an

The implementation of rigors with respect to efficiency is also not without difficulties and tensions. We set up the enterprises to be self-financing. The Supreme Sejm passed a law on improving the management of state enterprise and on bankruptcy. As far as the concept and legislation are concerned, we are well prepared. But are we going to be able to carry this off in practice? This is the question that we will have to answer in the coming months. According to the status of 30 June 1984, approximately 1000 enterprises and cooperatives either had lost or were threatened with loss of credit potential. More precisely, 900 enterprises were threatened, and 100 lost credit potential; 82 enterprises and cooperatives were already granted credit, and 795 enterprises and cooperatives were given it conditionally on the basis of proposed programs of economic improvement and improvement in efficiency. In 69 cases investigation of the financial situation of the enterprises is continuing.

In 1983 and 1984, we were very timid in exploiting the possibilities created by the law on economic improvement and bankruptcy of state enterprises. Seven enterprises were placed under commission management. The decision was made to liquidate seven cooperatives and one construction enterprise. There is a strong psychological barrier that makes it difficult to bring inefficient enterprises to bankruptcy. To a degree, this is the result of misunderstanding the meaning and essence of this new legal regulation. What is needed is an explanation that bankruptcy of an enterprise carried out in keeping with the law has nothing in common with capitalistic bankruptcy, that it ensures a full respect for the fundamental right of socialism, the right to work. It must also be explained that sale of the capital goods of a liquidated enterprise is nothing more than a better, more effective distribution of productive power within the framework of the socialized sector. This is a method for better exploitation of the potential that the economy has.

In a number of speeches attention was drawn to the social aspects and the social part of the reform. We have already passed the time when people thought that the reform was a magic wand that would change their fate, automatically solve all problems. Growing in numbers are those who are convinced that the reform only creates conditions for more efficient work, more productive organization, better activity, that it does not implement itself, but is realized to the extent that people are involved in its realization. Many are disillusioned with the reform, but at the same time, the number of those who are becoming actively involved in the reform is growing. The reform is gaining solid social anchoring in the minds and imaginations of the people. This is a great achievement.

The development of self-government is of special significance in winning people over to the reform. The years 1983 and 1984 were critical for spreading workers' self-government. Predictions that workers would not want to become involved in self-government were not borne out. Neither were the statements made by the opposition that the authorities do not want self-government and would limit its activity. The deputy-reporter indicated how broad the range of activity of workers' self-government is. This is an

important orientation in the actions of the government in formulating instruments for implementing the plan for 1985, particularly in systemic modifications that will most likely have to be made during the next five-year period. Thank you for your attention.

2950

CSO: 2600/157

TRADE RELATIONS WITH WEST VIEWED IN PZPR AGITPROP PAMPHLET

Warsaw FAKTY I KOMENTARZE in Polish No 15 (53), 22 Jul 84 pp 3-22 [Excerpts]

[Pamphlet by Ryszard Andrzej Pospieszynski: "Economic Relations With the West," published as part of the series "Biblioteczka Aktywisty PZPR" (The PZPR Activist's Library) by FAKTY I KOMENTARZE, an internal party training and guidance publication of the PZPR Central Committee Information Department]

[Text] In view of the above arguments, the following questions beg to be asked:

--How do we reconcile the policy of reorienting economic relations toward cooperation with socialist countries with a growth of trade turnovers with developed capitalist countries?

--Is intensification of trade turnovers with the latter countries necessary and economically justified?

--What are the prospects for Poland's economic relations with developed capitalist countries?

Socialist countries above all are our natural, tested and very attractive economic partners. We had the opportunity to learn this repeatedly during difficult times. For this reason the policy of reorienting economic relations toward CEMA countries, initiated at the Extraordinary Ninth Congress of the PZPR, finds full justification both in political and economic realities. This does not exclude however the possibilities of developing our trade turnovers with capitalist countries. Reorientation does not mean limiting our trade relations with the West. It would, on the other hand, promote the growth of the role of CEMA countries in our turnovers within the framework of the process of dynamic growth of Poland's participation in the international distribution of labor. In other words, our goal is an intensive development of economic cooperation with CEMA countries and a search for possibilities for continually stronger and more complex cooperational ties, while at the same time developing our relations with other partners, to our advantage and without being bound by political conditions. Thus, a growth of Polish trade turnovers with developed capitalist countries is not an obstacle and need not be contrary to the reorientation of our economic relations toward socialist countries. One could even say that a closer integration of the Polish economy

with CEMA, which is a guarantee of our country's development, will determine Poland's position in world markets as an attractive economic partner.

Moreover, a growth of trade turnovers with developed capitalist countries is one, although not decisive, condition of a faster overcoming of our economic crisis.

The size of our hard currency debt is one of the decisive factors in the need for development of trade turnovers with the West. By the end of June of the current year, this debt reached 26.8 billion dollars. It is four times as much as our annual hard currency earnings from the export of goods and services. No matter what conditions our creditors accept for the refinancing of the debt (postponed payments of the principal and the overdue interest), the need to pay off the debt will require sustaining a positive balance of trade turnovers with capitalist countries for many years (prevalence of export earnings over import expenses). This means a need for economic cooperation with those countries, particularly in the domains which guarantee us a faster resolving of our credit obligations.

It is worth noting here that the hard currency debt problem has been partially regulated by agreements with commercial banks. These agreements concern non-guaranteed loans to us, which constitute 26.9 percent of Poland's total debt in convertible currencies. The last of the four agreements, signed in July of the current year in London, concerns payments of the principal and interest for the years 1984-1987. Its advantage is that the size of credits granted us within its framework exceeds the amount of the the payments, because for the years 1984-1987 we received 688 billion dollars of credit, while payments for this period will amount only to 420 billion dollars.

The agreement signed with the banks creates a basis for regulating our mutual financial relations, which in turn will allow us to obtain credits necessary for purchases of supplies and raw materials.

Much more difficult are our talks with the so-called Paris Club (a grouping of 16 of our creditor states) on the issue of guaranteed credits (i.e., credits for which the governments gave guarantees). This results above all from tying progress in talks to political factors. It takes place, of course, at the dictate of the United States, in order to try--quite unsuccessfully--to exert pressure on our country. One of the conditions we are trying to negotiate, besides the refinancing of the debt, is admission of Poland to the International Monetary Fund and the Bank World. Membership in these organizations is connected with the possibility of getting credits on very favorable conditions and the execution of government projects credited by the Bank World. Unfortunately, so far our access to these organizations has been blocked by the United States. Although in its latest statement, the U.S. government (following proclamation by the Sejm of the amnesty decree) mentioned the possibility of withdrawing its veto in this matter and "easing" some other restrictions, it, nevertheless, continues to tie it to political conditions, which is an intervention in our internal affairs. This example clearly shows

the that Reagan administration continues to try to intervene in Poland's internal affairs, using the instruments of economic pressure for this purpose.

Investments, particularly those begun in the past decade, are another element conditioning the development of trade turnovers with developed capitalist countries. The continuation of some of them (others were suspended for lack of funds) requires the importation of machines and equipment from the West, which in many cases had been contracted in the past.

Much greater hard currency outlays are also necessary for keeping in motion the installed production apparatus. Let us recall that over 50 percent of all the machines and equipment purchased in the 70's came from the West. Although the past few years have shown that some of these machines can be successfully replaced with machines produced domestically or imported from socialist countries (this applies to spare parts as well), it is not, however, always possible, and always is connected with many difficulties. It would, for example, be difficult to imagine our agriculture without the import of fodder and grain, a large part of which, particularly in the years of poor harvests, we buy in the West. The suspension of credits for purchases of American corn for Polish poultry farms led to an almost total elimination of this meat from our menus. We must, therefore, achieve self-sufficiency in this domain in the near future. The policy of self-sufficiency in Polish agriculture does not mean, however, the suspension of imports, but only and exclusively balancing it with exports of agricultural products and other food articles. Unfortunately, the balance of turnovers with hard currency countries within the framework of the so-called food bloc continues to be negative, which means we buy more food than we sell.

Finally, in order to be able to talk about the dynamic development of our country, we must use foreign technology, including western. The development of cooperation, and purchases of new licences and know-how, are the simplest way to the modernization of production. The situation in this respect is not the best, which again, of course, is connected with our financial possibilities. The cooperative production turnovers with developed capitalist countries are declining again and for the past 3 years there have been no new licences. This causes, among other things, a decline in the competitiveness of our products in western markets.

The problems outlined above prejudice our need for trade turnovers with developed capitalist countries. Their profitability depends to a large degree on us. It is determined by the structure of the export, among other things. Will we be able to transform it, reducing the share of raw materials in our export to hard currency countries and increasing the import of more processed goods, according to the premises of the 3-year plan (fuels and energy amounted to about one-fourth of export to hard currency countries in 1983)? The results obtained so far do not portend fast progress. Nevertheless, it is the only road to the development of export to the markets of developed capitalist countries, a road which is certainly difficult and requires making a big effort. It requires a pro-export restructuring of our economy, in other

words, the development of branches specializing in export production. It requires large outlays of money and time. We are short of both today.

The economic development of Poland without cooperation or in the conditions of limited economic cooperation with the West is possible, as proven both by the past and by the most recent history. Nevertheless, Poland wishes to maintain economic relations with all the countries of the world. This is not a characteristic of Poland alone. Socialist countries repeatedly emphasized in official documents their interest in maintaining economic conditions with all countries, independently of their socioeconomic systems. The development of international economic cooperation can contribute to the realization of the principle of peaceful coexistence, supported by socialist countries. Good economic cooperation promotes the minimizing of many political differences and facilitates the conclusion of agreements on politically important questions. It is necessary, however, to base economic relations on the principles of respect for distinct systemic features, non-use of discrimination and compliance with the principle of equal advantages. Such an attitude was always represented by Poland both in its UN pronouncements and in official documents, including the resolutions of all the PZPR congresses, beginning with the Union Congress in 1948.

12270

CSO: 2600/163

PRESENT STATE OF PUBLIC CONTROL, INSPECTIONS REPORTED

General Ryba Sees Improvement

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 42, 20 Oct 84 p 7

[POLITYKA interviews General Marian Ryba, Chief Inspector at the Government Office of Inspection: "The Figures Tell the Most Convincing Story"]

[Text] Question: Poland has tens of institutions with the words "inspection," "control," or "supervision" in their names. These institutions employ tens of thousands of professional inspectors. In addition, there are several hundred thousand people engaged in civic control and inspection. Wherever you go you come across some kind of inspector, but graft still exists, regulations are not respected, and decisions are wrongly taken or badly implemented. And then we always get the sacramental question: "Where were the inspectors? Something's going wrong somewhere.

Answer: The legal and organizational structure of the inspection system covers a whole range of things which should be subject to control. But the number of organizations and matters which need to be inspected is so big that, in my opinion, we just cannot cover them all.

Hence the dilemma: should we carry out more inspections which would be less comprehensive, or concentrate on a smaller number, but conduct them really thoroughly and demand that the conclusions from them be carried out in full?

I believe conducting a bad inspection is worse than not inspecting at all. An inspection which has not taken place is "on the cards," it can take place any time, and those who are waiting for it fear that any irregularities which exist may be revealed. But if an inspection is carried out improperly or the conclusions from a proper inspection do not get implemented, then both the organization which has been examined and the general public get the impression that we are incompetent or powerless, or that we lack the required courage.

Question: And what is the real situation?

Answer: I believe that the figures tell the most convincing story. Last year the main specialized inspection organizations carried out 58,644 inspections. They uncovered economic offenses and tax evasions involving some 5 billion zlotys; 2,831 cases were handed over to the courts, the militia and public prosecutors, and 17,500 cases were committed for fiscal or administrative penal proceedings. In 1,762 cases, it was demanded that those responsible be dismissed from their posts.

Question: All right, but on the other hand we frequently hear complaints like those expressed by Kazimierz Szepelek from Krosno at the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee. Szepelek said, "We had 320 inspections at my enterprise last year. They absorbed the attention of a great deal of people and a lot of protocols were drafted, frequently on one and the same subject. These inspections usually ended with the issuing of formal instructions which were generally designed more to cover the inspector than to help the enterprise."

Answer: If situations like this occur, then that is obviously a bad sign. We are now devoting a lot of attention to coordinating inspections in order to avoid that kind of situation. But as far as the effectiveness of inspections is concerned, I do not believe that they themselves will produce a healthy economy or an efficient civil service. Yet this is what some people expect from us. The aim of inspections is to examine certain phenomena, uncover the causes of irregularities, formulate recommendations and see that these are carried out. And that is exactly what we do.

Question: For several years the Supreme Board of Inspection (NIK) was responsible to the Premier, but in October 1980 the Sejm took it over again. Since then we have seen the government surround itself with new inspection bodies, such as the operational groups and their commisars, the anti-profiteering commissions, the Armed Forces Inspectorate, the Local Government Inspectorate, etc. Are these supposed to compensate the government for the loss of NIK?

Answer: Inspections are used to guide and to control. When NIK stopped being responsible to the Premier, the government naturally could not be left without any inspection bodies of its own, particularly since there had been a reorganization of the economy and the civil service. This was one of the reasons for the Council of Ministers adopting Resolution No 57 on the exercise of control by state administration bodies.

Remember that the industry boards, which had been strongly involved in inspection work, were disbanded, and the ministries had to create their own inspectorates from scratch. The situation was similar in voivodship offices. The network of inspecting bodies is still being reconstructed. Around 30 percent of the jobs in inspectorates are still vacant. We do not have good candidates who want to become professional inspectors. The state inspection system had to be expanded and strengthened, one of the reasons for this being that the hopes we had pinned on enterprise autonomy were not borne out in practice. We had hoped that workforces, and particularly their self-management bodies, would themselves react to poor quality standards, waste, pilfering, or slack job discipline.

Question: But is it reasonable to expect workers' self-management bodies, which are still in their first term of office, to become a universal remedy for everything that has been going wrong in the economy for the past several decades?

Answer: It would be wrong to simplify things like that, but nevertheless, self-management bodies should take steps to eliminate those negative phenomena. They should also supervise internal controls within enterprises, since these constitute the weakest link in the whole chain of inspection; external inspections are no substitute.

Question: The reason these internal controls are so ineffective is that a controller has to assess whether the decisions of his superiors were correct and whether they are being properly implemented by his own workmates. Each controller has his own friends and acquaintances in the plant, and it is difficult for him to act as if he did not.

Answer: I think that those who do not see the sense in internal controls, try to suppress them, or don't use the information they provide in running enterprise are not qualified to occupy managerial positions. The same goes for people who underestimate the value of inspections carried out by civic activists.

Question: But do we really know how to use civic inspections? We have just seen the so-called Public Inspection Committees, created in a blaze of publicity 6 years ago, being quietly laid to rest. And now the workers and peasants inspectorate is being set up. Do you not fear that in a short time this inspectorate will also get shunted off to one side, that it will confine itself to trifling matters, leaving us with no control over the important ones--the ones which are at the root of our periodic sociopolitical crises?

Answer: We are good at drafting excellent legislation, but we do not know how to use the opportunities and powers it gives us. The Public Inspection Committees are a cause in point.

Question: Does the problem lie in the fact we do not know how to use these powers, or in the fact that we are not allowed to use them? How were these committees supposed to carry out serious inspections in the 1970's, when we were being told that everything was a success?

It was not until the years 1980 and 1981 that there were real opportunities for developing civic inspections. In fact, the stick was then bent the other way, with the authorities examining the most trifling matters.

Answer: Today we often discover irregularities in some institution or other that has had an inspection. But there is a party branch in that institution, a self-management body, a trade union, etc. All these organizations were aware of the irregularities but did not report them or try to combat them. It seems that psychological barriers are stronger than the conviction that malpractices have to be rooted out.

Question: Perhaps the reasons for this reluctance to struggle against malpractices are connected with the fact that this struggle has so far proved ineffective, and also with the idea that the real blame does not lie with any individual enterprise but with the economic system in general, with faulty management methods, etc.

Answer: Yes, some people may well think that way.

Question: So can we say that a new, coherent system of inspection is being created, and if so, in what direction is it developing?

Answer: The inspection system has already been adjusted to correspond to the new situation. Its weakness is the limited powers to inspect enterprises. Article 52 of the law on state enterprises only outlines the general right of the parent organization to inspect an enterprise. Paragraph 2 of this article says that inspections may only cover those matters which are not legally exempt from being subject to control. And now imagine trying to work out what can be inspected and what cannot.

In resolution 57/83, which we drafted together with the Economic Reform Commission, we gave an interpretation of these provisions. Inspection bodies are entitled to check that an enterprise's operations conform to the law of the land and to the targets set out in the national socioeconomic plan, that it is performing the tasks assigned to it individually, and that it is making proper use of the public property in its safekeeping.

The scope of inspections in cooperatives is also limited. The only exception is NIK, which is legally authorized to carry out all sorts of inspections.

Question: Don't these inspections pose a threat to enterprises' autonomy?

Answer: No, they do not, and they are in accordance with the law. An enterprise cannot be a law unto itself. When internal controls do not function, when neither the workers' council nor management are willing to organize inspections, then someone else has to do it, someone from outside.

Attitude of Public

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 42, 20 Oct 84 p 6

[Article by M. H.: "Inspections and Public Opinion"]

[Text] In September, the Public Opinion Research Center carried out a study on public attitudes to the system of inspections in Poland. The Center polled 774 blue-collar workers and 196 departmental heads at voivodship offices in 8 voivodships.

Sixty two point 4 percent of respondents were convinced that the existing inspection system is effective, 30 percent of respondents took a negative view of it, and the remainder had no opinion on the subject. Trade unionists had the fewest objections to the inspection system, and respondents' assessment of their own financial situation was one of the most important factors influencing opinions about this system. The worse-off the respondents, the more critical they were.

The main shortcomings of the existing system were cited as:

1. The immunity from punishment of certain groups in society which successfully avoid responsibility for their illegal activities. "The inspectors catch petty shysters and crooks, while the big shots keep on growing rich." This was an opinion 77.5 percent of respondents agreed with, i.e., four out of every five blue-collar workers and three out of every five voivodship officials. In addition, this opinion was accepted more readily by those respondents who were not party members and those without higher education.

2. Lack of active public support for inspections. Some 70.8 percent of respondents agreed with this; this viewpoint was particularly widespread among city dwellers and university graduates.

3. Certain people operate outside all controls. Some 77 percent of blue-collar workers and 32 percent of voivodship officials agreed with this view. It was more popular among people without higher education and those that were politically passive.

4. Corruption in the inspecting apparatus: A considerable proportion of respondents considered this a problem, blue-collar workers doing so twice as often as voivodship officials.

The Public Opinion Research Center also examined respondents' willingness to involve themselves in fighting abuses. Some 75.4 percent of respondents declared their readiness to be actively involved in such activity. This readiness was more frequent among males than females, among the elderly than among the young, among city dwellers than among the rural population, among party members (88 percent) than among those outside the party (65 percent) among university graduates.

In all, 96 percent of voivodship officials and some 70 percent of blue-collar workers declared they were ready to become actively involved themselves. A subsequent question concerned how they would counteract negative processes in a definite situation--in their own enterprises.

Over 50 percent of respondents said they would contact the trade unions, the party branch, the management, the local people's council, the Supreme Board of Inspection (NIK), the militia, the central authorities or other inspecting bodies. Some 12 percent said they would raise the problem at a self-management meeting and 1.8 percent were in favor of staging a protest strike. Yet, in spite of having previously declared themselves willing to become involved, as many as 32.4 percent said they would take no steps whatsoever, either because they did not believe these would do any good, or because they were afraid of the possible consequences.

In general, it can be said that public opinion about the system of inspections is highly diversified, although critical attitudes prevail. While the majority of the public is convinced that inspections have a positive influence on social relations and the economy, 84.1 percent of workers and voivodship officials agree that no system of inspections can substitute for an economic system where good, honest work guarantees decent living standards and social status.

Civil servants proved to be much less critical than workers, while also more willing to carry out inspections. But while this attitude is "to be expected" from civil servants, the fact that 70 percent of blue-collar workers declared their readiness to combat the evil they see around them should be interpreted as an expression of their desire to play a more active part in public life.

Supervisory Institutions Listed

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 42, 20 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by M.H.: "Public Control, Inspection and Supervision--Who Are We Being Watched By?"]

[Text] The following supervisory institutions currently exist in Poland:

1. The Supreme Board of Inspection. This operates on behalf of the Sejm, monitoring the work of the Government, among others, and employs around 1,500 inspectors.

2. State Supervisory Institutions. These employ 20,353 people, divided among the following:

a) The Government Office of Inspection (49 employees)

b) Departments of inspection at the 29 ministries and government offices, employing a total of 1,968 people. The greatest number of inspectors are to be found at the National Insurance Board (895!), the State Norms and Standards Commission (86) and the Ministry of Mining and Energy (83); the least at the Central Customs Office (6) and the Foreign Ministry (4).

c) Departments of inspection at the 49 voivodship offices (employing 526 people)

d) Twenty two specialist supervisory agencies, employing 17,811 people. These are (number of employees as of 30 June 1984, given in brackets):

- I. The Local Government Inspectorate (44)
- II. The Central Board of Financial Control (1,324)
- III. The National Bank of Poland (210)
- IV. The Agrarian Credit Bank (477)
- V. The Price Inspectorate (290)
- VI. The Central Energy Authority (564)
- VII. The Material Resources Inspectorate (159)
- VIII. The Sanitary Inspection Authority (6,904)
- IX. The State Trade Inspectorate (2,049)
- X. The Inspectorate of Agricultural Procurement and Processing (666)
- XI. The Board of Technical Inspection in Agriculture (200)
- XII. The Environmental Protection Authority (200)
- XIII. The Radio Detection Agency (483)
- XIV. The Technical Standards Office (1,086)
- XV. The National Mining Board (586)
- XVI. The Central Standards Inspectorate (359)
- XVII. The Road Transport Authority (328)
- XVIII. The National Rolling-Stock Inspectorate (44)
- XIX. The Railway Board of Technical Inspection (300)
- XX. The Inland Waterways Authority (73)
- XXI. The Polish Ship-Classification Register (355)
- XXII. The Seed Inspectorate (1,110)

The institutions named above are those listed by the Office of the Council of Ministers, but a quick flip through the Warsaw telephone directory reveals several more: the Board of Veterinary Sanitary Inspection at the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Control of Ration Cards and Rationed Goods at the Ministry of Distribution and Services, the Rail Safety Inspectorate and the Health and Safety Inspectorate at the Ministry of Transport, the Fire Prevention Inspectorates at the Ministries of Forestry and Communications, etc. It is hard to say how many more institutions of this kind there are and how many people they employ.

3. The Supervisory Bodies of the 12 Cooperative Unions. The largest number of inspectors (3,131 in all) are employed by the "Samopomoc Chlopska" Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (846) and the National Union of Farmers' Circles and Organizations (671); the least by Cepelia (19) and the Central Union of Blind People's Cooperatives (6).

4. Inspectors and Internal Inspection Departments in Enterprises. There are several thousand of these inspectors--the number in a given plant depends on enterprise policy. In addition, enterprises also employ accountants and quality controllers--all in all, several hundred thousand employees.

5. Civic Control Bodies. Here we have the supervisory work carried out by the party, the political alliances (ZSL and SD), representative bodies (the Sejm and people's councils and their commissions), the trade unions, workers' self-management councils, cooperative self-management councils, and residents' self-government bodies. In addition, civic control and supervision is also conducted by members' committees in shops, dairy suppliers' committees, anti-profiteering commissions, the workers' and peasants' inspectorate (currently in the process of being established), and also various specialized civic organizations--the Nature Preservation League, the consumer movement, the Polish Hunters' Association, the Anglers' Association, etc. In all, there are several hundred thousand people involved in civic control work, perhaps even more.

6. Informal Methods of Control. These include complaints and suggestions, letters from the public, and also information provided by informers....

7. Other Institutions. There are a number of other institutions which, in addition to their primary activities, also perform control and supervisory functions. These include the State Tribunal for Economic Arbitration, public prosecutors' offices, the courts, the Polish Patents Office, certain departments of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and National Defense, the Central Inspectorate of Publishing, Broadcasting and Entertainment, factory security departments, the State Labor Inspectorate, the fire brigade, the Railway Security Service, the Central Statistical Office, construction and employment offices, etc.

8. Theoretically, each of us is also supervised by his immediate superior, although in practice....

CSO: 2600/307

DETAILS ON POLICE CAR CRASH

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 1-2 Dec 84 pp 1, 2

[Staff report]

[Text] On 30 November a few minutes after 6:00 on route E-7 in the vicinity of the Sucha summer camp in Bialobrzeg township, Radom Province, a Fiat 125p sedan being driven by officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] Bureau of Investigation on their return trip to Warsaw after having completed their official duties collided with a Jelcz truck registered to PKS [State Automotive Transport Enterprise] in Ostroda that was making an unlawful passing maneuver.

The MSW officers, Col Stanislaw Trafalski, age 50, a department chief in the MSW Bureau of Investigation and a lawyer with a 23-year career in the Security Service, senior inspector Maj Wieslaw Piatek, age 41, an engineer with a 17-year career in the MSW, and the driver Sgt Piotr Andrzejczuk, age 25, were killed instantly. The driver of the Jelcz truck, 22-year-old Edward L., was uninjured and has been held for further questioning at the discretion of the Prosecutor's Office.

The preliminary investigation findings reveal that the Jelcz truck was in the process of unlawfully passing a Tatra semitrailer truck that was stopped in the roadway. The truck hit the Fiat with its left front section and knocked it off to the side of the road. A physician and Citizens Militia officers were on the scene a few minutes after the collision occurred.

We have been informed by the MSW that the Investigation Bureau officers were on their way back to Warsaw from Krakow and Tarnow, where they had been conducting official business involving the identification of contacts maintained by Grzegorz Piotrkowski, who is suspected of being implicated in the abduction and murder of Fr. Jerzy Popieluszko. The official papers compiled by the Investigation Bureau officers have been placed in safekeeping. A team from the Crime Detection Center of the Citizens Militia National Headquarters was present at the scene of the accident.

The District Prosecutor in Grojec is conducting an investigation into the circumstances of this accident.

CSO: 2600/304

NEED FOR NETWORK OF 'SEX SHOPS' DISCUSSED

Warsaw VETO in Polish No 46, 11 Nov 84 p 2

[Article: "Sex Shops for Poland?"]

[Excerpts] On 26 October, a panel discussion initiated by this journal was held at the Executive Council of the Society for Family Planning (TRR). The discussion involved the need for a national network of shops selling sex articles, including different kinds of contraceptives, medical literature (especially on the so-called art of love-making and planned parenthood), and also special drugs which are available only on prescription. Another subject discussed was the idea of combining sales of such articles with sex counselling, especially for people of reproductive age. The TRR was represented by Jerzy Witek, its secretary-general Wieslaw Sokoluk, the director of a youth counselling center in Warsaw, and the well-known sexologist Dr Zbigniew Lew-Starowicz.

During nearly 2 hours of discussion, speakers raised many important points concerning the creation of these shops--"sex shops," as they are popularly known. The TRR representatives said such shops should exist, but expressed a number of reservations, especially concerning the articles to be on sale in such shops. For example, the supply of guaranteed contraceptives in Poland is dramatically low. Polish-made condoms are poor in quality, as are the available IUD's (except for those in Pewex shops). Moreover, due to President Ronald Reagan's decision to cut subsidies for the London-based International Federation of Family Planning Societies, Poland will not be supplied by this organization with female contraceptives or high-quality condoms. Thus, Washington's financial policies are an indirect blow to the future customers of Poland's sex shops.

CSO: 1600/310

MICHNIK'S COMMENTS FUEL CONFRONTATION

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish No 273, 15 Nov 84 p 2

[Article by Zdzislaw Morawski: "Time for Reflection"]

[Text] After reading Adam Michnik's interview in the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL I must speak out. This is necessary even though the atmosphere, various forces in Poland are trying to create in the wake of the murder of Fr. Popieluszko, makes it difficult to launch discussions which might help further the cause of sense, encourage thinking instead of mindlessness, and establish a climate of condemnation around that crime--but which would be held in an atmosphere of mutual trust rather than hatred.

Still, I believe I must speak out, even cry out loudly, to warn against the stubborn bigotry, the hatred, the extremism and intolerance which have seized some people in so-called opposition circles, which inevitably set off broader, easily predictable reactions. All other considerations aside, such reactions, which are intended to change the atmosphere in Poland, are presumably exactly what these behind the provocation hoped to bring about.

But let us return to the interview, which is but one in a series of distressing events.

Michnik voices his evident and understandable condemnation of Fr. Popieluszko's murderers, and goes on to say, "I am not the only one who thinks that we all are to blame. The murder was preceded by harrassment, and even attempts on Fr. Popieluszko, and yet we all kept silent.

"Several weeks ago a hateful article by Jan Rem (the pen-name of the Government spokesman Jerzy Urban) against Fr. Popieluszko appeared in print.

"We did not discuss the text with our colleagues, but we only made fun of the author. It did not occur to any of us to see an omen of murder in the text."

Let me point out the last sentence. It implied that Jan Rem, or the Government spokesman, was an accessory to the killing.

I do not admire all aspects of Jan Rem's columns. But any attempt to "frame" the columnist, or even the government spokesman, for complicity in the murder because of his press articles is just witch-hunting.

Fr. Popieluszko was engaged in public activity which the entire Western press regarded, even after his death, as ardent support for the dissolved Solidarity Union. Jan Rem clearly recognized it as politically detrimental to national conciliation, so he sharply criticized it.

Political polemics published in the press are instigations to murder, but so-called oppositionist activities are acts of courage meriting moral blessing?

Any civilized person must reject this blatant case of moral doublethink, whatever his or her political persuasion. Nor can columnists say what even they wish, while the latter have no tribune. Owing to the backing they get in the West people from so-called opposition circles can reach, anyone who chooses to listen to them. Their utterances are reiterated so many times, broadcast on so many wavelengths that they become potentially as audible as official publications. Moreover, whoever in our present situation groundlessly charges his adversaries in the press with instigating murder is guilty of stirring hatred.

This is particularly hazardous given Poland's difficult situation. It is particularly dangerous now that Michnik, in an interview with what is a world-famous West German magazine, has deemed it right to "forget" that it was the authorities that disclosed the abduction and swiftly put the abductors and murderers under arrest even though the latter proved to be Internal Affairs Ministry officers. The authorities showed courage, which earned it worldwide recognition, by releasing extremely embarrassing information and firmly promising, in a PZPR Central Committee resolution, to reveal the whole truth about the details and background of this political provocation.

Nevertheless, the authorities are now accused of responsibility for the murder, even though it was directed against them.

Such accusations provide easy arguments for the opponents of dialogue and the proponents of force and administrative pressure as ways of resolving problems.

Does Michnik's statement serve the cause of dialogue, conciliation, and agreement in the current precarious situation? Or does it fuel extremist, confrontational attitudes in this society whose anguish has not deprived it of its human soul?

Every reader of our paper should answer these questions for himself.

END: END/ST

BRIEFS

POLICE CAR BOMBING VERDICT--From its seat in Swidnica the Provincial Court of Kalbrzych has handed down a verdict in the case of Marek Kozicki and Ryszard Belza, who stood accused of blowing up a "Nysa" militia vehicle parked in front of the Internal Affairs District headquarters in this locality on 4 March 1984. Both of the accused were sentenced to 4 years in prison and stripped of their civil rights for an additional 3 years. Only through a happy combination of circumstances did it turn out that this criminal explosion caused no casualties. The judgment of the court is not yet legally binding. [Text] [Warsaw RZECSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 84 p 5]

NUCLEAR MATERIALS THEFT--A CIR-106 isotopic smoke detecting sensor containing the radioactive isotope Plutonium 239 has been stolen from a fire prevention installation situated in one of the warehouses at the "Stilon" Synthetic Fibers Plant in Gorzow Wielkopolski. During normal use these ion sensors pose no threat to the environment, but tampering with the insides of these devices can cause damage to the surface of the radiation source housing, as a result of which human health may be jeopardized. In issuing its warning on this matter the District Office of Internal Affairs in Gorzow Wielkopolski also urged local residents to relay any information they might have which would be helpful in tracking down the stolen material by reporting to the District Office in person or by calling 129-164. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Nov 84 p 5]

CHURCH BREAKIN ARRESTS--Officers of the District Office of Internal Affairs in Grybnik Opatowski have apprehended the persons responsible for breaking into the St. Jolwiga Parish Church in the same locality. At the time of the breakin the burglars made off with a stereo set and amplifiers, religious paintings, jewelry, and a small sum of money. They tried unsuccessfully to pry open the ciborium. Three suspects have been arrested. One of the suspects is 30-year-old Jacek Buda, lately unemployed and convicted many times in the past for having committed similar types of offenses. He has been placed in temporary detention. The parish priest, Fr. Stanislaw Garbacz, thanked the law enforcement officers for their quick action, which resulted in the apprehension of the accused and the recovery of all of the stolen property. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Nov 84 p 5]

CHERNENKO'S NBC INTERVIEW REPORTED

AU201625 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 19 Nov 84 p 7

[Text] In an interview granted to the U.S. television company NBC, Konstantin Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, said the Soviet Union and the United States should reach an agreement, mainly in ways and means to remove the danger of a nuclear war and limit and reduce the arms race. They should also agree on limiting and reducing arms, primarily nuclear arms, in order to prevent the extension of the arms race into new and as yet untouched spheres. As far as we are concerned, K. Chernenko said, we are prepared to guide our efforts, energetically, in this direction.

He said that if statements recently made in Washington concerning the desire to resolve the problems of arms limitation are not just words, we could begin making progress toward more normal relations between our countries and toward a more secure world.

Referring to the importance of personal contacts between state leaders and the question of a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, K. Chernenko said that when conditions are created to guarantee the success of such a summit meeting and its positive results, then it will not be difficult to set a date for it.

CSO: 2700/58

CHERNENKO SPEECH TO POLITBURO REPORTED

AU191212 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 17 Nov 84 p 6

[Text] Addressing the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium reasserted that during the last 2 years, positive changes have taken place in all sectors of the Soviet national economy. He emphasized that, during this period, in industry alone a production increase amounting to R32 billion has been achieved. Encouraging results have been achieved in agriculture as well.

From this point of view, the speaker noted, the 1985 plan correctly guides the economic development, and the established growth rate has been above average during the last 4 years. The provisions of plan and budget for 1985 correspond with the 26th party provisions, stated Konstantin Chernenko, stressing that the main current task is to implement the decisions that have been endorsed.

The particularity of the current period is to elevate all the activity to a qualitatively new level. Chernenko pointed out the particular tasks for the new year to save raw materials, other materials, fuel, and energy and to increase labor productivity, and make full use of labor time, machinery, and equipment.

The speaker attached great significance to the issues of qualitative increase of the products, stressing the fact that the plan provisions for 1985 in this respect must be considered as minimal.

CSO: 2700/58

MIRIC'S VIEWS SUMMARIZED, REACTION NOTED

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 26 Oct 84 pp 35-38

[Article by Olivera Petrovic: "Are Yugoslavia and Serbia Actually Confederations?"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] BORBA has announced a series of 14 installments excerpted from the book "Sistem i kriza" [The System and the Crisis] by Dr Jovan Miric, and the half of the series which has been published has already aroused numerous comments. What is this about?

In the first of the series of installments Dr Jovan Miric recalls the decisions of the Second Session of AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia], referring to their clarity, pithiness and straightforwardness, to the fact that they expressed the continuity of the idea of Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia and provide evidence of the unified nature of the Yugoslav revolution, so that there cannot be any question of a plurality of national revolutions. Further, Dr Miric believes that when Yugoslavia as a whole and as a state is referred to in the AVNOJ decisions, the reference is actually to the sovereignty of a whole which does not constitute the sum of the separate sovereignties of its nationalities.

"... By contrast with certain conceptions we have encountered over the last 10 years or so, to the effect that the /Yugoslav Federation is a matter of agreement among the republics and provinces/, it is emphasized in the AVNOJ decisions that Yugoslavia is the common homeland of all the nationalities of Yugoslavia. Thus the Declaration of the Second AVNOJ Session states that 'the nationalities of Yugoslavia have by their persistent liberation struggle shown their determination and readiness to build their common homeland themselves on the new foundations of true democracy and equality of the nationalities.'"

No Bargaining Is Possible

"When this AVNOJ decision on building Yugoslavia on the federal principle states that the nationalities of Yugoslavia proved in their common armed struggle their firm determination to remain united in Yugoslavia in the future, then that cannot be given the interpretation that Yugoslavia is open to never-ending bargaining and that it is what the republics and provinces agree that it shall be, and is always subject to a new agreement. Such interpretations falsify both the spirit and the letter of the AVNOJ principles and

decisions. A modern political community cannot be constituted in that way, nor can it survive. One of the essential prerequisites of every political community's survival, especially that of a multinational community like Yugoslavia, is the existence of a /historical social compact/, which the separate units in a composite state cannot always call into question once again. Otherwise it is not possible to avoid the 'curse of conditionality,' with all the consequences which conditionality implies and generates. Now that we are referring to AVNOJ, we would have to assume that its constitutive decisions were a historical social compact of that kind."

In the next installment Dr Jovan Miric considers it natural in federal states to safeguard the influence of the separate units in the enactment and amendment of the federal constitution and unnatural to demand unanimity, since in practice this would signify the right of veto by any separate unit in the Federation. Quoting Professor Veljko Mratovic, Dr Miric emphasizes that an "/essentially new situation/" in which every amendment of the constitution requires acceptance by every republic and province in the SFRY Constitution was created in connection with the revision of the federal constitution by the 1974 Constitution.

"... Professor Mratovic, who was very familiar with the problems of constitutional law in the political system, rightly states that the Yugoslav system for revision of the constitution is an exception that sets it off from all federally regulated states. However, his substantiation (justification) of that exception is not beyond question. On the contrary, it raises many questions which go beyond the formal procedure for revision. Here is how Mratovic justifies the 'Yugoslav exception': 'This singularity can be understood only when we grasp the essential features of the kind of self-management socialism being built in socialist Yugoslavia. This is a result of the aspiration to do away with the Federation as a power over the republics and to realize it as a socialist community of free and equal nationalities and ethnic minorities and as a socialist community of all the working people of Yugoslavia. In other words, this change does not arise out of the logic of the classical federalism that grew up in class society. It is a reflection of the new framework in which federalism is developing--of its development in the framework of a self-managed socialist society. That is also why it should not be regarded as an element of the confederative system, although in its formal features that is what it is....'"

Playing With Words

Explaining that Mratovic's justification is typical of nearly all authors who do not accept the thesis that the 1974 Constitution defined Yugoslavia as a confederation, Dr Jovan Miric quotes what Edvard Kardelj wrote in the seventies in the debates that took place before enactment of the new constitution: "By contrast with this orientation toward specific regulation of relations in the Federation in keeping with the specific self-management structure and the orientation of our socialist society, in discussions of interethnic relations we often encounter attempts to go no further than /playing with the words federation and confederation/ (emphasis supplied by J. M.). For some people a confederation is the subject of nationalistic bargaining in order to discredit

the achievements of the socialist revolution in the domain of interethnic relations and to create artificial crises in those relations, while others threaten the dangers of confederation whenever the question is raised of overcoming the remnants of the centralistic state. There are certainly quite a few people who with the best intentions of contributing to progress in the development of our federation are taken in by such discussions because they are operating with /outdated concepts/ (emphasis mine--J. M.) which can no longer be fitted to the model of a socialist and self-managing community of nationalities.... That is in fact the reason why it appears that the discussions that revolve only within the limits of those two or similar categories seem deaf and blind to everything which present-day development of the productive forces in the world and scientific-technical progress have already incorporated into the social content of the term nationality and into interethnic relations in general. And not only that, one gets the impression that these opinions are blind even to the prospects which the development of the productive forces and scientific-technical progress are not only opening up, but by necessity and the force of a natural law they are imposing with respect to the integration of humanity...."

Citing that not a single present-day federation grants the right of veto to the separate units, which the 1974 Constitution granted to the republics and provinces, Dr Jovan Miric writes as follows in the third installment:

"The new constitution (and especially practice over the last 10 years or so) also overemphasize the role of the republics and provinces /in the division of powers between the federal state and the federal units/, and that in all the elements of government authority: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Even when it was left in the power of the Federation to deal with certain basic affairs of the integrity of the system and relations in the SFRY (Article 286 of the SFRY Constitution, for example), this is via facti passing over into the power of the republics and provinces. When we say via facti, however, that does not imply that this is being done outside the system. If we look at the structure of the SFRY Assembly, we see that there exist in it two chambers which are de facto /chambers of republics and provinces, that is, two second chambers, but not a single chamber that would be a general political representation of the working people and citizens of Yugoslavia/. It is quite understandable that this jurisdiction of the republics and provinces, which is already hypertrophied, will increase even more. That is, both from the standpoint of the division of powers and from the standpoint of the structure and activity of the SFRY Assembly a considerable deviation has been made toward confederation...."

The Principle of Representation of the Nationalities

Asserting that the republics and provinces are represented both in the two chambers of the Assembly and also in the SFRY State Presidency, while the citizens of Yugoslavia are not represented anywhere, Dr Miric says in the fourth installment in the series:

"Even in the SFRY State Presidency it is the /parity principle/ that is manifested, but /not the principle of the equal rights and equality of citizens/.

Yet there is no need to derive conclusions of this kind indirectly. /Members of the SFRY State Presidency are elected neither by the citizens of the SFRY, nor by the SFRY Assembly/, but by the assemblies of the republics and provinces." The author of the book "Sistem i kriza" then goes on to explain that the SFRY Assembly ought to be called "Assembly of Workers' Councils of Yugoslavia, Assembly of Citizens of Yugoslavia and Assembly of Nationalities and Ethnic Minorities of Yugoslavia," and that the principle of ethnic representation has now been safeguarded, but not that of class and political representation ("At least not satisfactorily").

In the fifth installment Dr Jovan Miric agrees with Professor Ratko Markovic that attributing to the autonomous province the attributes of a constituent element of the Federation is in opposition to the AVNOJ principles and decisions, and he adds: "But not only under the new constitution have the provinces become a constituent element of the Federation, that is, /federal units/, but they are in fact--/federal units of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia/! What is more, if we compare the phrasing used in the Basic Principles of the SFRY Constitution, which defines the constitutional character of the SFRY and that of Article 4 of the same constitution, which has to do with the provinces, it is not difficult to see (for anyone not ignorant of categorial analysis the /elements of confederation/ in both provisions....

"... As we see, under Article 4 of the SFRY Constitution, the socialist autonomous province /is not only autonomous, but even sovereign/: it is the /locus/ of the exercise of the sovereign rights of the working people and citizens and of the nationalities and ethnic minorities. Whatever of those rights would be exercised in the Socialist Republic of Serbia would be the--/remainder ('... and in the republic')/.

"The advocates of 'provincial sovereignty' may, it is true, appeal to the 1974 Constitution, but not to AVNOJ and its principles. In fact the AVNOJ decisions do not even mention autonomous units in the structure of the Yugoslav Federation, and it would be contrary to the spirit and letter of those decisions, as well as to the meaning of the right of a nationality to self-determination, to attribute to them the significance of a constituent element of the Yugoslav Federation...."

'Dual Federalization' of SR Serbia

"... The ambivalent character of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which arises out of the constitutional provisions, cannot be overcome by the worn-out formula to the effect that the provinces are a constituent element of the Federation and an integral element of SR Serbia. The problem becomes all the more complicated because SR Serbia--by the constitutional definition of the provinces--is also defined indirectly as a federation; what is more, with important elements of confederation! In the case of the /Federation/ some of the federal units (the republics) in the SFRY, as is the case with the Socialist Republic of Serbia. (There is no justification whatsoever, however, for SR Serbia to be a federation or quasi-federation (like the RSFSR in the USSR, for example). Aside from the Serbian nationality in SR Serbia there is no other nationality which would be entitled to political self-determination.

Aside from the Serbian nationality, there are there parts of the other Yugoslav nationalities and certain ethnic minorities which already have their own republics (states) or states outside Yugoslavia.) Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the SFRY Constitution contradict one another. Article 3 of the SFRY Constitution defined the socialist republic as a sovereign state. The position of the socialist autonomous province within SR Serbia was defined in almost the same way, just like the position of a republic in the Federation. What is more, Article I of the Basic Principles of the SFRY Constitution equated the position of the republics and provinces in the SFRY with respect to the exercise of sovereign rights.

"One might indirectly conclude on the basis of what has been said that as a sovereign state SR Serbia is restricted only to what is referred to as Serbia proper. However, in Article 1 and Article 2 of the SFRY Constitution it is explicitly stated that SAP [Socialist Autonomous Province] Kosovo and SAP Vojvodina are part of SR Serbia. This 'dual federalization' of SR Serbia, this dual division of sovereignty--once with respect to the provinces, a second time with respect to the Federation, must bring about (as it in fact has been) a blockade of the system with far-reaching consequences: economic, political and social.

"If SR Serbia is actually made up of socialist autonomous provinces (which is what is stated in Articles 1 and 2 of the SFRY Constitution), then with respect to the constitutional position of those units the sovereignty of SR Serbia is shattered, and it cannot make sovereign decisions on the most important issues of internal relations and organizations within the republic. But if the desire was to promote the provinces to republics in a roundabout way, then this is something on which all the nationalities of Yugoslavia would have to take a position.

"Not only by the constitutional definition, but also by the entire way in which the system of government is constituted--legislative, executive and judicial--has been 'rounded out' for the exercise of sovereignty. Accordingly, there is no basis for those arguments and advocates which see an essential difference between the republic and province in that /the republic is a state, and the province is not/. Although it is not explicitly stated in the SFRY Constitution that the socialist autonomous province is a state, nevertheless, that is what it is. It has remained an /autonomy/ only in name, while most of the constitutional provisions speak not of exercising autonomous rights, but of exercising /sovereign rights/.

"... The political and theoretical disputes and quandaries over definition of the character of SR Serbia and the provinces are among other things the results of a categorial inconsistency and of 'ideological euphemisms' incorporated into the new constitutional documents. As we have already emphasized, categories may not be a matter for arbitrariness, but are signifiers of real relations and of certain sociohistorical givens. Taking the example of SR Serbia, there is no dispute that Serbia is a state both of the Serbs and also of the Hungarians, the Albanians, and the Slovaks ... and of all others who live in it. However, /SR Serbia is a sovereign state of the Serbian people/ as a political expression of the historical right of the nationality to self-determination and political self-definition. But it cannot be the sovereign state

of the Hungarian or the Albanian or the Slovak ... nationalities, nor of a portion of that nationality (ethnic minority) living in Yugoslavia, that is, in SR Serbia. That is not an obstacle to, but rather a prerequisite of the full political, economic, cultural and every other kind of equality of all those living in SR Serbia. Without that equality, incidentally, Serbia could not be called either /socialist/ or a /republic/. All of this, of course, also applies /mutatis mutandis/ to our other republics as well."

Dr Jovan Miric states this view in the sixth installment: "The basic point of departure and decisive prerequisite of the Yugoslav Federation is the right of the nationality to self-determination. An ethnic minority may not qualify for that historical political-constitutive right, since it would not be 'broadened' thereby, but would be rendered worthless. So the first section of Article 1 of the SFRY Constitution rightly does not talk about ethnic minorities, but it does speak justifiably about the equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities in the socialist and self-managed democratic community."

A Poor Theory of the State and Law

"However, in other passages sufficient consideration is not given to this difference, which might at first seem petty, but is very sensitive for a political and ethnically complicated community. Thus even on the basis of Article 4 of the SFRY Constitution /the ethnic minority also has a sovereign right/. The sovereign right which the constitution granted to the ethnic minorities as well (perhaps in fact the ethnic minorities (nacionalna manjina) were renamed (narodnost) so that, like the nationalities, they could be given the attribute 'sovereign,' since that attribute is obviously unsuitable to the term 'national minority') also implies the right of political self-determination. The form of that self-determination is the /state/. Does that not mean that the ethnic minority has been granted the constitutional possibility of establishing its own state on the soil of Yugoslavia (regardless of what we call it, a national state, a national-minority state)? As a matter of fact, the attributes of statehood have been given to the province (Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the SFRY Constitution), just as they have to the republic. And since Article 3 of the constitution defines the republic as a sovereign state, the logic of the constitutional text opens up the possibility of 'renaming' the province a republic. Of course, we are not talking about a mere change of name! The political consequences are far-reaching (the example of Kosovo is instructive enough). But that only indicates the importance of categorial clarity, especially when dealing with such a fundamental legal and political document as the constitution.

"One might make to this mode of deduction and conclusion the seemingly justified objection: when the constitution speaks about the socialist autonomous province, it talks about exercising the sovereign rights of the /nationalities and ethnic minorities/, that is, not only of the ethnic minorities. Yet the objection is only a formal one. The part of the Croatian or Serbian or Montenegrin nationality living in SAP Vojvodina or SAP Kosovo is not going to seek 'its own republic.' (As far as we are aware, not a single case has been recorded since the counterrevolution broke out in Kosovo in 1981 when a single Serb or Montenegrin was associated with the slogan-demand 'Kosovo a Republic!')

And, no doubt about it, the Albanian nationalists and irredentists in Kosovo are not seeking a republic for the Serbs and Montenegrins either, but, on the contrary, are striving by every means (and they have had quite a bit of success) to drive them out of that 'republic.' With that kind of 'ethnically pure' Kosovo they are backing up their demands for /an Albanian republic in Yugoslavia/, which is to say /a sovereign Albanian state on the soil ... of Yugoslavia!/"

Dr Jovan Miric asserts among other things that the constitution of SR Serbia shares the federal constitution's inconsistency and "insufficient political alertness" in defining the SAP, and that when the phrasing is purged of "vagueness and flowery language," the socialist autonomous province is actually a state which "exercises the 'remainder' of the sovereign rights in the republic as a state...."

The first criticism of Miric's views came from Zagreb. Professor Stipe Suvar said in his reaction, published in BORBA:

"... Or, in BORBA a scholar from Zagreb argues in 14 highly promoted installments that this kind of Yugoslavia, the way it is arranged, is not arranged as it should be. The trouble is not that he is able to write like that in a book or state his view around a discussion table, and I do not make an issue of the person, but the issue lies in the responsibility of the BORBA editors, who found the need to give space on 14 emphatic pages to articles which present the viewpoint of a bad theory of the state and an outdated type of law, using this to question the present constitutional system of Yugoslavia." After Suvar came Milan Rakas, who said:

"The articles are being published at a time filled with assaults on the essential principles of Yugoslavia's future development by various opponents of its socialist and self-managed community. It is understandable, then, that these opponents would carefully analyze the critical observations of the author of these articles, seeking in them support and 'food' to nourish activity against our country. This is all the more likely because those opponents know that this is an author who occupies a place that is not exactly insignificant (quite clearly gained through his work and activity) in our scholarship, journalism and sociopolitical life.

"... The greatest dangers actually lie in the content of the critical examination of various issues in the development of our political system which BORBA is clearly offering through the articles of Jovan Miric to readers in these very delicate political moments of our present time."

Platforms for Opponents

"Objectively, probably aside from the author's good intentions, his critical examinations of the 'system and crisis' are platforms in which many opponents of our system of socialist self-management can find a point of support and indeed even justification for their struggle against our system. I will not elaborate this assertion more broadly, but will call attention only to the fifth and sixth installments, which apply the magnifying glass of criticism to

constitutional 'lack of precision' in the constitutions of the SFRY and SR Serbia concerning exercise of the right of sovereignty.

"Irredentists can objectively find in this criticism by Miric of our 'constitutional vaguenesses' not only a point of support, but even constitutional justification for the struggle under the slogan 'Kosovo a Republic,' and indeed even for their genocidal eviction of Serbs and Montenegrins and, more recently, other ethnic minorities from Kosovo.

"Critical considerations of this kind are all the more incomprehensible, since Miric is aware that the socialist subjective forces in both SR Serbia and in Yugoslavia through the effort to apply the essence of the constitutional provisions which he criticizes, demonstrated after the events in Kosovo that in spite of the 'constitutional vaguenesses' on which he insists in his criticism, the exercise of the right of sovereignty in our socialist self-managed community excludes any possibility for realizing the slogan 'Kosovo a Republic.'"

Vukasin Loncar also spoke in Belgrade at a conference in the Serbian LC Central Committee with the chairmen of opstina LC committees, emphasizing that certain unacceptable political-ideological questions are left unanswered: "Jovan Miric is offering the unitaristic concept of Yugoslavia in his articles, and we do not react to arguments of that kind."

The Danger of Unitarianism

Referring to Loncar's evaluation of Dr Jovan Miric's articles, at the end of the debate in the Serbian LC Central Committee, Spiro Galovic said that he was against that kind of roll-calling and condemnation from political rostrums: "If now, as we carry out the conclusions of the 13th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee, there is also something that we ourselves in the bodies of leadership should change, then it is this style of rendering judgment without any sort of argumentation, this posturing which places no obligation on us. I am not defending Miric's views, I have not even read all the installments, yet I do assume that the pages of BORBA are open both to other and to different opinions. We will not solve anything with an unadorned political condemnation, just as we achieve nothing with self-pleasing and apologetic speech and incidental critical comments which as a rule are devoid of any sort of argumentation at all. Can we be up to the task in this respect? Are we not turning people into opponents when they really are not?

"There is talk about unitarianism. Yet let us distinguish that danger which is expressed in the idea from the danger which is expressed in the act. Today it is not unitarianism that is abroad, but bureaucratic polycentrism. Comrade Nijaz Dizdarevic spoke well at the last meeting of the LCY Central Committee when he said that the pendulum had swung the other way. That is why exaggerating the danger of unitarianism is today usually at the service of the republic-provincial bureaucracy, which desires in this way as in others to shift the focus of the political struggle to what might be called an unreal terrain."

Reacting to the words of Spiro Galovic, Loncar added that in passages of his articles Dr Jovan Miric sees Yugoslavia through the prism of the unitaristic concept and regards some of our ethnic minorities as "subtenants" in that Yugoslavia and for that reason he cannot agree either ideologically or politically with Miric.

MUSCOVITE PATRIARCH'S VISIT TO KOSOVO DRAWS COMMENT

[Editorial Report] Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 411, 20 October 1984 carries on pages 44-49 an article by Nenad Ivankovic concerning the visit of Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, to his counterpart in the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch German, in late September and early October. The article is accompanied by color photographs, including one showing a Serbian tricolor in which the red star has been replaced by the traditional four-S symbol of Serbian unity. Ivankovic describes the beginnings of the visit, details the history of the Russian Orthodox Church and its relations with the Serbian church, pointedly takes note of visits to the Soviet Union by groups of Serbian priests under the guidance of the pastor of the Russian church in Belgrade, and remarks on the fact that the Russian ecclesiastical delegation spent 3 of its 4 days in Kosovo province.

The article concludes with a commentary: "All this together, along with certain other circumstances, suggests that Patriarch Pimen's visit to Belgrade and Kosovo is important from various standpoints. Not just because the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade paid special attention to him, or because presidency member Lazar Mojsov received Patriarch Pimen in Federation Mansion, but also because the Russian patriarch was going on a pilgrimage--after the well-known Kosovo occurrences--to Gracanica, Prizren, the patriarchate of Pec, the monasteries of Decani, Devic, and Studenica. Of course, there are numerous reasons related to faith and cultural history behind this. On the other hand, we should not lose sight of the fact that there have been attempts in certain circles of the Serbian Orthodox Church to resolve the Kosovo problem by means of some sort of 'parallel action' by the church (let us just recall the well-known 'Appeal of 21 Priests,' pressures on the U.S. Government to use financial and other means to blackmail the allegedly 'anti-Serbian Yugoslav Government,' and the like). Accordingly, persons could certainly be found now who would like to have this visit to Kosovo take on the aura of an ecclesiastical 'demonstration' with an international resonance. The immediate future will show whether anything on these lines has occurred. We would like to believe at this very moment, however, that neither Pimen nor German wanted anything like that."

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